Bradley W. Miller

The appellant was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking arising from a reverse sting operation conducted by the RCMP in August 1997.

The appellant was initially acquitted in 2000, but the Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

At the retrial in 2014, the appellant sought a stay of proceedings based on abuse of process, alleging that the lead investigator deliberately misled his superiors and withheld disclosure.

The trial judge rejected these allegations and convicted the appellant.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence, and dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the 10 years 10 months imprisonment and delayed parole eligibility were fit.

The appellant purchased a commercial property that was contaminated by hydrocarbons that had migrated from an adjacent former gas station property.

The respondents moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, arguing that the appellant knew or ought to have known of the contamination more than two years before commencing the action.

The motion judge granted the motion, finding that the appellant had knowledge of the claim by March 9, 2012, or alternatively by March 30, 2012.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors by equating the appellant's suspicion of contamination with actual knowledge of contamination, and by failing to consider the relevant circumstances of the multi-property transaction and the waiver of conditions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The trial judge had found that police surveillance officers observed a co-accused placing a bag in the appellant's vehicle trunk, which the trial judge relied upon to conclude the appellant was acting in a joint venture to traffic cocaine.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had misapprehended the evidence regarding this key fact.

This misapprehension was material to the conviction and, standing alone, required a new trial.

The court rejected the appellant's alternative submission that the verdict was unreasonable.

The court also addressed a procedural issue regarding a conspiracy charge that had been withdrawn but upon which the trial judge had rendered findings of guilt and imposed a concurrent sentence.

An appeal from a Superior Court of Justice order was dismissed on consent of both parties.

The appellant, 144673 Ontario Limited carrying on business as Whiskey A Gogo, and the respondent, the Estate of Freddie Romanoski, agreed to the dismissal of the appeal with costs awarded to the respondent.

Appeal from conviction for robbery, use of an imitation firearm while attempting to commit robbery, obstructing police, and breach of recognizance.

The appellant challenged his convictions for robbery and use of an imitation firearm, arguing that the evidence showed only presence and passive acquiescence in a carjacking.

The trial judge found the appellant was the third perpetrator who entered the victim's vehicle during an armed carjacking.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that the appellant's conduct in getting into the stolen vehicle, fleeing with the other perpetrators, and the constellation of circumstantial evidence (including cell phone records, similar clothing, and after-the-fact conduct) supported a finding of party liability under section 21 of the Criminal Code.

The applicants sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from arrest to the anticipated end of trial was approximately 79 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown conceded the delay but argued that significant portions were attributable to defence waiver or conduct, and that exceptional circumstances, including case complexity and transitional considerations, justified the remaining delay.

The court found that defence delay (waiver and conduct) accounted for 1017 days for Jun-Chul Chung and 938 days for Kathleen Chung.

Additionally, 347 days of delay were attributed to case complexity (voluminous disclosure, multiple co-accused, interpreter requirements, and time for submissions).

Considering these factors and the transitional exceptional circumstances for pre-Jordan cases, including the seriousness of the offences and institutional delay, the court concluded that the delay was justified.

The applications for a stay of proceedings were dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to set aside a default order that required the sale of the matrimonial home and a $400,000 equalization payment to the respondent.

The appellant argued the default order was temporary, not final, and alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the order was in substance a final determination of equalization entitlement and that the appellant's failure to provide timely instructions undermined his ineffective assistance claim.

The appellant appealed his convictions and 20-month sentence for possession and distribution of child pornography.

He argued the trial judge failed to properly apply the W.(D.) test to his defence of innocent possession, misapprehended evidence regarding deleted files, and provided insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the law and relied on compelling evidence of knowledge, including the sophisticated organization of the files.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 20-month term was within the appropriate range and the trial judge made no errors in assessing aggravating factors.

The appellants purchased a swine farm from the respondent but suffered a loss when they could not secure a supply of pigs due to adverse market conditions.

They appealed the trial judge's dismissal of their claim for damages, arguing breach of good faith, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract because the barn was empty on closing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants had waived a condition regarding the supply of pigs and thereby assumed the risk of market changes.

The court also found no negligent misrepresentation due to an entire agreement clause and the appellants' direct discussions with the supplier, and concluded the contract did not require pigs to be in the barn on closing.

The appellant clinic and respondent chiropractor had a business arrangement that broke down over a fee-splitting dispute.

The respondent abruptly left the clinic, leading to claims and counterclaims.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the respondent for loss of income.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by granting summary judgment in the face of conflicting evidence without explaining how the conflict was resolved or deploying the fact-finding powers under Rule 20.04.

The judgment was set aside and the parties were left to pursue their claims.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against two young children who attended his home daycare.

The trial judge had admitted the children's unsworn statements under the principled exception to the hearsay rule and rejected the appellant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred by relying on defence counsel's trial tactics to impugn the appellant's credibility and by finding the necessity criterion for hearsay met without expert evidence of psychological trauma or a proper voir dire on the children's ability to recollect.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and assault with a weapon following a road rage incident.

On appeal, he argued his s. 10(b) Charter rights were breached when police failed to provide a second opportunity to consult counsel after informing him of the additional assault charge.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the new charge significantly increased his jeopardy and moral blameworthiness.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the appellant's police statement under s. 24(2), allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed an order retroactively reducing the respondent's child and spousal support obligations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the respondent's job loss and subsequent re-employment at a lower salary constituted a material change in circumstances.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the motion judge erred by retroactively varying support without conducting the proper legal analysis under the D.B.S. framework.

The matter was remitted to the motion judge to determine whether retroactive change is warranted, the date of retroactivity, and the quantum of support.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for a declaration that a laneway on his property was private and not a public highway.

The municipality asserted the laneway was built on an existing public road to which it held title.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's assessment of the survey and historical evidence, which established that the road had been dedicated and accepted as a public highway.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions related to a drive-by shooting, arguing that the trial judge's factual findings were unreasonable.

Specifically, he challenged the findings that the stolen vehicle apprehended in a church parking lot was the same vehicle involved in the shooting, and that he was in the vehicle during the incident, citing differing evidence on the number of occupants and insufficient fingerprint and saliva evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge reasonably relied on a constellation of direct and circumstantial evidence to support his conclusions and eliminate alternative inferences.

The appellant's personal injury action was administratively dismissed for delay.

An order was obtained setting aside the dismissal on terms, but the appellant failed to take the required procedural steps or have the order entered.

Years later, the appellant moved to vary the terms of the order.

The motion judge dismissed the motion and stayed the action, finding extreme, unexplained delay and inferred prejudice to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the Reid factors or his conclusion that the delay was unexplained and prejudicial.

The appellants were convicted of kidnapping, extortion, and assault following a home invasion involving sexual assault and confinement.

They appealed their respective sentences of 13 and 12 years' imprisonment, arguing the trial judge failed to consider mitigating factors and the parity principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the sentences fit given the heinous nature of the crimes and the trial judge's proper application of sentencing principles, including denunciation and deterrence.

The respondent successfully brought an application to enforce payment of $263,600 on a promissory note.

The appellant appealed, arguing the application judge erred by refusing to consider the broader factual matrix, including a side-agreement that allegedly converted the demand note into one payable from future profits.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the matter involved material facts in dispute regarding the interpretation of the broader transaction and could not be resolved by application under Rule 14.05(3).

The judgment was set aside and the matter directed to proceed as a trial of an action.

The appellant appealed a judgment declaring valid a continuing power of attorney for property executed by his father in favour of the respondent, and the dismissal of a motion to consolidate the respondent's application with pending proceedings.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred by treating the respondent's application as separate from the pending proceedings, which involved the same parties and raised identical issues of undue influence and suspicious circumstances.

The appeal was allowed, the application judge's decision was set aside, and the application was converted to an action and consolidated with the pending proceedings.

The appellant brought an application under Rule 14 for a mandatory order enforcing an undertaking to pay money related to construction bonds.

The application judge dismissed the application on procedural grounds, finding it was not properly brought under Rule 14.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the application was properly founded under subrules (d), (g), and (h) as there were no material facts in dispute and the interpretation of the contract was conceded.

The matter was remitted to the application judge for a decision on the merits.