Ruby Cicely Samantha Chapman

The appellant appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel, which upheld a Hearing Panel's decision regarding the use of a prior civil judgment in disciplinary proceedings against him.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review to the merits and a correctness standard to the issue of abuse of process.

Finding no error in the Hearing Panel's reasons, the court dismissed the appeal and awarded agreed costs of $4,000 to the respondent.

The appellant brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside an order quashing his appeal to the Divisional Court from an order of the Law Society's Appeal Division.

The Appeal Division had quashed his appeal of a Hearing Division Tribunal order admitting findings of fact from a civil trial into his conduct proceeding.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the Appeal Division's order was not a final decision under s. 49.38 of the Law Society Act, as there had been no final determination of professional misconduct or conduct unbecoming.

The moving parties sought to quash the opposing parties’ attempt to revive and schedule a previously raised motion concerning an alleged breach of a Mareva injunction.

The earlier trial reasons and subsequent appellate decision left unresolved whether the injunction had been breached.

The court found that the trial judge had deferred the issue and that a later email from the trial judge declining to amend the judgment did not constitute a formal endorsement or order under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Given the absence of a final adjudication and the lack of reasons, the issue remained open.

The court exercised its discretion to permit the matter to proceed so the alleged breach of the Mareva injunction could be determined.

Following the dismissal of a motion by the defendants to dissolve a Mareva injunction, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The plaintiffs sought costs of $22,170.43 inclusive of disbursements and HST, while the defendants argued the amount should be reduced to $15,000.

The court rejected the defendants’ criticisms of the time spent by plaintiffs’ counsel, noting the absence of comparative information about defence counsel hours and characterizing the challenge as unsupported.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found that a costs award of $22,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST was appropriate.

The moving defendants were ordered to pay the amount within 30 days, failing which the receiver was authorized to pay the award and charge it to the receiver accounts.

The defendants moved to set aside earlier ex parte orders granting a Mareva injunction and appointing a receiver over corporate assets allegedly used to shield property from enforcement of a substantial fraud judgment.

They argued that changed circumstances following a partial appellate reduction of the judgment, the alleged inadequacy of the plaintiffs’ undertaking as to damages, delay in prosecuting the action, and the balance of convenience justified dissolving the orders.

The court held that although the Court of Appeal reduced and modified aspects of the original fraud judgment, the defendant remained liable for over $12 million and the underlying factual basis for asset preservation had not materially changed.

The court also rejected arguments concerning the undertaking as to damages and delay, noting the extensive appellate proceedings that reasonably delayed progress.

The Mareva injunction and receivership orders therefore remained justified to preserve assets pending trial.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to set aside a Mareva injunction and receivership order.

They argued that because the underlying trial judgment was stayed pending appeal, only the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to grant such relief under Rule 63.03(1).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the injunction and receivership were granted in a separate, new action to preserve assets, and did not constitute steps to enforce the stayed trial judgment.

The moving parties (respondents on appeal) brought a motion to quash the appellants' appeal from an order dismissing their motion to strike a statement of claim.

The moving parties argued the order was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal held that because the motion judge dismissed the appellants' motion to strike the entire action for lack of jurisdiction, the order finally determined a substantive right and was therefore a final order.

The motion to quash the appeal was dismissed.