Sarah E. Pepall

The Plaintiffs, representing Air Ontario pilots, brought a class action against the Defendants, representing Air Canada pilots, alleging unlawful act conspiracy, intentional interference with economic interests, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent misrepresentation.

The dispute arose from the failure to implement a merged pilot seniority list following an arbitration award by Michel Picher.

The court dismissed all claims, finding that the Defendants' conduct was not unlawful, there was no intention to injure, no fiduciary duty was owed to the Plaintiffs, and the representations made were not actionable.

Furthermore, the court found that the Plaintiffs suffered no damages as Air Canada would never have agreed to the merged seniority list.

The Township of Tiny appealed a decision of the Deputy Director of Titles under the Boundaries Act, which confirmed the westerly boundary of a beachfront cottage lot to be the water's edge of Lake Huron.

The Divisional Court found the Deputy Director's decision unreasonable, as it ignored the commercial reality of the original subdivision plan, which intended to reserve the beach for the use of back lot owners and the public.

The appeal was allowed, and the boundaries were confirmed as depicted on the original Plan of Subdivision, which set the boundary at a monumented straight line inland from the water's edge.

The appellant was stopped for speeding.

During the stop, an officer noticed a box in the vehicle and suspected it contained contraband cigarettes.

The officer asked the appellant about the box without advising him of his right to counsel.

A subsequent authorized search under the Tobacco Tax Act revealed unmarked cigarettes and marijuana.

The appellant was convicted of possession for the purpose of trafficking.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the appellant's s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated when the questioning shifted from the traffic stop to a regulatory investigation.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter and entered an acquittal.

The plaintiff was awarded $50,000 in damages by a jury following a motor vehicle accident, despite claiming over $1 million.

The trial judge initially set aside the verdict and awarded the plaintiff $196,695 in costs.

The Court of Appeal previously reinstated the jury verdict and remitted the costs issue.

The trial judge again awarded $196,695 in costs.

The defendants appealed the second costs order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge failed to properly apply the principle of proportionality, and reduced the costs award to $166,695.

The appellants appealed an order striking portions of their claim against Carleton University and several of its employees.

The motion judge had struck the Charter claims, finding the university was not implementing a specific government program when booking space for non-academic extra-curricular use, and struck the negligence claims against the individual employees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the university's actions did not attract Charter scrutiny under the Eldridge test, and that the pleadings failed to establish that the individual employees exhibited a separate identity or interest from the university to attract personal liability.

The appellant appealed his conviction and six-month sentence for assault causing bodily harm following a bar fight where he sucker-punched the complainant.

He argued the trial judge misapplied the standard of proof and erred in assessing credibility regarding his self-defence claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's core findings were supported by a sober, independent witness.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the six-month term fell within the appropriate range given the circumstances.

The appellant appealed a first degree murder conviction, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable because the Crown's case was entirely circumstantial and that police vetting of prospective jurors constituted an abuse of process.

The court applied the unreasonable verdict standard and held that the cumulative effect of the evidence of motive, opportunity, access, and post-offence conduct was capable of supporting findings of unlawful killing, murder, and planning and deliberation.

The court also held that police checks for criminal records and outstanding charges, without Crown involvement and without any resulting unfairness in jury selection, did not amount to a per se abuse of process.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a carriage order made by the Superior Court of Justice in a class proceeding.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the carriage order is an interlocutory order, meaning the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court noting that the proper route is to the Divisional Court by way of leave to appeal.

The appellant withdrew its appeal from the order of the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal ordered the appeal withdrawn with prejudice and without costs.

The moving party brought a motion to quash the appellant's appeal from a Superior Court order.

The Superior Court judge had dismissed the appellant's appeal of a master's order setting aside a noting in default.

The appellant argued the judge erred in referring the matter to a master and that the master's order was final.

The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, finding the referral was permitted under Rule 37.15(1.1) and the order remained interlocutory.

The motion was granted and the appeal was quashed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment ordering him to pay approximately $500,000 and deliver possession of his property to the respondent bank.

The bank had demanded payment on a secured line of credit after the Canada Revenue Agency registered a lien against the property without the bank's consent, which violated the loan contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's allegations of identity fraud did not alter the fact that the contract was breached by the CRA lien.

The court also upheld the dismissal of the appellant's counterclaim and the award of substantial indemnity costs.

The appellant appealed her convictions for six counts of fraud.

She argued that she could not be a principal to the offences because she only provided her banking information to a friend who deposited forged cheques.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that her actions of providing account information, accepting the money, and immediately withdrawing and distributing it amounted to an implicit misrepresentation to the banks.

The court also found that while the trial judge erred initially regarding hearsay, the error was cured when the appellant later testified about the conversations.

Finally, the court held that any error in drawing an adverse inference for failing to call witnesses was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving causing bodily harm, arguing the jury's guilty verdict was inconsistent with his acquittals on two 'over 80' charges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that impaired driving and driving 'over 80' are separate offences.

The court found there was abundant evidence of impairment, including prior drinking, erratic driving, and unusual behaviour, to support the conviction despite the acquittals on the blood alcohol charges.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for a robbery committed at an ATM, based on a diagnosis of schizophrenia.

On appeal, he sought to introduce fresh evidence showing that his treating psychiatrists had ruled out schizophrenia and that his symptoms were likely caused by a substance-induced psychosis.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding that the NCRMD verdict amounted to a miscarriage of justice since self-induced intoxication cannot support such a verdict.

The appeal was allowed, the NCRMD verdict was set aside, and a conviction for robbery was entered with a sentence of one day's imprisonment, given the seven years the appellant had already spent in custody.

The Crown appealed an order granting a stay of proceedings on charges of armed robbery due to a breach of the accused's right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

It took 52.5 months to bring the case to trial, with significant delay occurring in the provincial court.

The Crown argued the application judge erred in attributing defence counsel's dilatory conduct to the Crown's failure to be proactive.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the Crown is not responsible for defence counsel's failings, but ultimately dismissed the appeal because the delay was unconscionable and prejudice could be inferred.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision dismissing a grievance.

The grievance challenged the employer's practice of counting paid bereavement leave under the collective agreement towards the 10 days of unpaid personal emergency leave provided by section 50 of the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective agreement and the statute was reasonable and within a range of acceptable outcomes.

The appellants appealed convictions arising from a vicious, pre-meditated group assault intended to intimidate a victim from testifying at an upcoming murder trial, arguing that the trial judge failed to provide an adequate Vetrovec warning regarding an unsavoury key witness and misdirected the jury on confirmatory evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that the caution, framed consistently with standard jury instructions and reinforced by repeated references to the witness's frailties, was more than adequate in the context of the case as a whole.

It further held that the cited confirmatory evidence was capable of bolstering material aspects of the witness's account and was not misleading.

On sentence, the court found an error in the trial judge's statement that there were no mitigating factors, but concluded that denunciation and deterrence properly predominated and that the four-year global sentence remained fit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm-related offences, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence obtained during an illegal search of his apartment.

The police had executed a search warrant without reasonable and probable grounds.

The trial judge excluded drug-related evidence but admitted the firearms evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, applying the Grant framework.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the conclusion that the police did not act in bad faith and that there is a heightened public interest in the prosecution of firearms offences.

The appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and was sentenced to four years' imprisonment.

He appealed his conviction, seeking to introduce fresh evidence to argue his guilty plea was involuntary because a co-accused allegedly threatened to kill him if he did not plead guilty.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application to introduce fresh evidence and the appeal, finding the appellant's claims lacked credibility and were contradicted by the record, including his own letter of apology and the withdrawal of charges against the co-accused.

The employer applied for judicial review of an arbitrator's award that ordered it to repay funds to an employee.

The employee, a station collector, had erroneously credited customers' debit cards instead of debiting them, resulting in a shortage.

The arbitrator found the employee responsible for the shortage under the collective agreement but held the employer could not recover the funds because it failed to mitigate its loss.

The Divisional Court granted the application and quashed the award, finding the arbitrator's imposition of a duty to mitigate unreasonable in the context of a contractual debt and the collective agreement's clear language.