Sarah E. Pepall

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed that a factual error occurred but found it immaterial.

The trial judge's finding that the appellant was a party to possession by consenting to the use of a secret compartment for a joint enterprise to traffic drugs was supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence for drug trafficking, arguing the trial judge erred by imposing a sentence beyond the settled range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle.

The Court held that the appellant's extensive criminal record, including five previous convictions for the same offences, and the total absence of mitigating factors justified a sentence beyond the usual range, as sentencing is an individualized process.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to set aside a Mareva injunction and receivership order.

They argued that because the underlying trial judgment was stayed pending appeal, only the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to grant such relief under Rule 63.03(1).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the injunction and receivership were granted in a separate, new action to preserve assets, and did not constitute steps to enforce the stayed trial judgment.

The appellant appealed an 18-month sentence for assaulting a police officer by spitting in the officer's face.

The Crown conceded that the appellant should have received credit for 134 days of pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal found the original sentence manifestly excessive, noting that while denunciation is required, a 12-month sentence adequately meets the needs of deterrence and denunciation.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to 365 days, less 134 days of pre-trial custody credit, resulting in a net sentence of 231 days.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for breach of fiduciary duty and dismissing his counterclaim.

The appellant argued he was not a fiduciary, that any such relationship had terminated, that the respondent had unclean hands, and that his counterclaim should have succeeded because no defence was filed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that a trust relationship existed and continued, that the unclean hands doctrine did not apply, and that the appellant still bore the burden of proving his counterclaim despite the lack of a defence.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to set aside a default judgment sounding in fraud and negligence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's application of the test for setting aside a default judgment.

Although the first two branches of the test may have been satisfied, the appellant failed to establish any arguable defence on the merits to either the fraud or negligence claims.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $2,000.

The applicant union sought judicial review of a Grievance Settlement Board decision which held that the Board could not award damages for workplace injuries compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act or the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act.

The grievances alleged that exposure to second-hand smoke violated the health and safety provisions of the collective agreement.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Board's decision, confirming that the historic trade-off barring civil actions for workplace injuries also applies to grievance arbitrations seeking damages for such injuries, unless clear and careful language in the collective agreement provides for supplementary benefits.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his action due to his failure to pay six outstanding costs orders totalling approximately $6,000.

At the hearing, the appellant requested an adjournment pending the resolution of other alleged proceedings, which the court denied due to lack of justification.

The appellant then declined to make oral submissions.

The Court of Appeal reviewed his written materials, found no error in the motion judge's decision, and dismissed the appeal, noting the lack of evidence supporting the appellant's claim of impecuniosity.

The appellant was discharged at a preliminary inquiry on several firearm offences due to insufficient evidence of constructive possession.

The Crown successfully applied for certiorari and mandamus, and the application judge quashed the discharge and committed the appellant for trial.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge did not err in her consideration of the evidence as a whole, and that any error in assessing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence was not jurisdictional and therefore not reviewable on certiorari.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's order staying proceedings against the respondent for impaired driving charges due to an alleged breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The delay primarily stemmed from the defence's successful motion to quash the initial information on the scheduled trial date, which required the Crown to relay the charges.

The Court of Appeal found that the delay resulting from the defence's tactical decision to bring the motion to quash should be attributed to the defence or considered neutral.

Consequently, the overall delay did not violate s. 11(b).

The stay was set aside and the matter remitted for trial.

The appellant challenged convictions for internet luring and related sexual offences arising from online communications and a subsequent sexual encounter with a child complainant, arguing that he honestly but mistakenly believed the complainant was 14 and had taken sufficient steps to ascertain age.

The court held that the statutory mistake-of-age defence under ss. 172.1(4) and 150.1(4) required an objective, contextual assessment of whether a reasonable person would have taken further steps, particularly in light of numerous red flags and the complainant's mother's explicit warning that the complainant was underage.

The court found that a single initial inquiry and later reliance on the complainant's online representations were insufficient.

The appellant's sentence appeal also failed because the sentencing judge had expressly treated the lengthy and strict bail conditions as mitigating, and the global sentence of 23 months' incarceration followed by probation was fit given the grooming conduct and possession of child pornography.

The appellant appealed his conviction and eight-year sentence for cocaine importation.

He argued that his s. 11(b) Charter rights were violated, that the Crown's cross-examination and closing address were improper, and that the trial judge erred in discharging a juror.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge's interventions cured any potential prejudice from the Crown's conduct and that the s. 11(b) delay was not unreasonable.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the eight-year sentence was within the appropriate range for a sophisticated courier.

The appellant, a 19-year-old first offender on bail, killed a police officer while fleeing arrest in a stolen vehicle.

He was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment and a 10-year driving prohibition.

On appeal, he argued the sentence was unfit and the sentencing judge erred in her findings of fact, admission of a video tribute, and application of sentencing principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding that the sentence, while at the high end of the range, was not demonstrably unfit given the paramountcy of denunciation and deterrence in these circumstances.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent.

The Court of Appeal held that a trial judge is entitled to rely on hearsay evidence to make findings of fact on sentence under s. 723(5) of the Criminal Code, even if the facts are disputed.

The Court declined to interfere with the trial judge's findings that the respondent was an addict who turned to crime to support his habit and was taking rehabilitative steps.

The appeal was dismissed as the sentence was not unfit.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a decision finding that provisions of the Expenditure Restraint Act limiting compensation increases for federal employees infringed the freedom of association guaranteed by s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the parties had already engaged in a meaningful process of collective bargaining before the Act was enacted.

The Court concluded that s. 2(d) guarantees a process, not a result, and the Act did not render the pursuit of collective goals effectively impossible.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment, arguing the trial judge failed to consider the impact of his despondent mental state on the proof of mens rea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the issue was not raised at trial and was negated by the appellant's own testimony.

The trial judge properly found all essential elements, including mens rea, established beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of its application for certiorari to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's decision to commit the accused for manslaughter rather than murder.

The accused was charged in the death of his severely disabled brother, who died from starvation and infected bedsores.

The Court of Appeal held that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by weighing the evidence and determining that gross negligence did not equate to the mens rea for murder, rather than assessing whether a jury could reasonably infer the requisite intent.

The appeal was allowed, and the accused was committed to stand trial for second-degree murder.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

Following a request for an early Board hearing, counsel advised that the appeal would not be pursued.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing his guilty plea was invalid due to a mental disorder and equivocation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge made the necessary inquiries to ensure the plea was informed and voluntary.

Fresh evidence, including medical records without expert interpretation, did not demonstrate the plea was involuntary or unequivocal.

The respondents contracted with the appellants to build a new home and with third parties for stucco finishing.

After experiencing water leaks, the respondents sued the appellants for negligence and breach of contract.

The appellants moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was barred by the two-year limitation period.

The motions judge dismissed the motion, finding the respondents did not have sufficient knowledge of which party was responsible until they received expert reports.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that certainty of a defendant's responsibility is not required to trigger the limitation period, and expert opinions are not always necessary.

The action was statute-barred.