Yeganeh Pejman

The applicant failed to pay the fee to advance her condominium dispute to Stage 3 adjudication within the required 15-day period, having initially intended to withdraw the case pending a human rights mediation.

When the respondent raised the issue of costs, the applicant requested to reopen the case and proceed to adjudication.

Applying the Frey factors, the Tribunal granted the extension of time, noting the applicant's bona fide intention to proceed, the minimal 10-day delay, the respondent's consent to the extension, and the overriding interest of justice in avoiding the need to restart the entire process.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer denied benefits and scheduled multiple insurer's examinations under section 44 of the Schedule, which the applicant failed to attend.

The Tribunal found that the insurer's notices of examination complied with the Schedule and that the applicant failed to provide a reasonable explanation for his non-attendance.

Consequently, the applicant was barred from proceeding to a substantive issues hearing for all claimed benefits pursuant to section 55(1)2 of the Schedule.

The Plaintiff, Reza Hassim Zadeh Tabrizi, sued Majesty Development Group Inc. for breach of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) for a property, seeking the return of his $150,000 deposit.

He alleged Majesty breached the APS by refusing to consent to a severance application, which he claimed was a fundamental term.

Majesty counterclaimed for damages due to the Plaintiff's failure to close, including loss of bargain, carrying costs, and financing costs for another property.

The Plaintiff also brought a third-party claim against his real estate agents for negligence, alleging they failed to include the severance condition in the APS.

The court found that the Plaintiff breached the APS by refusing to close, primarily due to a decline in the real estate market, and that severance was not a term of the original agreement.

Majesty's refusal to cooperate with severance was not a breach.

The court awarded Majesty damages for the difference in sale price and carrying costs, but denied claims for financing costs of another property and property improvements, finding them too remote or unnecessary.

The Plaintiff's action against Majesty and the third-party action against the real estate agents were dismissed.

The appellants, Amaryco Inc. and Fabrizio Lucchese, appealed a judgment obtained by the respondent, US Income Partners LLC, based on a consent to judgment in a settlement agreement.

The appellants defaulted on the agreement and argued the consent was ineffective because the statement of claim had not been issued prior to the consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge's reliance on Rule 1.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure was appropriate as there was no prejudice to the appellants, and upholding the principle of substance over form.

The plaintiff brought a motion for judgment based on a consent to judgment signed by the defendants as part of a settlement agreement regarding a defaulted loan secured by Florida real estate.

The defendants argued that one corporate defendant should not be a party, that they lacked independent Canadian legal advice, and that the debt was satisfied by a foreclosure.

The court found that the non-signing corporate defendant should not be subject to the judgment, but rejected the other defenses, noting the defendants had US legal advice and the settlement agreement explicitly valued the foreclosed property at a set credit amount.

Judgment was granted against the signing defendants for the remaining balance, converted to Canadian dollars.

The plaintiff brought a motion to turn a second action against his real estate agents into a third party proceeding in his main action against the vendors for a failed real estate transaction, or alternatively to consolidate the actions.

The defendants opposed, arguing the motion was premature and should wait until their summary judgment motions were heard.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion, finding that leave to issue a third party claim is mandatory unless prejudice results, and the defendants would not be prejudiced by correcting the procedural error of commencing a separate action.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to remove Friedman Law Professional Corporation (FLPC) as lawyers of record for the defendants due to an alleged conflict of interest.

FLPC had previously represented the plaintiff Keith Alexander in a family law application involving complex family and business disputes.

The court found that the prior retainer was sufficiently related to the current defamation action, which involved allegations of abuse and extortion related to the same family disputes.

The court concluded that FLPC likely acquired relevant confidential information during the prior retainer and ordered FLPC removed as counsel of record to protect the integrity of the justice system.

The United States Securities and Exchange Commission brought a motion to lift the stay of proceedings under s. 69.4 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to continue actions enforcing foreign judgments against the bankrupt and the debtor.

The moving party argued the judgments arose from fraud or misappropriation and would survive discharge under s. 178(1).

The respondents opposed, citing a recent US Supreme Court decision and limitation period defences.

The court granted the motion, finding a fair issue to be tried regarding the limitation periods and the nature of the claims, but ordered that no enforcement steps be taken without further leave.

A commercial motor vehicle operator was charged with two offences under the Highway Traffic Act: (1) driving without a currently validated permit contrary to section 7(1)(a), and (2) operating an overweight vehicle in violation of section 121(1).

The vehicle was a snow-clearing truck being transported for engine repairs outside its normal service area.

The court determined that the first charge should be stayed based on the defence of officially induced error of law, as the defendant had received erroneous advice from a Ministry of Transportation official regarding registration exemptions for snow-clearing equipment.

The second charge was dismissed because the court found the vehicle qualified for a weight exemption under section 114(3) of the HTA, as it was being operated on behalf of a municipality and was equipped with snow-clearing equipment (a salter), even though the ploughs had been temporarily removed for repairs.