Bradley W. Miller

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine into Canada.

She appealed on the sole ground that the trial judge erred in refusing to give a good character instruction to the jury.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge properly treated evidence of the appellant's background and absence of criminal record as relevant to the central issue of knowledge, and that a separate character evidence instruction was unnecessary, redundant, and potentially confusing given the specific nature of the case.

The appellant, a physician, appealed a trial judgment awarding damages for wrongful termination of employment to the respondent, a nurse who had worked in his medical office for 22 years.

The trial judge found that the appellant terminated the respondent's employment at a meeting on June 20, 2012, based on credibility findings that favored the respondent's account of events.

The appellant argued the trial judge's credibility findings were unreasonable and failed to consider the context of the respondent's resistance to converting office records to electronic format.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding no overriding and palpable error in the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility.

The court also found no reversible error in the trial judge's determination of reasonable notice period under the Bardal factors.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $15,000, all inclusive, with a correction to the pre-judgment interest rate from 3 percent to 1.3 percent to be recalculated by the parties.

The appellant was convicted of possession of child pornography and making child pornography available following a trial by judge and jury.

The conviction on the first count was stayed under R. v. Kienapple.

The appellant was sentenced to 21 months in jail plus three years' probation on the second count.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his conviction on the making available count on two grounds: first, that the trial judge failed to adequately rectify the Crown's violation of the rule in Browne v. Dunn regarding cross-examination of a defence witness; and second, that the trial judge's W.(D.) instruction was improperly limited to the appellant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds and upheld the conviction.

The appellants failed to appear for the hearing of their appeal scheduled before the Court of Appeal for Ontario, despite the case being held down until 11:25 a.m.

The appellants had previously requested an adjournment which was refused.

The appeal was dismissed as abandoned, and costs were fixed in favour of the respondent.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict finding him negligent in a motor vehicle collision.

The collision occurred when a vehicle travelling eastbound was struck from behind, causing it to spin, flip, and cross into the westbound lane where the appellant's vehicle collided with it.

The respondents had settled their claim against the driver of the first vehicle and had settled damages with the appellant, leaving only the issue of negligence for the jury.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: that the jury held him to a standard of perfection, that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the "range of vision" standard, and that the trial judge failed to adequately address improper closing submissions by respondents' counsel that appealed to sympathy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the jury verdict.

The appellant appealed from the dismissal of her application for an interest in the increase in equity of a home owned by the respondent during their six-year common law relationship.

The appellant claimed unjust enrichment based on contributions to living expenses, home maintenance and repairs, and a $5,000 lump sum payment toward the mortgage.

The application judge found no joint family venture and held that the shared expense arrangement provided a juristic reason for retaining the $5,000 payment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the proprietary claim but allowed the appeal regarding the $5,000 payment, finding the application judge erred in characterizing it as part of the shared expense arrangement and ordering its return with interest.

The appellant was convicted of five counts of robbery with a firearm and five counts of theft over $5,000 following a trial by judge alone.

Following conviction, the defence advanced a not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCR) plea.

Two forensic psychiatrists testified with conflicting opinions on whether the appellant knew his actions were morally wrong at the time of the offences, with their opinions based on the appellant's self-reports during interviews.

The trial judge assigned no weight to the experts' opinions because they were based on hearsay statements and the appellant had not testified.

The trial judge dismissed the NCR application.

Subsequently, defence counsel informed the trial judge that counsel had agreed before the hearing that the appellant's self-reports could be relied upon for their truth without the appellant testifying.

The trial judge declined to reopen, holding she lacked jurisdiction to do so after rendering a verdict.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in concluding she had no jurisdiction to reopen and erred in failing to engage in proper analysis of the conflicting expert evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of crack cocaine for the purposes of trafficking and his sentence of 18 months imprisonment.

The conviction appeal challenged whether police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and search the appellant.

The trial judge found such grounds existed based on police observations of the appellant's vehicle making three stops at different locations within 15 minutes, with interactions at each location involving known drug users.

The sentence appeal challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence provision under the Controlled Drugs and Substance Act.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and dangerous driving.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's s. 24(2) Charter analysis regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained following a police take-down.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Grant factors.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal on the basis that the trial judge failed to adequately consider the appellant's exceptional physical condition and the disproportionate impact of incarceration on him.

The sentence was varied to make the dangerous driving sentence concurrent rather than consecutive to the firearm sentence.

The appellant was convicted of assault, possession of a weapon (a knife), aggravated assault, and breach of probation following an incident with her then-boyfriend.

She was sentenced to two years' imprisonment on the aggravated assault conviction and 30 days concurrent for breach of probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's rejection of her self-defence claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly considered and rejected the self-defence argument on the merits based on the evidence she accepted.

The appellant failed to demonstrate any palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings or inferences.

An appeal of an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering that a person found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder remain on the secure forensic unit of a hospital.

The appellant sought an absolute or conditional discharge.

The Board found the appellant posed a significant risk to public safety based on his lack of insight into his mental illness, likelihood of non-compliance with medication, and psychological testing indicating high risk of psychotic relapse and violent behaviour.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's disposition as reasonable and dismissed the appeal.

The Crown appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that had set aside a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court Judge had found that the respondent raised a doubt regarding the reliability of the breath-testing instrument based on a low calibration check.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that the Summary Conviction Appeal Court Judge erred by failing to apply the proper standard of appellate review and by substituting his own view of the evidence for that of the trial judge.

The Court restored the conviction and sentence.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a costs order made by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal reviewed additional material filed by counsel at the court's request and determined that the appellant's submissions did not raise an issue on which leave to appeal the costs order should be granted.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a former senior advisor to the Prime Minister on a charge of influence peddling contrary to section 121(1)(d) of the Criminal Code.

The respondent had negotiated a contract providing commissions to his girlfriend on sales of water treatment systems to First Nations communities, with the understanding that he would use his government contacts to promote the company.

The trial judge acquitted the respondent, finding that there was no "matter of business relating to the government" because First Nations communities had autonomy in purchasing decisions and INAC was not involved in approving such purchases.

The Court of Appeal was divided: the majority allowed the appeal and entered a conviction, interpreting "any matter of business relating to the government" broadly to include the respondent's exercise of influence on government officials regarding the sale of products to First Nations.

The dissent would have dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the trial judge's interpretation and reasoning.

The appellant appealed his conviction for multiple sexual offences against his step-sister, who was significantly younger.

The trial judge found the appellant had been in a position of trust and had exploited the complainant's vulnerability.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: (1) apprehension of bias based on the trial judge's interventions during trial, and (2) misapprehension of evidence.

The Court of Appeal rejected both grounds, finding the trial judge's interventions were appropriate and did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, and that there was no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings of fact.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted after a 21-day jury trial of 32 charges including sexual assault, assault with a weapon, and assault causing bodily harm.

The convictions arose from a pattern of domestic abuse spanning over 10 years, including facilitation of sexual assault by strangers and assaults with various weapons.

The appellant appealed on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel and multiple errors in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no merit to the claims of ineffective assistance or errors in the charge to the jury.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its unjust enrichment claim against the respondents on the basis that the action was commenced outside the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion judge found that the appellant knew or ought to have known of all material facts giving rise to the claim by January 2012, when the respondent admitted under cross-examination that Silverwood had supplied flooring for the M5V Project.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the respondent's testimony that profits were less than the management fee removed the possibility of damage from the appellant's mind, and that the appellant only discovered the actual damage when the respondent later admitted in 2015 that the project had made at least $200,000 in profit.

The action commenced in September 2015 was therefore within the limitation period.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for sexual interference with an 11-year-old child.

The respondent, then 25 years old, had befriended the victim, engaged in grooming behaviour via text and telephone, and subsequently raped her.

The trial judge sentenced him to 30 months' imprisonment with 15 months credit for presentence custody.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by failing to give proper effect to the principles of deterrence and denunciation, by failing to recognize that the respondent had sought out a young girl, and by failing to consider the significant impact of the offence on the victim as a separate aggravating circumstance.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and increased the sentence to 33 months' imprisonment (resulting in an effective sentence of 4 years after credit for presentence custody).

A police officer was convicted of sexually assaulting a complainant by performing searches of her while transporting her to a police station.

At trial, the trial judge admitted a prior consistent statement made by the complainant to a female officer at the police station, in which the complainant stated she had already been searched three times.

The summary conviction appeal judge quashed the conviction, finding the trial judge erred in admitting and relying on the prior consistent statement.

The Crown appealed to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the prior consistent statement was admissible under the narrative as circumstantial evidence exception to the rule against prior consistent statements, and that the trial judge properly used the statement to assess the complainant's credibility by considering the context, timing, and spontaneous nature of the complaint.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision dismissing his appeal of an assault conviction.

The appellant had been represented at trial by a law student from a legal aid clinic and argued on appeal that he received ineffective legal representation because his counsel failed to raise Charter issues regarding a strip search conducted after his arrest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the Summary Conviction Appeal Court Judge's determination regarding the reasonableness of the legal representation was a case-specific determination that did not extend beyond the four corners of the case and was not clearly wrong.

The other issues raised by the appellant also failed to meet the test for leave to appeal.