Margarida M. Pacheco

The mother brought a motion under Rule 25(19) of the Family Law Rules to set aside a final trial order that placed the subject child in the father's custody.

The mother had previously appealed the trial decision unsuccessfully to the Superior Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the mother's allegations of factual errors were not the types of mistakes contemplated by Rule 25(19) and were properly the subject of an appeal.

The court held that attempting to relitigate the trial decision through this motion constituted an abuse of process.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court of Justice decision that dismissed an appeal from a child protection order made in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the appeal judge's conclusions regarding the inapplicability of the federal Conflict of Interest Act, the absence of a reasonable apprehension of judicial bias, and the delay in releasing the initial decision.

The Court of Appeal declined to entertain arguments or fresh evidence relating to the merits of the initial decision, as those issues were not pursued before the appeal judge.

The appeal and fresh evidence application were dismissed.

In an ongoing child protection proceeding, the court issued an endorsement expressing profound frustration with the criminal justice system's handling of a mother's release conditions.

The mother, who pled guilty to failing to provide the necessaries of life, was subject to release terms that restricted her to supervised access with her children, without an exception for family court orders.

Despite the society and the children's lawyers supporting a transition to unsupervised access to facilitate reunification, the Crown refused to consent to a bail variation.

The court highlighted that such restrictive release conditions effectively nullify the family court's jurisdiction to make decisions in the children's best interests, causing unintended and severe emotional harm to the children involved.

The self-represented appellant brought a motion within an appeal of a publication ban order, seeking a court order to compel the Toronto Police Service to investigate the Children's Aid Society of Toronto, the Office of the Children's Lawyer, and other individuals for alleged child trafficking and fraud.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that police do not owe a private or public duty to investigate criminal complaints and their discretion cannot be fettered by a court order of mandamus.

This four-day trial concerned a child protection application brought by the Children's Aid Society of Toronto regarding the child A.E. The Society sought a protection finding and an order placing the child in the care of the paternal grandparents under a supervision order, with access to the father at the agency's discretion.

The father sought the child's return.

The court found the child in need of protection due to the father's mental health, impulsive and risky behavior, and exposure to domestic violence.

The court ordered the child's placement with the paternal grandparents under a 12-month supervision order, with no access to either parent, and issued a restraining order against the father due to his non-compliance with previous orders and chaotic, hostile conduct during the trial.

A motion to change an existing access order for a mother's contact with her five-year-old child during a status review application.

The mother sought unsupervised access twice weekly, including overnight visits.

The maternal grandfather, who had custody of the child, opposed the motion and sought to restrict access to virtual contact due to COVID-19 concerns.

The court found that the mother had made significant gains since the original order, that the existing order was no longer in the child's best interests, and that unsupervised in-person access should be restored with specified terms and conditions.

The court rejected the maternal grandfather's concerns as lacking reliable evidentiary foundation and found that the pandemic alone did not justify suspending in-person contact where appropriate safety protocols were in place.

Two children who were Crown wards brought motions for temporary openness orders to maintain contact with their biological mother following their placement for adoption with their maternal grandmother and her partner.

The mother also brought applications for openness orders.

The court dismissed the children's motions for temporary openness orders, finding that while the children desired contact with their mother, such contact was not in their best interests given the mother's demonstrated inability to support the adoption placement, her undermining behaviour toward the adoptive family, and the destabilizing effect visits had on the children's emotional well-being and school behaviour.

The court emphasized that openness orders must prioritize the security and stability of the child in the adoptive home.

This is a costs decision following a three-day family law trial.

The court granted the respondent (mother) sole custody of two children and made a no-access order against the applicant (father).

The father was ordered to pay child support of $345 per month based on minimum wage income.

The mother sought full recovery costs of $29,153.45, while the father argued for no costs due to divided success on the support issues.

The court found the mother was the successful party on the dominant issue (access) and awarded costs in her favour, but reduced the amount significantly to account for the father's limited financial means and the reasonableness of his decision to proceed to trial on the access issue.

The father applied for access to his two children, whom he had not seen since 2009 following domestic violence charges.

The mother opposed access and sought sole custody, citing a history of severe physical and emotional abuse, controlling behaviour, and the children's fear of the father.

A psychological assessment indicated the older child exhibited anxiety and fear towards the father, while the younger child had no memory of him.

The court found the mother's evidence credible and the father's evidence evasive and lacking insight.

Applying the best interests of the child test under the Children's Law Reform Act, the court granted the mother sole custody and denied the father access, concluding that the children's need for safety and stability outweighed the benefits of contact with the father.

A family law trial concerning custody and access of two children following a separation marked by domestic violence allegations.

The father sought supervised access followed by unsupervised access to his children, whom he had not seen since June 2009.

The mother opposed any access and sought sole custody, the ability to obtain government documentation for the children, and permission to travel outside Canada with them without the father's consent.

The court found the father had engaged in a pattern of abuse, control, and violence against the mother and children.

The court granted the mother sole custody and made a no-access order, finding that the children's safety, stability, and security outweighed any benefit of contact with the father.

The court also granted the mother's requests regarding documentation and travel.

In this child protection case under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act, the Children's Aid Society sought a finding that two young children were in need of protection and a disposition order for crown wardship without access.

The respondent parents had engaged in domestic violence, substance abuse, and neglect.

The court found the children were in need of protection but rejected the society's crown wardship plan.

Instead, the court placed the children in the joint care and custody of the maternal grandmother and maternal aunt under a supervision order, with limited supervised access to the parents.

The court rejected placement with the father due to his criminal history, lack of insight into risk factors, and ongoing credibility issues.

This is an evidentiary ruling in a child protection trial concerning the admissibility of a letter from the Children's Aid Society of Sudbury and Manitoulin summarizing historical involvement with the respondent father and his parents.

The applicant society sought to admit the letter under section 50(1)(b) of the Child and Family Services Act to establish the paternal grandmother's historical inability to protect children.

The respondent father opposed admission, arguing the letter contained multiple hearsay, unidentified sources, and opinion evidence without proper foundation.

The court denied admission, finding that threshold reliability had not been met and that the letter was not an appropriate vehicle for introducing historical evidence as a substitute for sworn testimony subject to cross-examination.