Sarah E. Pepall

The appellants, found in contempt for multiple failures to disclose assets and account for misappropriated investment funds, appealed the motion judge's decision to grant judgment against them for approximately $9 million as a sanction for contempt.

The Court of Appeal held that while striking a defence or barring participation can be a sanction for contempt, final judgment is not directly available as a punishment for contempt under Ontario's Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court found that the motion judge erred by relying on the merits of the action to grant judgment while simultaneously barring the appellants from addressing those merits.

The judgment was set aside, and the matter remitted to a different judge for a new sentencing hearing.

The appellants, LMC 477R Corp. and Newstead Inc., appealed the dismissal of their oppression application under the Condominium Act, 1998, against Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corporation No. 1046.

The application alleged oppressive conduct by the respondent in interfering with the appellant's parking facility operations and refusing good faith negotiations for a new parking agreement.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the application judge's decision, finding no error in the application of the oppression test or in the factual findings, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision striking their claims for breach of privacy, breach of confidence, and punitive damages against an insurer and its counsel.

The claims arose after the appellant's friend attended a Licence Appeal Tribunal case conference as a witness, and the insurer's counsel reported this to the insurer, who subsequently terminated the friend's employment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the attendance at the tribunal and the provision of a witness list did not constitute private information, and that the insurer's counsel owed no duty to the appellants.

Furthermore, any claim regarding the insurer's bad faith handling of the accident benefits claim was barred by section 280 of the Insurance Act.

This appeal concerned a commercial lease renewal dispute where the appellant tenant challenged the application judge's findings regarding the true agreement to lease and whether the respondent landlord had negotiated the renewal rent in good faith.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's findings of fact, which were based on conflicting evidence and credibility assessments.

The court also declined to admit fresh evidence, finding it irrelevant or unlikely to affect the outcome, and reiterated the high standard of review for factual findings on appeal.

The appellant, Seyar Khairzad, appealed a Superior Court order that dismissed his motion to change a consent decision-making and parenting time order and increased his child support.

He also sought leave to adduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material error in the motion judge's decision regarding decision-making responsibility or parenting time, noting the history of domestic violence and communication issues.

The court upheld the imputed income for child support due to the appellant's non-compliance with disclosure orders.

The motion for fresh evidence was also dismissed, as the evidence was either available at the original hearing or would not have affected the outcome.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant sought to appeal a lower court order that found material changes in circumstances, reduced support arrears, and terminated spousal and child support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's decision regarding material change, imputation of income, termination of support, or costs.

The court emphasized the deference owed to family support decisions.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision regarding the effective date for the retroactive variation of a child support order.

The appellant sought an earlier effective date, arguing the motion judge erred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's determination that the appellant was responsible for inordinate delay in bringing the application, which prejudiced the respondent and children.

The court also rejected fresh evidence from both parties, concluding it did not meet the Palmer test.

The appellant abandoned its appeal, and the respondent sought substantial indemnity costs.

The appellant challenged the court's jurisdiction to award costs for an abandoned appeal and proposed a lower partial indemnity amount.

The Court of Appeal affirmed its jurisdiction under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, finding that Rule 61.14 did not displace this discretion.

The court awarded the respondent partial indemnity costs, finding substantial indemnity was not justified.

The College of Massage Therapists of Ontario appealed a Divisional Court decision concerning a discipline committee order.

The appeal became moot when the respondent accepted the licence revocation.

The Court of Appeal declined to hear the appeal on its merits to set a judicial precedent, citing the absence of an adversarial context and the inappropriate use of judicial resources for an issue without practical consequences for both parties.

By consent, the Court reinstated the original order of the Discipline Committee.

The appellants, Amaryco Inc. and Fabrizio Lucchese, appealed a judgment obtained by the respondent, US Income Partners LLC, based on a consent to judgment in a settlement agreement.

The appellants defaulted on the agreement and argued the consent was ineffective because the statement of claim had not been issued prior to the consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge's reliance on Rule 1.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure was appropriate as there was no prejudice to the appellants, and upholding the principle of substance over form.

The moving party sought to quash an appeal by the responding party, Henia Gefen, on the grounds that it was out of time.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the appeal was not out of time because the time for appeal began to run from the date the judgment was finally settled and issued (October 16, 2020), rather than the date reasons were released (October 17, 2019).

This exception applied because the judgment was uncertain on a substantive point (paragraph 5, identifying deceased's assets) which was not part of the initial summary of disposition.

The court also noted that an extension of time would have been granted in the interests of justice due to factual connection between appeals and no prejudice to the moving party.

The appellants, purchasers of a condominium unit, appealed the dismissal of their claim for damages arising from the vendor's breach of an agreement of purchase and sale and their request for relief from forfeiture of their deposit.

The vendor repeatedly extended the occupancy date, which the trial judge found constituted a breach.

However, the trial judge also found that the purchasers had affirmed the agreement by continuing to press for performance and denied relief from forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on repudiation and affirmation, concluding that the purchasers' conduct was consistent with treating the agreement as subsisting.

The Court also affirmed the trial judge's refusal to grant relief from forfeiture, emphasizing the discretionary nature of the remedy and the vendor's incurred expenses.

However, the Court found that the trial judge erred in principle in assessing costs by not adequately considering the vendor's net profit from the resale of the unit.

Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal on the main issues but granted leave to appeal the costs award, vacating the original costs order and directing each party to bear their own costs for both the trial and the appeal.

The appellant, Dwayne Brown, appealed his conviction for drug trafficking offences, challenging the validity of a general warrant that authorized covert entries into a storage locker.

Police discovered cocaine, marijuana, oxycodone, alprazolam, and Canadian currency in the locker.

Brown argued that the warrant violated his s. 8 Charter rights, contending that the reviewing judge applied an incorrect standard for reasonable grounds and that the requirements of s. 487.01 of the Criminal Code were not met.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the reviewing judge correctly applied the "reasonable probability" standard for issuing the warrant and that all statutory preconditions for a general warrant, including the "best interests of the administration of justice" and "no other provision" elements, were satisfied.

The appellants failed to comply with a court order requiring them to post security for costs of the trial and appeal by a specified deadline.

Despite their application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada and attempts to obtain a stay of the order, the security was not posted.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal granted the respondents' motion to dismiss the appeal for non-compliance with the security for costs order.

The appellant, John McRae, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and the life sentence with a 12-year parole ineligibility period for stabbing his son to death.

The appeal raised four grounds: the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on provocation, errors in the Scopelliti and Corbett rulings regarding character evidence, an erroneous hearsay caution, and an excessive parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding no air of reality to the provocation defence, no significant prejudice from the character evidence rulings, the hearsay caution was not undermining, and the sentence was fit, including the application of the position of trust aggravating factor.

The appellants, landlords of student housing, appealed the dismissal of their claims for negligent investigation, malicious prosecution, Charter violations, and bad faith against fire prevention officers and the City of Windsor.

The claims arose after the appellants were charged with Fire Code violations for operating their properties as lodging houses, which charges were later withdrawn or acquitted.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the fire prevention officer had reasonable and probable grounds to lay charges, did not conduct a negligent investigation, and did not act with malice.

The court also dismissed the Papic appellants' additional claims related to property development delays, finding them to be policy decisions or lacking legal basis.

The appellant, Romy Desir, appealed an adult sentence for multiple serious crimes, including three jewelry store robberies and aggravated assault, committed when he was 16 years old.

The sentencing judge imposed a global sentence of seven years.

The appellant argued the judge erred in imposing an adult sentence and failed to apply the principle of restraint.

The Court of Appeal upheld the adult sentence, finding no error in the rebuttal of the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness.

However, the court found that the sentencing judge failed to properly apply the principle of restraint, which dictates that a first penitentiary sentence for a youthful offender should be as short as possible.

Consequently, the global sentence was reduced from seven years to six years less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The parties agreed not to seek any costs of the appeal motions or the appeals.

The Court of Appeal issued an endorsement reflecting this agreement, with no costs awarded.

Thorneloe University sought leave to appeal a CCAA judge's decision that allowed Laurentian University to disclaim federation agreements and approved a debtor-in-possession (DIP) loan amendment.

Thorneloe argued the disclaimer would cause its insolvency, provided minimal financial benefit to Laurentian, and was motivated by anti-competition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the leave motion, finding the proposed appeal was not prima facie meritorious, not of significance to the practice, and would unduly hinder the progress of the CCAA restructuring.

The court upheld the CCAA judge's balancing of interests under s. 32(4) of the CCAA, emphasizing the high deference owed to supervising judges in CCAA proceedings.

The appellant, Kossay El-Khodr, appealed an application judge's order to release $385,000 from a trust to Northbridge Commercial Insurance Company.

The funds were held pending the outcome of a previous appeal (the "Assignment Appeal") concerning the assignment of statutory accident benefits (SABs) for future medical and rehabilitation expenses.

The appellant argued that the conditions for release in the Minutes of Settlement were not fully met because the Assignment Appeal did not grant an assignment of *all* medical and rehabilitation benefits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge correctly interpreted the Minutes of Settlement in the context of the Assignment Appeal, which had assigned the specific categories of benefits at issue, thereby satisfying the conditions for the release of funds to the respondent and preventing double recovery.