David M. Paciocco

The appellant appealed a 12-month sentence imposed for aggravated assault.

The appellant and victim, both in their mid-30s, engaged in a consensual fight with long-standing animosity between them.

During the altercation, the appellant struck the victim multiple times with a beer bottle, causing serious injuries to the victim's left hand requiring surgery.

The sentencing judge found the assault was not unprovoked and that the appellant caused all injuries.

The appellant had a difficult background with post-traumatic stress disorder and mental health issues, but the trial judge found these did not contribute to the offence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's approach and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and his sentence of six months' imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no basis to set aside the trial judge's credibility findings.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, finding that the sentence failed to reflect the appellant's peripheral role in the offence given the amount of marijuana involved.

The sentence was reduced to time served, with all ancillary orders remaining in place.

The appellant brought a motion to reinstate his appeal from conviction and to seek an extension of time to seek leave to appeal his sentence.

The appellant's former counsel had filed a Notice of Abandonment of the appeal based on instructions allegedly from the appellant's brother, not the appellant himself.

The Crown did not oppose the motion.

The court found that the appellant intended to pursue his appeal and was unaware that a separate notice was required for leave to appeal sentence.

The conviction appeal was reinstated to include leave to appeal sentence, and the matter was adjourned for further proceedings.

The appellant appealed a sentence of two years imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice following guilty pleas to several counts including robbery.

The original joint submission between Crown and defence was for 18 months, but defence counsel requested the sentencing judge impose two years to enable the appellant to access addiction assistance in a penitentiary.

The Crown consented to this request.

However, the appellant was not placed in a penitentiary but rather remained in a detention facility awaiting trial on another matter.

The Crown subsequently sought to have the original 18-month joint submission imposed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and substituted an 18-month sentence, while increasing the probation period to two years to further rehabilitation goals.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and designated a dangerous offender with an indeterminate sentence.

He appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the evidence of sexual assault of an unconscious, highly intoxicated complainant was overwhelming.

On the sentence appeal, the court confirmed that the trial judge's findings satisfied the requirements of intractability and high likelihood of harmful recidivism established in R. v. Boutilier.

The court rejected arguments regarding misapprehension of prior criminal record, consideration of unproven allegations, and failure to consider Gladue factors and alternative measures.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference with a person under the age of 14 years.

The victim alleged that the appellant touched her vagina while she was sleeping on a mattress in the appellant's living room.

The appellant denied the allegations, and his son testified in support of his father.

On appeal, duty counsel raised grounds challenging the trial judge's assessment of credibility and reliability, and alleging that the trial judge mischaracterized evidence and reversed the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly considered both credibility and reliability, fairly characterized the evidence, and was entitled to make the credibility findings as made.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing her claims against Minto Group Inc. (her penthouse landlord) and Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP (her lawyers).

The appellant had been defrauded by a man she met online who misrepresented his age, wealth, and background.

She sought damages from various parties, alleging they failed to protect her from the fraudster.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding that the appellant's claims against both Minto and Faskens lacked merit.

Against Minto, the court found no genuine issue requiring trial on claims for intrusion upon seclusion, breach of contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, or infliction of mental distress.

Against Faskens, the court found that the lawyer had no obligation to conduct background investigations on the appellant's fiancé absent explicit instructions, and that the scope of the retainer did not include such duties.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences under the Criminal Code and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act in respect of fraudulent refugee applications totalling 170 applications.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of 45 months' imprisonment less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed both his convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the conviction appeal, noting that the evidence overwhelmingly supported the trial judge's findings and that the trial judge properly evaluated witness credibility and the appellant's unworthy evidence.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding that the sentence was appropriate given the serious aggravating factors including the number of fraudulent applications, multiple breaches of trust, and the appellant's motives of financial gain and community standing.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault following a judge-alone trial.

The complainant testified that the appellant overpowered her, pinned her on a bed, and touched her sexually without consent.

The appellant provided a contradictory account, claiming the complainant initiated sexual contact and that he ended it after thinking of his girlfriend.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on acceptance of the complainant's evidence, supported by corroborating evidence including a torn bra, a mark on the complainant's neck, and text messages.

The appellant raised five grounds of appeal challenging the trial judge's credibility findings and evidentiary rulings.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no legal error or overriding error of fact in the trial judge's decision.

The appellant tenant sued the respondent commercial landlord for damages arising from roof leaks and a non-functioning gas line.

The landlord obtained summary judgment dismissing the action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by failing to resolve material factual disputes regarding when the tenant's obligation to insure commenced and whether the premises were insurable.

The motion judge also committed extricable errors of law in interpreting the 'as is' provisions of the lease by conflating 'Premises' and 'Building' and ignoring a relevant schedule.

The appeal was allowed and the summary judgment set aside.

An appellant found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder in 2000 for assault and uttering threats appealed his disposition of detention in a general forensic unit with community living privileges at the discretion of the hospital.

The appellant argued the Board's finding that he continues to pose a significant threat to public safety was unreasonable and sought a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's majority decision, finding the disposition reasonable based on the appellant's persistent pattern of threatening behaviour, impulsivity, inability to control anger, and the structured environment's role in preventing escalation to physical violence.

The appellant appealed an order of Forestell J. concerning the jurisdiction of a trial judge to issue a bench warrant to compel the personal attendance of the accused in summary conviction proceedings.

The appellant filed a motion seeking to compel the attendance of three individuals to provide testimony regarding whether the appellant appeared in court on September 15, 2017.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion as the evidence sought had no relevance to the issue on appeal, which concerned the trial judge's jurisdiction to issue the bench warrant.

The court ordered the appellant to perfect her appeal by August 31, 2018, with no extensions permitted, and warned that failure to do so would result in dismissal of the appeal without further notice.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that declared the respondents had a right of way "in, over, and upon" a portion of the appellant's property, including the right to maintain drainage infrastructure (a catch basin and lateral pipe).

The appellant, who was self-represented at trial, argued the trial judge erred by failing to provide adequate assistance and by improperly interpreting the scope of the easement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding no procedural unfairness and that the drainage infrastructure constituted an ancillary right reasonably necessary to the use and enjoyment of the right of way.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder under s. 231(5)(b) of the Criminal Code on the theory that he intentionally killed the victim while committing sexual assault.

The appellant argued that first degree murder under s. 231(5)(b) requires physical domination of the victim and that a sexual assault arising from fraudulently obtained consent does not satisfy this requirement.

The appellant also challenged the Crown's cross-examination as improper and prejudicial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that domination is not a distinct element of s. 231(5)(b), that sexual assault by its nature involves unlawful domination, and that any improprieties in cross-examination were adequately remedied by the trial judge's jury instructions.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a Provincial Offences Appeal Court decision dismissing his appeal from a conviction for speeding.

The applicant was charged with speeding on Highway 2 in the Region of Durham, clocked at 107 km/h in a 70 km/h zone.

He was convicted at trial and again at a retrial after his first conviction was overturned due to a misapplication of the rule in R. v. W.(D.).

The motion judge granted leave to appeal on three grounds: (1) misapplication of the W.(D.) rule by the Justice of the Peace; (2) improper restriction of cross-examination regarding prior inconsistent testimony; and (3) failure to provide adequate assistance to a self-represented accused.

A motion judge approved a receiver's sale of a partially constructed property (Birchmount Property) for $3.45 million, free and clear of all mortgages.

The third mortgagee, World Finance Corporation, sought to appeal, claiming an appeal as of right under section 193(b) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, or alternatively, leave to appeal under section 193(e).

The Court of Appeal held that section 193(b) did not apply because the order pertained only to one bankruptcy proceeding, not multiple similar cases within the same proceeding.

Leave to appeal was also denied because the proposed appeal lacked prima facie merit, did not raise an issue of general importance, and would unduly hinder the bankruptcy proceedings.

The sale was approved to proceed.

The Ontario Media Development Corporation (OMDC) denied Pong Marketing and Promotions Inc.'s application for a digital media tax credit on the grounds that its sweepstakes games were developed primarily to promote the sale of phone cards rather than to educate, inform, or entertain users.

The Divisional Court majority found the OMDC's decision unreasonable, holding that "primary purpose" must be assessed from the user's perspective rather than the developer's motivation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the OMDC's appeal, finding that the OMDC's interpretation was reasonable and that the Divisional Court erred in applying a residual presumption in favour of the taxpayer.

Application for bail pending appeal from convictions for bribery, attempt to obstruct justice, criminal breach of trust, and trafficking cocaine, with a sentence of 13 years' imprisonment less 6 months' credit.

The applicant sought to establish that his appeal was not frivolous, that he would surrender himself into custody, and that his detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The court found that while the applicant's grounds of appeal were not frivolous and he would likely surrender himself, his detention was necessary in the public interest given the gravity of the offences, the aggravated circumstances of their commission, and the weakness of the grounds of appeal.

The application was dismissed and the appeal was expedited.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against the Ontario Review Board's disposition dated November 16, 2017.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder in 2012 for criminal harassment and failure to comply with a recognizance.

The Board found the appellant remained a significant risk to public safety due to his psychotic disorder, active substance use disorder, lack of prosocial behaviour and motivation, and continued use of marijuana despite clinical advice against it.

The Board imposed a conditional discharge with detention order provisions.

The appellant appealed, arguing the Board erred in finding he constituted a significant threat and failed to provide adequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding it reasonable and supported by unanimous opinion of the treatment team.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference against his 15-year-old cousin.

The Crown relied on the complainant's pregnancy as corroborating evidence of the assault.

The application judge dismissed the appellant's section 276 application seeking to cross-examine the complainant about other sexual activity that could account for her pregnancy.

The trial judge, who took over after the application judge became unable to continue, held that he was bound by the application judge's ruling.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred in refusing the cross-examination and that the trial judge erred in holding himself bound by the prior ruling.

The court ordered a new trial.