Sarah E. Pepall

The Association of Professional Geoscientists of Ontario appealed a Divisional Court decision that allowed the respondent's appeal from a decision of the Association's Council.

The Council had upheld a Registration Committee decision deferring the respondent's membership application until she completed four additional university courses, despite her holding a four-year Bachelor of Science degree.

The Divisional Court found the Association had no statutory authority to impose these additional requirements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Divisional Court applied the appropriate standard of review (reasonableness) and made no error in its analysis or conclusion.

The appellant leased a luxury vehicle from the respondent but returned it to a third-party dealership a few months later to purchase a different vehicle, claiming an oral agreement allowed him to do so.

The respondent sued for breach of the lease, claiming accelerated rent and damages for the loss on the sale of the vehicle.

The trial judge found the appellant liable, rejecting the argument that the dealership acted as the respondent's agent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding there was no evidence of agency, the accelerated rent clause was an enforceable liquidated damages provision, and the respondent had reasonably mitigated its damages.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial because the appellant had already obtained judgment for the full amount of its loss in a separate lawsuit and failed to establish damages against the respondents.

The appellants, auditors and underwriters of Sino-Forest Corporation, appealed an order declaring that their claims for contribution and indemnity against Sino-Forest were 'equity claims' under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA).

The claims arose from proposed shareholder class actions alleging misrepresentation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the definition of 'equity claim' in s. 2(1) of the CCAA focuses on the nature of the claim rather than the identity of the claimant.

The court found that the appellants' claims for contribution and indemnity were clearly connected to the shareholders' equity claims and thus fell within the expansive statutory definition.

The appellants were charged with trading in real estate as brokers without being registered.

The justice of the peace acquitted them, providing ambiguous reasons regarding whether they possessed the requisite mens rea or were acquitted based on perceived unfairness.

The summary conviction appeal judge reversed the acquittals and entered convictions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that both the justice of the peace and the appeal judge provided inadequate reasons that foreclosed meaningful appellate review on the mens rea component of the offences.

Two sets of plaintiffs commenced competing class proceedings against the defendants.

The motion judge granted carriage to the respondents and stayed the appellant's action.

The appellant appealed the carriage order to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because a carriage order is interlocutory, not final.

The stay of the unsuccessful plaintiff's action does not terminate their claim, as they may still opt out or participate in the certified class action.

Therefore, the appeal lies to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appellant appealed his indeterminate sentence as a dangerous offender, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to consider the long-term offender (LTO) option.

The appellant also introduced fresh evidence of a 2010 risk assessment showing rehabilitation progress.

The Court of Appeal applied the curative proviso and dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable possibility the trial judge would have imposed an LTO order in 1998 even with the fresh evidence.

The court noted that the appellant's progress should be assessed by the Parole Board, not through a new sentencing hearing.

The appellant physician was found guilty of professional misconduct involving sexual abuse of young boys.

He appealed the Discipline Committee's decision, arguing that the summons power under s. 76(1) of the Health Professions Procedural Code violated his s. 8 Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure, and that the College's delay in prosecuting the case amounted to an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the summons power is constitutional in the regulatory context as it is properly constrained by relevance and privilege.

The Court also found that the delay was not inordinate given the concurrent criminal proceedings, and the appellant did not suffer significant prejudice.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and attempted murder following a drug transaction where the victims were shot.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by denying an adjournment to retain new counsel, forcing him to self-represent, failing to put an alternative suspect theory to the jury, and leaving speculative evidence of planning and deliberation with the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion to deny the adjournment due to the appellant's manipulative delay tactics, and that the jury instructions on the alternative suspect and planning and deliberation were correct.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months' incarceration for domestic assault and a concurrent three months for breaching probation.

He argued the sentencing judge erred by rejecting a joint submission and failing to consider the 'jump' principle.

The Court of Appeal found it was not a joint submission case but agreed the sentencing judge erred by significantly exceeding the Crown's proposed sentence without giving counsel an opportunity to make submissions, and by failing to allow the appellant to speak before sentencing.

The Court varied the sentence to 12 months' imprisonment for the assault and three months concurrent for the breach, followed by three years' probation.

The appellant pled guilty to manslaughter after accidentally shooting his friend with a prohibited firearm while in a vehicle.

He was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge failed to properly apply s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code regarding his Aboriginal heritage and erred in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application of s. 718.2(e) given the mandatory minimum sentence, but the majority held the trial judge failed to give sufficient mitigating weight to the appellant's positive life steps.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence reduced to five years.

The appellant appealed from orders granting summary judgment and dismissing her claims against the Crown and Seneca College.

She alleged wrongful denial of student aid funding and an improperly assigned failing grade in a nursing course.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's findings that student aid was discretionary and restricted due to an unrefunded overpayment, and that the appellant failed the course despite numerous opportunities to rewrite the exam.

The appeal was dismissed, and fresh evidence was not admitted.

The appellant husband appealed an order declaring that each party had an equal interest in the former matrimonial home, which was located on an Indian reserve.

The appellant sought sole ownership and exclusive possession of the home.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Derrickson, the Court of Appeal held that provincial courts lack the authority to make orders concerning the possession, ownership, or disposition of property on a reserve governed by the Indian Act.

The appeal was allowed in part to vary the lower court's order, clarifying that the equal interest in the home was for equalization purposes only.

The appellant appealed his convictions for careless storage of a firearm and his sentence of 12 months' imprisonment and a five-year weapons prohibition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the marked departure standard of care.

The sentence appeal was allowed, as the trial judge erred in treating rehabilitative prospects as a neutral factor and failed to explain why consecutive sentences were justified.

The sentence was varied to time served and the prohibition order was reduced to two years.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order regarding child support and section 7 expenses under the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The appellant challenged the imputation of her income, the denial of nanny expenses, the treatment of university expenses, and the order allowing direct payment of section 7 expenses rather than through the Family Responsibility Office.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or significant misapprehension of evidence by the motion judge.

Two priority disputes arose between insurers regarding the payment of statutory accident benefits to independent contractors injured while operating commercial vehicles.

The contractors operated as sole proprietorships and were named insureds under their personal-use vehicle policies, but not under the commercial fleet policies.

The Court of Appeal held that under s. 66(1)(a) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, an insured vehicle can be made available for an individual's regular use by their own sole proprietorship.

Consequently, the contractors were deemed named insureds under the commercial fleet policies, making the commercial insurers responsible for paying the accident benefits.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of an application for a dangerous offender assessment order under s. 752.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, adopting the interpretation of 'serious personal injury offence' from R. v. Goforth.

The court found that some of the respondent's offences met the definition and ordered an assessment, remitting the matter to the trial judge.

The appellant, who acted as guardian of property for his mother, appealed a judgment dismissing his application to pass accounts and ordering him to repay misappropriated funds and unjustified legal expenses to the estate.

The application judge also deprived him of compensation due to his shocking conduct and blatant disregard of his fiduciary obligations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the majority of the application judge's findings, rejecting arguments of unfairness and insufficient reasons.

The appeal was allowed in part only to permit the estate to reimburse the appellant for a portion of legal fees if it successfully collects a specific costs award.

The appellant doctor sued the respondent hospital, producing emails during the litigation that the hospital suspected were fabricated.

After the action settled, the doctor applied for reappointment to the hospital's medical staff.

The hospital sought to use an affidavit obtained during the litigation, which questioned the emails' authenticity, at a Medical Advisory Committee meeting.

The application judge granted relief from the deemed undertaking rule under Rule 30.1.01(8) to permit this use.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the doctor's appeal, finding no error in the application judge's exercise of discretion, as the parties were the same and the interest of justice in denouncing potentially fabricated evidence outweighed any non-existent prejudice to the appellant.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible (NCR) eight years prior, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board detaining him at a maximum security facility.

He argued the Board erred by refusing to order his transfer to another psychiatric facility for an independent assessment, citing a change in his psychiatric diagnosis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board reasonably exercised its discretion in concluding that a transfer was not necessary for an appropriate disposition and that treatment and assessment could continue at his current facility.