Stephen T. Goudge

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his counterclaim and the judgment against him regarding mortgage arrears.

He argued that he did not receive a demand letter, was entitled to notice under the Family Law Act, and that his counterclaim should not have been dismissed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was aware of the arrears, his existence was unknown when the action commenced, and the counterclaim disclosed no cause of action.

The appellants, a police officer and the Chief of Police, appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario finding that the officer discriminated against a Black mail carrier.

The officer stopped and questioned the mail carrier while on patrol in an affluent neighbourhood.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal reasonably applied the prima facie test for discrimination, correctly placed the onus on the complainant, and properly considered the unique statutory duties of police officers.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The parties agreed that the Review Board's decision had no current effect or consequence for the appellant, as it was effectively erased by a subsequent decision of Trotter J. The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for robbery.

He argued the trial judge erred in relying on similar fact evidence from two other convenience store robberies.

He also argued the trial judge erred in sentencing by failing to enhance pre-sentence credit for lack of earned remission, using probation breaches to infer resistance to rehabilitation, and imposing a consecutive sentence for breach of probation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's analysis of the signature features of the robberies or in the exercise of his sentencing discretion.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence.

Based on the joint position of the parties, the Court of Appeal set aside the conviction on count one and ordered a new trial.

The Crown conceded that the 18-month custodial sentence for the remaining convictions was unfit.

The Court substituted an 18-month conditional sentence, noting the appellant's employment, support for his mother, and compliance with bail conditions.

The Crown appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition that granted the respondent an absolute discharge.

The Crown argued the Board failed to properly assess the risk of psychological harm to the public, misapprehended evidence, and exceeded its jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision that the respondent was not a significant threat to the public was reasonable and supported by the record.

The appellants, former senior employees of the respondent software company, resigned without adequate notice to start a competing business.

They misappropriated confidential technical and business information, successfully targeting the respondent's clients.

The trial judge found them liable for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of confidence, and breach of contract, ordering them to disgorge 10 years of profits totaling over $12.3 million, plus full indemnity costs.

On appeal, the appellants challenged the 10-year accounting period, the finding of fiduciary duty for two employees, joint and several liability, and the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the 10-year period reasonable given the highly specialized nature of the software and the time required to develop it.

The respondent's cross-appeal for a permanent injunction was also dismissed.

The appellant, who acted as a pilot in a pre-existing scheme to import a very large quantity of cocaine and hashish, appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentence was justified by the need for deterrence and denunciation given the nature of the scheme and the amounts involved.

The court also held that the absence of evidence of extra monetary gain did not render the sentence an error in principle, as the sentence was imposed due to the extraordinary damage caused by the drugs.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision ordering a new trial for the accused, who had been convicted of driving with excess alcohol.

The appeal judge had found that the trial judge erred in interpreting 'forthwith' under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code as 'within a reasonable time' rather than 'immediately'.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that 'forthwith' requires a prompt demand and immediate response, but allows for a reasonably necessary delay to enable the officer to properly discharge their duty.

The 17-minute delay in this case was found to be reasonably necessary.

The respondent and the deceased held title to their matrimonial home as joint tenants.

They were in the process of separating and dividing their matrimonial assets when the deceased died.

The respondent claimed exclusive ownership of the home through the right of survivorship.

The deceased's estate trustees brought an application for a declaration that the estate was entitled to an undivided, one-half interest in the matrimonial home, arguing the joint tenancy had been severed by a course of dealing.

The application judge dismissed the application.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred by adopting a category-based approach to the course of dealing test.

The spouses' conduct, including negotiating an equal division of assets and opening separate bank accounts, demonstrated they were mutually treating their co-ownership as a tenancy in common.

The appellant commenced a proposed class action asserting a statutory cause of action under s. 130 of the Securities Act for misrepresentations in a prospectus.

The motion judge found the claim was barred by the limitation period in s. 138 of the Securities Act and was not saved by the suspension of limitation periods in s. 28 of the Class Proceedings Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that a prior class action appeal did not encompass the s. 130 claim, meaning the suspension of the limitation period ended when the time to appeal the dismissal of that specific claim expired.

The plaintiff commenced a proposed class action alleging secondary market misrepresentations by the defendants.

The statement of claim asserted common law causes of action and indicated an intention to seek leave to assert a statutory cause of action under section 138.3 of the Securities Act.

Facing a potential limitation issue, the plaintiff successfully moved for a declaration that the limitation period was suspended under section 28 of the Class Proceedings Act.

The defendants appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a statutory cause of action under section 138.3 is not 'asserted' within the meaning of section 28 until leave to proceed has been granted.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court (SCAC) decision that overturned the respondent's sexual assault conviction and ordered a new trial.

The SCAC found that the trial judge misapprehended the complainant's evidence regarding whether she consented to the initial sexual contact.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the SCAC, noting clear inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony about her initial consent that the trial judge failed to recognize when assessing her credibility.

Finding no error in the SCAC's decision, the Court of Appeal denied the Crown's application for leave to appeal.

The Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement following an appeal where the appellant lost on the primary issue of oppression but succeeded in obtaining a new trial on an unresolved breach of contract issue.

The court found that responsibility for the failure to litigate the contract issue was divided between the parties.

Given the unusual circumstances and divided success, the court concluded that a fair costs award was for each side to bear its own costs throughout the proceedings.

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction, arguing that the trial judge failed to expressly caution himself about the specific dangers of visual identification evidence, particularly that it was interracial, occurred under stress, and involved a weapon.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the experienced trial judge is presumed to know the law and had expressly cautioned himself on the generic risks of identification evidence.

The trial judge provided clear positive reasons for accepting the victim's identification, noting the victim had a clear, close-up look at the assailant and took great care during the photo line-up.

The appellant appealed an order recognizing a foreign default judgment, arguing that the English process denied him natural justice through the registration of the default judgment, refusal to set it aside, denial of an adjournment, and absence of reasons for a costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had ample opportunity to be heard had he complied with the English rules of court, and that the denial of an adjournment was an exercise of judicial discretion.

The court awarded costs to the respondent on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing its claim for breach of contract.

The appellant argued that a preliminary contract was formed when it submitted a proposal, or alternatively, that an oral contract was formed during a phone call.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual conclusions that a purchase order was required to form a contract and that the phone call did not constitute offer and acceptance.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for break and enter and breach of probation.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, misapplied the W.D. principle, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fingerprint evidence on the point of entry window was sufficient to support the conviction.

The consecutive sentence for breach of probation was also upheld given the appellant's lengthy related record.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that the finding of murder during forcible confinement under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code was unreasonable.

The appellant contended that the act of killing was not discrete from the act of confinement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that the appellant confined the victim by tying him up, beat him, and subsequently strangled him, taking advantage of the dominance gained through the confinement.

An employee of the appellant hospital defrauded his employer by causing it to issue cheques to a made-up entity for services never rendered.

The cheques were deposited by an accomplice at the respondent bank.

The hospital sued the bank for conversion.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the made-up entity was a 'non-existing person' under s. 20(5) of the Bills of Exchange Act, which allowed the bank to treat the cheques as payable to bearer and provided a complete defence to the conversion claim.