Sarah E. Pepall

This appeal arose from high-conflict divorce litigation, addressing three issues: the division of post-valuation date increase in the matrimonial home's value, the determination of parties' incomes for child support, and the s. 7 expense order.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in applying proprietary estoppel to divide the post-separation increase in the matrimonial home's value, as the respondent did not demonstrate detrimental reliance.

The appeal on income imputation and s. 7 expenses was dismissed, with clarification provided for the latter.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCR) for attempted murder and assault, appealed a DNA order granted by the trial judge under s. 487.051(3) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the test for imposing a DNA order on an NCR offender and did not err in granting the order based on stereotypical reasoning or speculation, as the conclusions were anchored in evidence.

The appellant, Norman Perry, appealed his conviction for assault with a weapon, arguing that the trial judge provided insufficient reasons for accepting the complainant's evidence and rejecting his own, especially given his acquittal on a related break and enter charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons were discernable in context, allowed for meaningful appellate review, and that the two verdicts were reconcilable.

The appellant, Robert Sowell, appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence for child luring, transmitting explicit material to a child, possessing child pornography, and failing to comply with a recognizance.

The sole ground of appeal was the sufficiency of the sentencing judge's reasons for rejecting a determinate sentence followed by a long-term supervision order in favour of an indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge's reasons, though brief, were sufficient and responsive to the key issue of the intractability of the appellant's risk and treatability in the community, particularly regarding his willingness and ability to take sex drive reducing medication.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Ian Reid, appealed his convictions for multiple firearm-related offences, alleging Charter ss. 7 and 9 violations and insufficient reasons from the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that the detention was not arbitrary, the police had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest based on confidential informant information, and the trial judge's reasons were sufficient.

The court also rejected the appellant's argument regarding the burden of proof on the Charter application and the trial judge's assessment of police credibility.

The appellant, Oslyn Lewis, appealed the dismissal of his action for a real estate commission, which was granted by a motion judge on summary judgment due to the expiry of the limitation period.

The appellant argued that the motion judge erred in finding no tolling agreement, in not allowing him to adduce evidence of psychological incapacity, and in applying the discovery rule.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's decision.

The court affirmed the strict test for tolling agreements, found the fresh evidence regarding incapacity insufficient and inconsistent with the appellant's prior actions, and distinguished the case from situations involving running accounts for limitation purposes.

The appellant's motion to adduce fresh evidence was also dismissed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment for a mortgage deficiency, arguing that the respondent (mortgagee) failed to take reasonable precautions to obtain the property’s true market value during power of sale proceedings, leading to an improvident realization.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge correctly applied the summary judgment test and that there was no evidence of the respondent failing to take reasonable precautions or of an improvident sale.

The court also rejected the appellants' arguments regarding inadequate evidence and the legal test for a mortgagee's duty, affirming that a mortgagor must show a higher price would have been obtained but for any alleged breach.

The respondent in an appeal sought to dismiss the appeal under Rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the appellant's conduct in related lower court custody proceedings, including removing children from the jurisdiction in defiance of court orders, constituted an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that while the appellant's conduct in the Superior Court was problematic, it did not amount to an abuse of process in the context of the appeal itself.

The court clarified that Rule 2.1 is not intended to address issues of non-compliance with lower court orders unless such conduct directly abuses the appellate process.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to amend their statement of claim to advance personal claims for damages and increase the prayer for relief, stemming from an explosion in an apartment building they previously owned through a numbered company.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's decision.

The court found the motion to amend was brought too late, would cause presumed non-compensable prejudice to the defendants by materially altering the factual framework and requiring new evidence, and that the proposed personal claims by shareholders lacked a proper legal foundation as they did not demonstrate a personal cause of action separate from the company's claims.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal in a child protection case.

The appellant, T.M., sought partial indemnity costs against the individual respondents (parents and aunt) and the Oneida Nation of the Thames.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario, guided by the Family Law Rules, declined to award costs against the individual respondents but found it appropriate to order costs against the Oneida Nation.

The court noted that the Oneida Nation's costs submissions contained unsworn, unproven, and disrespectful statements attacking the appellant's character, and that the appellant had to bring a contested motion for continued access pending appeal.

The court ordered the Oneida Nation to pay $10,000 in costs to the appellant.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment motion that found the appellants liable for knowing assistance and knowing receipt in a fraudulent scheme.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by drawing unwarranted inferences of liability based largely on the mere rejection of the appellants' evidence, rather than requiring positive proof.

The motion judge also made speculative and stereotypical findings regarding the appellants' credibility and financial arrangements.

The Court held that the rejection of a witness's evidence does not amount to positive proof of the opposite proposition.

The appeal was allowed, the summary judgment set aside, and the case remitted to the Superior Court for trial.

Following an appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement.

The appellants were ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal, fixed at $27,689.52 inclusive of HST on a partial indemnity scale.

The appellant insurer appealed a declaration that it owed the respondent builder a duty to defend under a commercial general liability policy.

The underlying action involved alleged deficiencies in construction and repairs of a boathouse and cottage.

The insurer argued the policy was occurrence-based and that the property damage was known prior to the policy period.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding that the pleadings raised the mere possibility that damage occurred during the policy period, thus triggering the duty to defend.

The appeal on costs was also dismissed, with the court reaffirming that an insurer breaching its duty to defend must pay full indemnity costs incurred by the insured to enforce that duty.

The respondents (plaintiffs below) moved to quash an appeal brought by the appellant (defendant below) from two interlocutory orders.

The appellant had appealed orders dismissing his motion to vary a summary judgment order and a subsequent motion to set aside an order granting leave for a writ of possession.

The Court of Appeal determined that the orders appealed from were interlocutory in nature, meaning jurisdiction for the appeal lay with the Divisional Court with leave, not the Court of Appeal.

Consequently, the motion to quash the appeal was granted.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario quashed an appeal brought by 9001522 Canada Limited, finding it lacked jurisdiction under s. 71(1) of the Construction Act.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to transfer the appeal to the Divisional Court, dismissing 9001522 Canada Limited's cross-motion for transfer.

Costs were awarded to East Elgin Concrete Forming Limited.

The appellant, a kin caregiver for a First Nations child, appealed an order dismissing a child protection proceeding and denying her motion to be added as a party.

The motion judge had dismissed the proceeding based on a customary care agreement signed by the biological parents, the child's aunt, the First Nation, and the Children's Aid Society, which excluded the appellant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellant met the statutory definition of a 'parent' under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act and was entitled to party status.

The Court further held that the proceeding could not be dismissed on consent without the appellant's participation and a proper analysis of the child's best interests.

The appellant, a former employee, appealed the striking out of her statement of claim without leave to amend.

Her claim sought further compensation for alleged racial discrimination, arguing that correspondence with the CEO constituted a binding agreement, despite having signed a full and final release upon dismissal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the conclusion that the letters did not form an enforceable contract and that the elements of promissory estoppel were not pleaded.

The court reiterated that claims with no reasonable chance of success should be struck.

The appellant, Julie Daly, appealed the dismissal of her claim for damages under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and other relief against the Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) and the Crown.

Her claim alleged improper treatment and bias by LTB members during several applications concerning her lease.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the LTB was not a suable entity and the Crown was not vicariously liable for the LTB's actions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, confirming that the LTB is not a suable entity and that the Crown is immune from vicarious liability for judicial acts of quasi-judicial board members acting in good faith under the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 and the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their anti-SLAPP motion, which sought to dismiss a defamation counterclaim brought by the respondent.

The motion judge found that the respondent had suffered sufficient harm and that the public interest in permitting the counterclaim to continue outweighed the public interest in protecting the appellants' expression, noting the strategic nature of the motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge made no reviewable errors in inferring harm from the serious allegations or in conducting the weighing exercise.

The court also upheld the motion judge's discretionary award of partial indemnity costs to the respondent.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of a youth charged with impaired driving causing death.

The trial judge had excluded evidence of the youth's statements to a paramedic, breath samples, and blood samples, finding multiple breaches of section 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the youth had a reasonable expectation of privacy during a medical assessment in an ambulance, and that the police officer's breath demand lacked subjective grounds.

The Court also agreed that the subsequent breath demand by a technician was tainted by the initial breach, and that the search warrant for hospital records was invalid.

The exclusion of evidence under section 24(2) was upheld due to the seriousness of the police misconduct.