Vanessa Lam

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order dismissing his motion to set aside final family law orders and requiring him to obtain leave before bringing further motions until outstanding costs were paid.

He also sought to appeal a $20,000 costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant misread the leave order and failed to identify any errors by the motion judge.

The Court awarded the respondent $10,000 in costs on a substantial indemnity basis due to the appellant's improper conduct, and directed that the costs order is enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office as a support order.

This appeal concerns the determination of spousal support in a 14-year marriage between two high-income earners.

The appellant, a financial advisor earning over $2 million annually, challenged the trial judge's order requiring him to pay $20,000 monthly spousal support for 9.5 years to the respondent, a respirologist earning an imputed income of $550,000 annually.

The appellant argued the respondent had no entitlement to spousal support due to her high income and lack of economic disadvantage.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding the respondent had both compensatory and non-compensatory entitlements to spousal support based on her role in supporting the appellant's career advancement during the marriage, despite her own professional income.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated January 23, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded all-inclusive costs of $2,200 to the responding party.

The appellant father brought an urgent motion to stay an interim order permitting the respondent mother to relocate with their two young children to Winnipeg.

The motion judge had released a 'bottom-line decision' with reasons to follow.

The Divisional Court granted the stay, finding that the lack of reasons and vague terms of the order raised a serious issue for appeal, and that the children would suffer irreparable harm to their relationship with their father if they moved before the appeal was determined.

The balance of convenience favoured maintaining the status quo pending the motion for leave to appeal.

The appellant father appealed a motion judge's order regarding retroactive and ongoing child support and section 7 expenses.

He argued the motion judge erred by refusing to hear his cross-motion for table support, finding one child was not a dependent while taking part-time virtual courses, and awarding costs based on bad faith.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the dependency finding and upholding the motion judge's exercise of discretion regarding the cross-motion.

The court also denied leave to appeal costs, noting the bad faith finding was justified by the father's failure to disclose income increases.

The respondent father brought a motion to stay new orders issued by an Ontario Court of Justice judge pending appeal.

The motions judge had initially ordered the child to attend the father's preferred school, but later issued new orders changing the school to the mother's preference after realizing she had not considered all the evidence.

The motions judge also engaged in ex parte communications with the mother's counsel.

The Superior Court granted the stay, finding a strong likelihood of success on appeal due to jurisdictional errors, breach of natural justice, and reasonable apprehension of bias, and ordered the child to return to the father's preferred school pending the appeal.

The appellant appealed a decision finding that a prior order declaring the jurisdiction of the Ontario court was a final order, rather than a temporary one.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the parties had consented to the jurisdiction of the Ontario court for all purposes.

The appeal was dismissed, along with a motion to introduce fresh evidence, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant father appealed a final order requiring him to pay prospective and retroactive child support, arguing the motions judge erred in finding his income, providing inadequate reasons, and misapplying the tests for retroactive support and undue hardship.

The Divisional Court found no palpable and overriding error in the income determination and held the reasons were adequate.

While the motions judge conflated the 'undue hardship' test for prospective support with the 'hardship' factor for retroactive support, the Divisional Court applied the correct test and upheld the retroactive award due to the father's long history of underpayment and failure to disclose income.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant brought a motion for summary judgment in a family law application seeking sole custody, child support, and spousal support.

The respondent failed to file an answer or comply with disclosure orders, and the matter proceeded as an uncontested trial.

The court granted the applicant sole custody and the right to travel with the child without the respondent's consent.

The court imputed income to the respondent based on financial support from his parents and ordered him to pay retroactive and ongoing child support, retroactive spousal support, and $50,000 in costs.

The parties separated after a six-year marriage, leading to a highly contentious 25-day trial over custody, support, and a malicious prosecution claim.

The trial judge granted sole custody to the respondent mother, ordered child and spousal support, dismissed the appellant father's malicious prosecution claim, and awarded the respondent $254,500 in costs, with $10,000 designated as support enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office.

The appellant appealed the custody, support, and malicious prosecution decisions, arguing trial unfairness due to the exclusion of secretly recorded tapes and his retained experts.

The respondent cross-appealed the costs designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings, application of the malicious prosecution test, rejection of the appellant's undue hardship claim based on staggering legal fees, or discretionary apportionment of costs.

The appellant and respondent, former common-law partners, resolved their family law proceedings through mediation/arbitration.

The appellant subsequently issued a civil statement of claim against the respondent and her counsel, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation regarding child support and financial disclosure, and seeking damages.

The motion judge struck the statement of claim as frivolous, vexatious, an abuse of process, and barred by res judicata.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the civil action was an abuse of process attempting to circumvent the family law statutory scheme, an impermissible collateral attack on existing family court orders, and barred by cause of action estoppel and the appellant's prior consent to the settlements.

The appellant sought to appeal a judgment and a vesting order granted following an uncontested trial, which occurred after his statement of defence was struck for failure to comply with disclosure obligations.

The respondent moved to quash the appeal.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that an appellant must exhaust their remedies to change, vary, or set aside a default order in the court of first instance before an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal.

The moving party brought a motion to transfer an appeal of a Hague Convention application from the Court of Appeal to the Divisional Court.

The underlying application was heard in the Family Court branch of the Superior Court of Justice.

The moving party argued that under section 73 of the Children's Law Reform Act and section 21.9.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, the appeal properly lies to the Divisional Court.

The responding party argued that the appeal should remain in the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the moving party, finding that on a plain reading of the statutory provisions, the first appeal of an order under Part III of the CLRA made at a Family Court lies to the Divisional Court.

The motion was granted and the appeal was transferred.