Bradley W. Miller

The appellant appealed his conviction for armed robbery and related offences, arguing that the trial judge failed to address a suggestion that a police officer may have condoned the complainant lying in his statement to police.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the suggestion was not the only interpretation of the evidence and that the trial judge properly addressed inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony.

The court also upheld the sentence of eight years less two years' credit for pre-sentence custody as fit, but granted leave to appeal sentence and varied it only to strike the victim fine surcharge in light of R. v. Boudreault.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention at the General Forensic Unit of the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.

The appellant had been found not criminally responsible for assault and robbery offences committed in 2013 near Sudbury.

He sought an absolute or conditional discharge, arguing he posed no significant risk of serious harm to the public.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision to be reasonable given concerns about the appellant's drug use triggering psychotic decompensation and his lack of community living experience.

However, the court expressed concern that the appellant's inability to abstain from drug use had become an insurmountable barrier to obtaining privileges and suggested the Board consider crafting a disposition to facilitate community living experience in future reviews.

The appellant was convicted of failing to provide the necessaries of life and assault against her 86-year-old mother.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty of failing to provide necessaries based on leaving her mother on the porch for approximately one hour in freezing temperatures on November 26, 2007.

The appellant was also convicted of assault based on a neighbour's evidence of witnessing the appellant push her mother out the front door.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, setting aside the conviction for failing to provide necessaries and entering an acquittal, and setting aside the assault conviction and ordering a new trial.

The plaintiff, Randy Brown, sued the defendants for damages after a slip and fall on ice at their property.

The matter proceeded as an undefended trial.

The court found the defendants liable for failing to maintain safe premises, despite prior warnings.

However, the plaintiff was found contributorily negligent due to his awareness of the hazard.

Damages for general injury, past and future loss of income, and future costs of care and housekeeping were assessed, with reductions for a pre-existing condition and contributory negligence.

OHIP's subrogated claim and the plaintiff's costs were also awarded.

The appellant appealed from an order under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act that prohibited him and any company he controlled from instituting or continuing any proceedings in any court except by leave of a Superior Court judge.

The appellant raised both substantive and procedural grounds of appeal, including claims that he was denied natural justice by not being allowed to give viva voce evidence, call witnesses, or convert the application into an action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural error and no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's factual conclusions or legal analysis.

The appellant, Grant Zilney, appealed convictions for an indecent act (December 19, 2016) and for an indecent act and criminal harassment (May 1, 2017), as well as the sentence for the latter and the finding that his right to a trial without delay was not breached.

The court dismissed the appeal regarding the December 19, 2016 conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of defence evidence or corroboration.

However, the court found a reasonable apprehension of bias in the trial judge's comments during sentencing that "guilt was obvious" regarding the May 1, 2017 convictions.

Consequently, a new trial was ordered for the indecent act and criminal harassment charges related to Mary Smith.

The appeal on the s. 11(b) Charter right to a trial without delay was dismissed, with the court affirming that judicial reserve time does not count towards the Jordan ceiling for unreasonable delay, as it constitutes an exceptional circumstance.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissal of her negligence action against a lawyer and his law firm.

The appellant alleged the respondent lawyer negligently counselled her to accept an improvident settlement of a motor vehicle accident tort claim and failed to report two other settlements to the Ontario Disability Support Program.

The motion judge found the settlement was not improvident but rather favourable to the appellant and in her best interests, and found no negligence in the failure to report the settlements to ODSP.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusions and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's dismissal of his action seeking a declaration of adverse possession over part of the respondents' property.

The appellant contended that the motion judge failed to consider evidence of his predecessor in title's mistaken understanding regarding the boundary location.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the predecessors had no intention to use the land to the exclusion of its true owner, based on the totality of evidence including the R-Plan filed in support of conversion to the Land Titles Act regime.

The court also rejected the appellant's assertion regarding an old fence creating a boundary, finding it unsupported by evidence.

The appellant signed an agreement for purchase and sale of real property as a buyer "in trust for a company to be incorporated without any personal liabilities" and provided a $100,000 deposit.

When the appellant advised the vendor that he would not close the transaction, the vendor refused to return the deposit.

The motion judge granted summary judgment in favour of the vendor, finding that the deposit was forfeited.

The appellant appealed, arguing that section 21(4) of the Business Corporations Act, which exempts pre-incorporation contract signatories from personal liability, should also exempt them from forfeiture of the deposit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a deposit stands as security for performance of the contract and is distinct from the purchaser's contractual obligations.

The court found that the phrase "without any personal liabilities" did not extend to the deposit, as the contract contained no express provision to that effect, and such a contrary intention must be expressly stated.

The appellant appealed a decision by the motion judge upholding a default payment of $60,000 in a settlement agreement, arguing it was unconscionable.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's thorough analysis and conclusion that the default payment was reasonable in the circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant was convicted by jury of attempting to knowingly participate in or contribute to the activities of Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group, and counselling an undercover police officer to do the same.

The trial judge imposed consecutive sentences of five years on each count, resulting in a total sentence of 9 years and 7.5 months with credit for presentence custody.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the conviction grounds and upholding the sentence as fit and appropriate for terrorist offences.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated April 26, 2018, continuing a conditional discharge for an NCR accused.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge, arguing the Board erred in finding she continues to pose a significant threat to public safety.

The Board's decision was based on the appellant's schizoaffective disorder, substance abuse disorder, history of violence, lack of insight into her mental illness, medication compliance issues, and actuarial risk assessment placing her at moderate-high risk.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's disposition fell within the range of reasonable outcomes supported by evidence.

The appellants appealed an order of the motion judge declaring them to be vexatious litigants under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellants argued that the motion judge erred in counting 20 motions since a prior order, when the actual number was seven.

The Court of Appeal found this was not a palpable and overriding error and upheld the vexatious litigant designation based on clear evidentiary support, including findings from prior judges.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed a divorce order granted by a pretrial conference judge on the ground of mental cruelty.

The parties had been married on January 6, 2018, never cohabitated, and both sought a divorce based on allegations of mental cruelty against the other.

The pretrial conference judge granted the divorce based on the respondent's application, creating the impression that the divorce was granted due to the appellant's cruelty.

The Court of Appeal found that the judge erred in granting a divorce on the ground of mental cruelty without agreement between the parties that one had inflicted mental cruelty on the other.

Cross-allegations do not constitute agreement.

The court set aside the divorce order and remitted the matter for retrial, noting that the parties would become eligible for a no-fault divorce one year from the separation date.

The appellant, a company that purchased land in Kingsville, Ontario, gave a promissory note for $171,000 to Ronald Colasanti in exchange for an assignment of a water allocation.

When the appellant refused to pay, claiming the promissory note was void for failure of consideration, the trustees of Colasanti's estate brought an action in debt.

The trial judge found valid consideration existed and awarded judgment.

On appeal, the appellant renewed its argument that the water allocation never belonged to Colasanti and therefore could not constitute valid consideration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant obtained an immediate resolution of its water supply problem and a building permit, which constituted valid consideration regardless of the legal status of the water allocation itself.

An appeal concerning the division of proceeds from the sale of a family residence held as joint tenants by parties in a common law relationship.

The appellant contributed $5,000 to the purchase price while the respondent contributed $116,000.

The trial judge found that the appellant failed to rebut the presumption of resulting trust and that there was no unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no basis to interfere with the findings regarding the presumption of resulting trust and the unjust enrichment analysis.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of three overlapping actions brought under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The actions arose from a family dispute concerning the appellant's exclusion from his grandfather's will and alleged undue influence and fraudulent conduct by family members and lawyers.

The motion judge dismissed the actions as frivolous and vexatious.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the motion judge failed to make explicit findings that the proceedings were frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process; (2) the harassment and defamation claims were supported by the pleadings; and (3) the motion judge failed to explain why the statements of claim could not be amended.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three grounds of appeal and upheld the dismissals.

The appellant was convicted of sexual and violent offences against a complainant aged 12-14 years over a two-year relationship while the appellant was aged 27-29.

The trial judge imposed an 8-year sentence.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's acceptance of the complainant's evidence despite inconsistencies and admitted lies, the authentication of photographic evidence, reliance on the parents' evidence, and rejection of the defence theory regarding motive to fabricate.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part only with respect to pre-trial custody credit, with the Court finding the sentence otherwise fit given the appellant's position of trust, the complainant's vulnerability, the age disparity, duration of abuse, and instances of violence.

A lawyer was convicted of three offences arising from conversations with an undercover police officer posing as a refugee claimant.

The Crown alleged the appellant counseled the undercover officer to provide false information to immigration authorities.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence, challenging the validity of the wiretap authorization on the basis of material omissions and misrepresentations in the affidavit.

The trial judge found two errors in the affidavit but concluded they would not have affected the issuance of the authorization.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge's analysis was correct and her credibility findings were entitled to deference.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as the circumstances warranted a significant jail term given the seriousness of the offences and the appellant's professional status.

The appellant insurance company appealed a summary judgment order that found the respondents (an adult son, his wife, and their daughter) were covered under the homeowner's policy of the named insured (their mother/mother-in-law) as relatives "living in the same household." The named insured owned a house that served as her primary residence until she entered a nursing home, after which the respondents used it as a cottage.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that "household" in insurance law refers to a type of community requiring intimacy, unity, and permanence, not merely physical residence.

The respondents maintained separate lives in the city and did not share a common life with the named insured meeting these requirements.