Sarah E. Pepall

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery and aggravated assault, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge improperly inferred guilt from disbelief of his testimony and that the robbery conviction was unreasonable, contending the theft was complete before the violence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's reasoning regarding the rejection of testimony or the continuous transaction for robbery.

The court also found the custodial sentence imposed was fit.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence of six months' custody, arguing the sentencing judge erred by imposing "real" custody instead of the agreed-upon "pre-sentence custody" as part of a joint submission.

The joint submission aimed to replicate a global resolution with prior charges, ensuring the appellant's time in custody was not extended.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge made an inadvertent error in principle by deviating from the reasonable joint submission.

The appellant Township appealed a trial decision finding it 45% liable for damages resulting from a negligently installed solar panel array on the respondents' barn.

The Township admitted negligence in failing to have an engineer inspect the installation before closing the building permit, but argued its liability should be lower and challenged the quantum of damages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the 45% apportionment of liability, finding no palpable and overriding error.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the quantum of damages, finding the trial judge made material errors in adopting the respondents' expert's estimate, including double-counting truss repair costs.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court for a reassessment of damages.

The appellant was convicted of historical sexual offences involving his daughter.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's credibility findings, arguing different levels of scrutiny, misapplication of *R. v. W.(D.)*, and misapprehensions of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's entitlement to accept the complainant's evidence and reject the appellant's, and finding no significant errors in the application of legal principles or assessment of evidence.

Nylene Canada Inc. appealed a wrongful dismissal damage award, arguing the trial judge erred in calculating the reasonable notice period by including pre-retirement service and by exceeding a 24-month maximum.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's findings that the "retirement/re-hiring" was solely for pension access and did not constitute a break in service.

The court also upheld the 26-month notice period, finding it justified by the employee's unique circumstances, including long tenure, specialized skills, age, and difficulty finding new employment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought an extension of time to perfect an appeal from an order dismissing an oppression application under the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The Court of Appeal determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as section 255 of the Act specifies that appeals from such orders lie to the Divisional Court.

Despite finding that other factors for an extension of time (intention to appeal, brief delay, minimal prejudice) would have favoured the applicant, the motion was dismissed due to the fundamental lack of jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and sought leave to appeal his six-year custodial sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in not finding various Charter infringements (ss. 7, 9, 10(a), 10(b), 11(d)) that should have led to the exclusion of the firearm, and in her assessment of circumstantial evidence.

He also contended his sentence was unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's Charter analysis, her factual and credibility findings, or her conclusion on circumstantial evidence.

Leave to appeal sentence was denied as the sentence was deemed fit and not demonstrably unfit.

Multiple appeals arose from a complex family estate dispute following the death of a spouse whose estate passed to the surviving spouse under mirror wills.

Two sons alleged that a handwritten document and surrounding circumstances created both a mutual wills agreement and a secret trust requiring equal distribution of the estate among the three sons after the surviving spouse’s death.

The Court of Appeal held that the evidence did not establish a binding mutual wills agreement or the elements of a secret trust, emphasizing the absence of a transfer of property and clear contractual intent.

The court also upheld the trial judge’s treatment of certain inter vivos transfers and confirmed that a joint tenancy in a condominium had been severed through the parties’ course of dealings.

All appeals were dismissed.

This is a post-appeal motion brought by the applicant under Rule 59.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to set aside an order of the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The applicant sought to set aside the court's previous decision, which upheld a trial judge's finding that a Ukrainian divorce decree was valid and recognized in Canada, thus precluding the need for a Canadian divorce decree.

The applicant argued fraud or newly discovered facts, but the court found no new facts or evidence of fraud.

The motion was dismissed.

Alka Singh (client) appealed a Superior Court order that set aside an Assessment Officer's certificate of assessment regarding legal fees from Reesa Heft and Heft Law (solicitors) and referred the matter for a new assessment.

The Assessment Officer had previously reduced the solicitors' fees, finding them not fair and reasonable.

The motion judge set aside this assessment, concluding the Assessment Officer exceeded jurisdiction by assessing a disputed retainer and erred in not considering the solicitors' objections or evidence.

The Court of Appeal addressed the preliminary issue of jurisdiction, determining whether the motion judge's order was final or interlocutory.

Applying established principles, the Court found the order interlocutory because it did not finally dispose of the substantive rights or the real matter in dispute, but rather remitted it for a new assessment.

Consequently, the appeal to the Court of Appeal was quashed, as jurisdiction for interlocutory orders lies with the Divisional Court with leave.

The appellant appealed the Superior Court's dismissal of three of his actions under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, on the grounds that they were frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The motion judge also granted ancillary relief regarding fee waivers.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's findings and conclusions, agreeing that the actions were clearly frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and that the fee waiver determination was a legitimate exercise of jurisdiction.

All three appeals were dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay costs.

The appellant, Bijan Naghshbandi, appealed judgments from two actions where he was ordered to repay significant debts to Shahram Heidari and Tarra Engineering Inc. The appeal raised five grounds: that the trial judge introduced a new theory of liability (joint investment), failed to provide adequate reasons for liability, did not apply a claimed credit, misstated the test for an oppression action, and erred in relying on unreliable witness testimony regarding a share transfer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, upholding the trial judge's findings, particularly on credibility, and confirming the debts owed.

The appellant, Chad Noureddine, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder following a jury trial.

The appeal raised four grounds concerning the trial judge's jury instructions: the limited use of a witness's criminal record, the sufficiency of the Vetrovec instruction, the failure to adequately present the defence's position on intent and motive, and the inclusion of an alternate path to conviction not explicitly raised in the Crown's closing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's charge, when considered holistically, was comprehensive and balanced, adequately addressing the issues of witness credibility and all routes to liability.

This appeal concerns the interpretation of a will granting trustees absolute discretion to encroach on capital for the income beneficiary's comfort and well-being.

The primary issue was whether the trustees improperly considered extraneous factors in exercising their discretion.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred in characterizing the trustees' distrust of the beneficiary's living arrangement as extraneous, as due diligence was warranted.

However, the court upheld the finding that the trustees' personal dislike of the beneficiary was an extraneous factor, justifying judicial intervention.

The appeal regarding the monthly encroachment was dismissed, but the arrears calculation was adjusted to reflect when sufficient financial disclosure was provided.

The Court of Appeal heard a motion to review a single motion judge's order that dismissed requests to expedite an appeal and waive the requirement to file a formal liability order.

The panel upheld the motion judge's decision not to expedite the appeal, finding no error in principle or misapprehension of evidence.

However, the panel varied the order to relieve the moving parties from the obligation of filing a formal liability order to perfect their appeal, noting that the liability order was a final order.

The motion was otherwise dismissed, and costs were fixed to be awarded to the successful party on the appeal.

This appeal addresses the role of "public correction" in secondary market misrepresentation class actions under s. 138.3 of the Securities Act.

The appellant sought leave to pursue a statutory remedy, which the motion judge denied by requiring a discrete and identifiable public correction that explicitly revealed the misrepresentation.

The Court of Appeal, following its own decision in *Barrick OCA*, found that the motion judge applied an unduly onerous standard for public correction.

The Court clarified that public correction does not require "facial symmetry" with the misrepresentation and must be understood in context by the secondary market.

The appeal was allowed, and the leave motion remitted for redetermination.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal where the appellants (defendants) successfully challenged the sanction (judgment in the action) imposed by the motion judge for contempt, due to procedural flaws.

The Court of Appeal upheld the initial costs award for the contempt finding, but set aside the costs for the sanctions hearing and the action, and ordered no costs for the appeal, acknowledging the appellants' underlying contemptuous conduct as the root cause of the proceedings.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision recognizing a Ukrainian divorce obtained by the respondent in 1998, pursuant to s. 22 of the Divorce Act.

The appellant argued the Ukrainian divorce was invalid due to lack of jurisdiction and notice.

The trial judge accepted expert evidence that the Ukrainian court had jurisdiction and that the appellant had notice, and noted the appellant's reliance on the divorce for tax purposes and delay in challenging it.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's findings or analysis, affirming the validity of the Ukrainian divorce and dismissing the appeal.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granted against them for defaulting on a lease agreement for laboratory equipment.

The respondent had obtained an order to recover equipment and sought damages and delivery of remaining items.

The appellants argued a settlement agreement existed, which the motion judge rejected.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings, dismissing arguments regarding a settlement, credibility issues, and damages assessment, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario ordered the appellant, Narwhal International Limited, to pay costs to the respondent, Teda International Realty Inc., in the amount of $7,500, inclusive of disbursements and all applicable taxes, after considering written submissions from both parties.