David M. Paciocco

An employee of a daycare facility operated by the appellant municipality sustained a workplace injury from a slip and fall on a wet floor.

The municipality leased the daycare space from the respondent school board.

The school board was sued and brought a third party claim against the municipality, seeking a declaration that the municipality must defend and indemnify it under the terms of their commercial lease.

The motion judge ordered the municipality to defend and indemnify the school board.

On appeal, the municipality challenged the interpretation of the lease provisions governing insurance obligations and indemnification.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the municipality's obligation to maintain comprehensive general liability insurance constituted an assumption of the relevant risk of loss, and that the lease provisions, read together, clearly allocated the risk to the municipality.

A motion to set aside orders of a chambers judge denying leave to appeal.

The core issue was whether an appeal from a decision denying leave to sue a court-appointed receiver is governed by the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) or the Courts of Justice Act (CJA).

The receiver was appointed under both statutes.

The applicant argued that since the leave to sue provision could be grounded in provincial law under the CJA, the appeal should follow the CJA route, which permits appeals as of right within 30 days.

The respondent argued that the BIA governs because the receivership proceedings are BIA proceedings and the appeal provisions are in operational conflict.

The court held that the BIA governs the appeal route because the leave to sue provision is authorized by the BIA through necessary implication of section 243(1), and federal paramountcy applies to the conflicting appeal provisions.

The appellant was convicted of attempted aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault (twice), assault with a weapon, threatening death, assault causing bodily harm, and assault.

He knew he was HIV-positive but did not disclose this status to the complainant, a vulnerable victim whom he brutally assaulted on multiple occasions, including putting a drill to her head while threatening to kill her.

The trial judge imposed a nine-year sentence.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence, primarily challenging the denial of his Rowbotham applications for state-funded counsel.

The trial judge had instead expanded the role of an amicus curiae to assist the appellant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and sentence, finding that the trial judge properly exercised discretion in refusing the Rowbotham order based on the appellant's history of unreasonably discharging counsel, and that the expanded amicus role ensured trial fairness without constituting a miscarriage of justice.

This is a supplementary decision addressing outstanding issues following the Court of Appeal's partial allowance of both the defendant's and plaintiff's appeals in a personal injury case.

The respondent, a minor, suffered serious injuries when pushed onto a roadway by the appellant, also a minor.

The case involved complex issues regarding statutory accident benefits deductions, prejudgment interest rates, and costs awards.

The court addressed whether the defendant should pay costs of the plaintiff's statutory accident benefits recovery, the appropriate prejudgment interest rate, costs of the trial, costs of the appeal, and the deductibility of management fees and out-of-pocket expenses.

An appellant who was found not criminally responsible appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition continuing his detention in a forensic hospital.

The appellant sought a conditional discharge but the primary issue was whether the Board should exercise its inquisitorial powers to investigate alternative community residential arrangements.

The Court of Appeal found that while a conditional discharge was not available due to the appellant's significant risk to public safety, the Board had erred in failing to properly exercise its inquisitorial duties to break the residential impasse.

The Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new hearing.

The appellant was convicted after a judge-alone trial of possession of cocaine and crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and breach of probation.

He appealed his convictions on grounds of Charter delay under s. 11(b), arguing the trial judge erred in applying the law of reasonable doubt, and contending his conviction for drug possession was inconsistent with his acquittal on firearm possession charges.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence of two years less a day plus three years probation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the Crown's sentence appeal, finding the delay was reasonable in the transitional post-Jordan context, the convictions were supported by evidence, and the sentence, though lenient, was not demonstrably unfit given the appellant's secondary role in the drug enterprise and rehabilitative efforts.

The appellant was convicted of obstructing justice under s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code for fleeing Canada to avoid testifying as a Crown witness under a subpoena.

Although the subpoena was issued improperly by the Registrar of the Superior Court of Justice, the trial judge held that it had to be obeyed unless set aside.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the invalidity of the subpoena meant the actus reus of the offence was not proven.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the rule against collateral attacks applied and the appellant's evasion of the subpoena had a tendency to obstruct justice regardless of its validity.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code.

The complainant was heavily intoxicated and could not recall the events.

The trial judge found the complainant incapable of consenting due to intoxication and rejected the appellant's defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, finding he had not taken reasonable steps to determine consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the law despite some evidentiary misapprehensions that did not affect the verdict.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing his application for certiorari to quash decisions by two Justices of the Peace who refused to issue process on private informations for fraud under $5,000.

The appellant had previously commenced a civil action against the same individuals, which was dismissed and settled.

The Justices of the Peace declined to issue process on various grounds, including lack of prima facie case, expiration of limitation periods, and absence of reasonable prospect of conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no jurisdictional error by either Justice of the Peace and noting that the Crown would have been duty-bound to withdraw any charges issued.

The appellant signed an agreement for purchase and sale of real property as a buyer "in trust for a company to be incorporated without any personal liabilities" and provided a $100,000 deposit.

When the appellant advised the vendor that he would not close the transaction, the vendor refused to return the deposit.

The motion judge granted summary judgment in favour of the vendor, finding that the deposit was forfeited.

The appellant appealed, arguing that section 21(4) of the Business Corporations Act, which exempts pre-incorporation contract signatories from personal liability, should also exempt them from forfeiture of the deposit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a deposit stands as security for performance of the contract and is distinct from the purchaser's contractual obligations.

The court found that the phrase "without any personal liabilities" did not extend to the deposit, as the contract contained no express provision to that effect, and such a contrary intention must be expressly stated.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of a third party claim arising from a tug-of-war injury.

The plaintiff was severely injured during a recreational tug-of-war at a campground when his arm became caught in a loop in the rope, resulting in amputation of his forearm.

The appellants sought contribution and indemnity from the third parties who participated in the game.

The motion judge dismissed the third party claim, finding that the third parties owed no duty of care to the plaintiff.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, holding that the third parties did not fall within any of the circumstances that would impose a positive duty to act, and that the injury was not a reasonably foreseeable result of participation in a recreational tug-of-war game.

The appellant appealed her conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

She raised three grounds of appeal: (1) a Sekhon error regarding inadmissible expert evidence, (2) reversal of the onus of proof regarding personal use, and (3) an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that while the Crown expert offered some inadmissible anecdotal information, the expert's ultimate opinion was well-grounded in objective facts and the trial judge did not rely on the inadmissible evidence.

The court also found no reversal of the onus of proof, as the trial judge's conclusion was supported by the amount of cocaine, its value, and its form (pressed chunk rather than powder).

The verdict was reasonable based on ample evidence supporting the inference that possession was for trafficking purposes.

The appellant appealed his conviction for theft from mail contrary to s. 356(3) of the Criminal Code.

Both the Crown and the appellant agreed that the guilty plea was uninformed because the appellant was not aware of the immigration consequences of a conviction for that offence.

The parties agreed that had the appellant been fully informed, he would have pled guilty to the lesser included offence of theft under $5,000 contrary to s. 334(b) of the Criminal Code.

On consent, the appeal was dismissed, the conviction for theft from mail was set aside, and a conviction for theft under $5,000 was substituted.

The sentence remained unchanged and had already been served.

The appellants appealed an order of the motion judge declaring them to be vexatious litigants under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellants argued that the motion judge erred in counting 20 motions since a prior order, when the actual number was seven.

The Court of Appeal found this was not a palpable and overriding error and upheld the vexatious litigant designation based on clear evidentiary support, including findings from prior judges.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant, a company that purchased land in Kingsville, Ontario, gave a promissory note for $171,000 to Ronald Colasanti in exchange for an assignment of a water allocation.

When the appellant refused to pay, claiming the promissory note was void for failure of consideration, the trustees of Colasanti's estate brought an action in debt.

The trial judge found valid consideration existed and awarded judgment.

On appeal, the appellant renewed its argument that the water allocation never belonged to Colasanti and therefore could not constitute valid consideration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant obtained an immediate resolution of its water supply problem and a building permit, which constituted valid consideration regardless of the legal status of the water allocation itself.

The appellant appealed a divorce order granted by a pretrial conference judge on the ground of mental cruelty.

The parties had been married on January 6, 2018, never cohabitated, and both sought a divorce based on allegations of mental cruelty against the other.

The pretrial conference judge granted the divorce based on the respondent's application, creating the impression that the divorce was granted due to the appellant's cruelty.

The Court of Appeal found that the judge erred in granting a divorce on the ground of mental cruelty without agreement between the parties that one had inflicted mental cruelty on the other.

Cross-allegations do not constitute agreement.

The court set aside the divorce order and remitted the matter for retrial, noting that the parties would become eligible for a no-fault divorce one year from the separation date.

An appeal concerning the division of proceeds from the sale of a family residence held as joint tenants by parties in a common law relationship.

The appellant contributed $5,000 to the purchase price while the respondent contributed $116,000.

The trial judge found that the appellant failed to rebut the presumption of resulting trust and that there was no unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no basis to interfere with the findings regarding the presumption of resulting trust and the unjust enrichment analysis.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of three overlapping actions brought under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The actions arose from a family dispute concerning the appellant's exclusion from his grandfather's will and alleged undue influence and fraudulent conduct by family members and lawyers.

The motion judge dismissed the actions as frivolous and vexatious.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the motion judge failed to make explicit findings that the proceedings were frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process; (2) the harassment and defamation claims were supported by the pleadings; and (3) the motion judge failed to explain why the statements of claim could not be amended.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three grounds of appeal and upheld the dismissals.

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Las Vegas, Nevada in 2005.

The dispute concerns her entitlement to benefits under the OPCF 44R Endorsement in her Ontario motor vehicle insurance policy.

At a June 30, 2016 pre-trial, both counsel agreed that Ontario law applies and signed a Rule 50.08(3) certificate confirming this.

Subsequently, the respondents' counsel learned of the Chomos decision, which held that threshold and collateral benefits questions are governed by the law of the place where the accident occurred.

At a second pre-trial on January 25, 2018, the respondents' counsel sought to withdraw the choice of law agreement.

The motion judge dismissed the appellant's cross-motion for a declaration that Ontario law applies and declared that Nevada law will apply.

The appellant appealed, arguing the parties had reached a binding litigation agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no binding agreement existed and that the respondents' counsel had made an inadvertent admission based on a misunderstanding of the law.

Appellants sought a declaration that section 14 of the Health Insurance Act, which prohibits OHIP-eligible Ontario residents from purchasing private health insurance for OHIP-covered services, violated their Charter rights under section 7.

The appellants' OHIP coverage had been cancelled for failure to prove Ontario residency, and they claimed private insurers refused to sell them insurance citing section 14.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the appellants were not affected by section 14 itself but rather by an alleged misinterpretation of it by private insurers.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, holding that the appellants failed to demonstrate that section 14 of the HIA, rather than a misinterpretation by non-parties, was affecting them.