David M. Paciocco

The appellants, contractors who supplied services and materials to an insolvent developer, appealed a motion judge's decision determining the quantum of their priority payables claim under s. 78(2) of the Construction Act.

The motion judge held that the deficiency in the holdbacks should be calculated as ten percent of the unpaid invoices, rather than ten percent of all invoices rendered.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that where there are no subcontractor lien claims at the time of the priority dispute, and a payer has fully paid invoices from a contractor, there is no deficiency in the holdbacks related to those fully paid services or materials.

Calculating the holdback based on all invoices would result in double recovery for the contractor and unfairly prejudice the building mortgagee and other creditors.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence for assaulting, threatening, and stealing from his live-in girlfriend, arguing the trial judge erred by imposing restrictive probationary terms that deviated from a joint submission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly notified counsel of his intention to depart from the joint submission because the proposed terms did not sufficiently protect the public, given the appellant's history of domestic violence.

The court also rejected the argument that the trial judge improperly assumed facts about a prior fatal car crash involving the appellant's former partner.

This was a sentence appeal concerning an agreed error in the calculation of pre-sentence custody credit.

The parties agreed that the appellant was entitled to 101 additional days of pre-sentence custody, amounting to 152 days after applying 1.5 to 1 credit.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal sentence, allowed the appeal, and reduced the sentence accordingly.

Given that only 18 days remained to be served after the correction, the court stayed the balance of the custodial sentence in the absence of any public interest in requiring re-surrender.

The appellant, convicted by a jury as a party to a commercial robbery for acting as the getaway driver, challenged both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal held that the circumstantial evidence, including cellphone searches, call activity, her links to the robbers before and after the offence, and her role in transporting the robbers and stolen property, reasonably supported the inference that she knew in advance that a robbery involving violence or threats would occur.

The court also held that although Crown counsel's reconstructed dialogue in closing submissions was improper and should not be used, the tactic did not render the trial unfair in light of the qualifications given, the evidentiary foundation for the inferences, and the trial judge's corrective instruction.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed because no error in principle or factual error was shown and there was no basis to interfere with the custodial sentence.

Appeal from summary judgment in a life insurance coverage dispute arising after the insurer denied a beneficiary's claim based on an alleged change in insurability between the insured's application and delivery of the policy.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 180(1)(c) of the Insurance Act creates a condition precedent to contract formation and is not subject to the two-year contestability limitation in s. 184(2).

The court rejected both the argument that s. 180(1)(c) operates only prospectively and the argument that the policy's incontestability clause ousted the statutory requirement.

The appeal was allowed, the summary judgment set aside, and the parties were left to determine how to litigate the insurability issue.

The appellant challenged an Ontario Review Board disposition continuing his detention under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code after an NCR finding.

He argued that the Board gave insufficient reasons on significant threat and failed to use its inquisitorial powers to test defence counsel's concession that he continued to pose a significant threat to public safety.

The Court of Appeal held that the reasons were sufficient when read in light of the hospital report, the treating psychiatrist's evidence, and the uncontested record showing a link between substance use, psychiatric decompensation, and risk of criminal offending.

The court further held that the Board was not required to make additional inquiries where the position advanced was supported by evidence and had been independently considered by the Board.

The appeal was dismissed.

Criminal appeal from convictions for fentanyl trafficking, possession of property obtained by crime, and firearms offences arising from a street arrest after police surveillance.

The appellant argued that police breached the duty to hold off questioning at arrest and during a later station interview, and that the resulting evidence should have been excluded under ss. 10(b) and 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal held that the arrest-scene questioning issue was not a live issue at trial, no additional s. 10(b) breach occurred before the interview, and the trial judge’s Grant analysis attracted deference.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction arising from historical allegations involving a complainant who was under 14 during the charge period.

He argued that the trial judge failed to resolve material inconsistencies between the complainant and another Crown witness, improperly treated inconsistent evidence as confirmatory, misstated the application of the W.(D.) rule to exculpatory Crown evidence, and failed to explain the impact of frailties in one allegation on the complainant's overall reliability.

The court held that the alleged inconsistencies were either not borne out by the record or concerned immaterial details, and that the shared details between independent witnesses could properly reinforce the accepted account.

Although the trial judge described the W.(D.) rule too narrowly, the reasons showed that exculpatory Crown evidence was in fact used to generate doubt on one incident.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged a second degree murder conviction arising from a targeted fatal stabbing proved primarily by circumstantial identification evidence, including surveillance video, shoe DNA evidence, clothing evidence, vehicle evidence, and recognition evidence from a recanting witness.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did misapprehend the defence position by stating that all parties agreed the appellant was not the driver of the van, but found the misapprehension immaterial because the conviction rested on affirmative circumstantial evidence identifying the appellant as the stabber.

The court rejected arguments based on Villaroman, insufficient reasons, and unreasonable verdict doctrine, holding that the proposed innocent inferences were speculative and that the reasons, read functionally in context, clearly rejected the blood-transference theory.

The court also upheld the limited reliance placed on the recanting witness's recognition evidence after proper Vetrovec and Hudson analysis.

The appellant challenged convictions for possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking arising from drugs found during an inventory search of a vehicle he was occupying.

Applying the circumstantial-evidence framework for constructive possession, the court held the trial judge erred by treating guilt as a reasonable inference rather than the only reasonable inference available on the whole of the evidence.

The evidence was equally consistent with sole possession by the co-occupant, particularly because the drugs were concealed in a backpack linked by DNA to that person and there was no evidence of the appellant handling the backpack or participating in trafficking activity.

The convictions were therefore unreasonable and were set aside, with an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed a decision finding that an assignment of an agreement of purchase and sale was null and void.

The assignment was subject to a true condition precedent requiring vendor approval.

The motion judge found that the vendor insisted on unreasonable terms for its approval, which constituted a 'deal breaker', and that the respondents' subsequent attempt to negotiate an abatement was not an anticipatory breach.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusions, and affirmed that the failure of the condition precedent rendered the agreement null and void, entitling the respondents to the return of their deposit.

The appellant appealed an order staying the proceedings below.

The motion judge had found an abuse of process based on the appellant's failure to immediately disclose settlement agreements, relying on the Handley Estate doctrine.

However, this doctrine was overruled by the Court of Appeal in 1086289 Ontario Inc. (Urban Electrical Contractors) v. Welland (City), 2026 ONCA 352, after the motion judge's order.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge's decision was based on an unduly rigid inquiry that did not consider actual prejudice, as is now required.

The appeal was allowed, the stay was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the motion judge for re-determination under the current law.

The appellant appealed her convictions for assault, assault with a weapon, uttering threats, and obstruction of justice, as well as her 14-month sentence.

She argued the trial judge misapplied the W.(D.) framework regarding her alibi evidence and failed to consider Gladue factors on sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that while the trial judge misstated the second branch of the W.(D.) test, the error had no impact because the trial judge completely rejected the appellant's exculpatory evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge appropriately considered the appellant's difficult upbringing despite being unable to formally substantiate her Indigenous ancestry for Gladue purposes.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court of Justice decision that dismissed an appeal from a child protection order made in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the appeal judge's conclusions regarding the inapplicability of the federal Conflict of Interest Act, the absence of a reasonable apprehension of judicial bias, and the delay in releasing the initial decision.

The Court of Appeal declined to entertain arguments or fresh evidence relating to the merits of the initial decision, as those issues were not pursued before the appeal judge.

The appeal and fresh evidence application were dismissed.

The appellant bank appealed an order dismissing its motion regarding the character of a debt.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the motion judge's order was not a final order because it did not resolve the substantive dispute between the parties, leaving the issue open to be pursued before the Bankruptcy Court.

The respondent suffered injuries after slipping and falling on ice in a parking lot while reaching for his vehicle's door handle.

He received statutory accident benefits (SABs) after a LAT adjudicator found the incident was an 'accident' under the SABs Schedule.

He subsequently sued the parking lot owner and winter maintenance provider for occupiers' liability.

The appellants moved to determine whether any damages awarded must be reduced by the SABs received under s. 267.8 of the Insurance Act, and whether OHIP's subrogated claim was barred under s. 30(5) of the Health Insurance Act.

The motion judge found the tort claim did not arise directly or indirectly from the use or operation of an automobile, meaning the statutory deductions and subrogation bars did not apply.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's substantive approach or her conclusion that the context and purpose of the LAT proceeding differed from the tort action, precluding abuse of process or issue estoppel.

The Crown appealed a verdict finding the respondent not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder for first-degree murder and other offences.

The respondent had killed his brother-in-law and assaulted his mother and sister while experiencing command delusions.

The Crown argued the trial judge misapplied the legal test for expert evidence and failed to properly assess the respondent's capacity to know his actions were morally wrong.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly weighed the expert evidence and correctly concluded the respondent's major mental illness rendered him incapable of appreciating the moral wrongfulness of his actions.

The appellant was convicted of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking after police found drugs in the trunk of a vehicle he had rented and was driving.

On appeal, he argued the verdict was unreasonable because the evidence was circumstantial and did not conclusively tie him to the drugs, and that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the absence of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's control over the rental vehicle and the location of the drugs supported a reasonable inference of constructive possession.

The Court also held that the jury charge, read as a whole, adequately instructed the jury on reasonable doubt and circumstantial evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against children, which arose from guilty pleas.

He argued the pleas were involuntary due to pressure after his trial counsel was released and his adjournment request was denied, leaving him to face self-representation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant failed to overcome the strong presumption that guilty pleas made in open court are voluntary.

The court held that emotional pressure and fear of self-representation did not impair his ability to make a conscious volitional choice.

The appellant retained the respondent to provide strategic advice for a hostile takeover of a competitor.

The contract included a success fee payable upon the appellant gaining control of the target's management.

After an initial meeting requisition strategy failed, the appellant pursued a consensual purchase transaction without the respondent's involvement.

The trial judge found the contract was goal-focused and awarded the success fee and management fee to the respondent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found no extricable errors of law or palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's interpretation of the contract.

The appeal was dismissed.