Robert A. Blair

The appellant was convicted of several gun-related charges arising from a single incident in which he allegedly discarded a loaded handgun while fleeing from police.

The Crown's case relied on police testimony that the appellant appeared to have a gun and dropped it near where he was tackled, with the gun found in close proximity and a magazine still in his hand.

The defence argued the gun belonged to another individual who had placed it at the location.

The jury convicted on all counts save one, and the trial judge imposed an effective sentence of 43 months.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence on three grounds: improper jury selection procedures, prejudicial comments by the trial judge regarding defence counsel's opening, and inadequate jury instructions on credibility assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The Crown's case relied on evidence that the appellant was driving at a very high rate of speed (40-50 km/h above the speed limit) and possibly racing another vehicle when he entered an intersection where a collision occurred with a vehicle making a left turn.

The appellant argued he was driving only somewhat over the speed limit and that the accident resulted from the other driver's illegal left turn.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all four grounds of appeal, finding the trial judge's instructions on the fault component of dangerous driving were consistent with R. v. Roy, the expert evidence was properly admitted, the instruction regarding Highway Traffic Act convictions was harmless, and the verdict was reasonable.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention at Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for assault, argued that he had reached a treatment impasse at Waypoint and sought an independent assessment and transfer to a less secure facility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence did not substantiate the existence of a treatment impasse and that the Board's decision to maintain detention at Waypoint was well-supported by evidence regarding the appellant's risk to public safety, including his history of water intoxication, threats to staff, and previous elopement from other facilities.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that continued his conditional discharge from the North Bay Regional Health Center.

The appellant argued that the Board failed to focus on whether he posed a significant risk of serious harm to the public as required by s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code, and that the Board erred in failing to consider whether a community treatment order under the Mental Health Act could mitigate residual risk.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's decision was reasonable given the appellant's schizoaffective disorder, his history of violence, and the evidence that he would discontinue medication if absolutely discharged.

The appellant sought leave to appeal the dismissal of his Summary Conviction Appeal by Justice Ferguson, which upheld the conviction and sentence imposed by Justice Armstrong at trial.

The primary issue concerned whether the trial judge was obliged to demonstrate an appreciation of the potential impact of interpreter use on credibility assessment.

The Court of Appeal held that while trial judges must bear in mind the effect of testifying through an interpreter on credibility assessment, no specific formulation is required and the approach depends on the circumstances of each case.

The court found no evidence in the trial record that the trial judge failed to account for the appellant's use of an interpreter.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for shooting and killing Andrew Christie in the doorway of Christie's apartment on December 19, 2004.

Although charged with first degree murder, the jury convicted him of the lesser charge.

He was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility of 17 years.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the admission of evidence regarding an accomplice's manslaughter conviction, the deceased's ante-mortem statements, and the trial judge's jury instructions on post-offence conduct, self-defence, and provocation.

The appellant also challenged the sentence as unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, and finding the sentence fit.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a declaration that the respondent was eligible for accelerated parole.

The respondent had pled guilty to conspiracy offences that straddled the date the Abolition of Early Parole Act repealed accelerated parole.

The Court of Appeal held that for the purposes of s. 11(i) of the Charter, a crime is committed when culpability attaches, even if it is a continuing offence.

Since the respondent entered into the conspiracies before the repeal, he was entitled to the benefit of the lesser punishment (accelerated parole).

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought to certify a global class action against an Ontario accounting firm for auditor's negligence regarding a clean audit report used in a US private placement.

The motion judge denied certification, finding no real and substantial connection to Ontario for the foreign investors and concluding that joinder was preferable to a class proceeding.

The Divisional Court upheld this decision.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by mischaracterizing the claim as being about the foreign financing rather than the Ontario-based audit, and by failing to properly conduct the comparative access to justice analysis required for the preferable procedure criterion.

The action was certified as a class proceeding.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision to change a final custody order that had granted him sole custody of his two sons and required them to attend a reunification program.

The younger son had repeatedly run away and refused to live with the appellant or attend the program.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the son's extreme resistance constituted a material change in circumstances and that it was no longer in his best interests to enforce the custody order.

The court also dismissed the son's cross-appeal seeking a declaration that he had withdrawn from parental control, finding the motion judge's order that no person had custody or access rights over him was sufficient.

The appellant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of marijuana, and failing to comply with probation.

The drugs were found hidden behind a recessed light fixture in a basement closet of a residence where the appellant was sleeping.

The trial judge found the appellant in constructive possession based on circumstantial evidence, including his wallet and a letter in the bedroom.

The Court of Appeal held that the circumstantial evidence could not reasonably support an inference that the appellant had knowledge of the hidden drugs.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals were entered on all charges.

In a multi-jurisdictional class action regarding credit card merchant fees, Class Counsel entered into a Fee Sharing Agreement with a competing law firm to resolve a carriage dispute.

The agreement provided the competing firm up to $800,000 from Class Counsel's fees in exchange for staying rival actions.

On a motion to approve a partial settlement and fees, the motion judge reduced Class Counsel's requested fees by 10%, declared the Fee Sharing Agreement unenforceable, and prohibited any payments to the competing firm.

The Court of Appeal upheld the fee reduction and the prohibition on paying the competing firm from the settlement or approved fees, finding the agreement was subject to court approval under the Class Proceedings Act.

However, the Court set aside the declaration that the agreement was entirely unenforceable from any source, as the competing firm was not given notice or an opportunity to make submissions on that specific issue.

The appellant appealed a manslaughter conviction arising from a fatal stabbing during a bar fight.

He argued that the trial judge erred by excluding a paramedic's statement recounting an alleged witness account said to support self-defence and to impeach a Crown witness, and by failing to leave accident with the jury.

The Court of Appeal held that the first level of hearsay was not shown to be sufficiently reliable, so the statement was inadmissible both substantively and for impeachment.

It further held that the accident defence lacked an air of reality because there was no evidentiary foundation explaining how the deceased could have been stabbed multiple times accidentally.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of seven drug charges and sentenced to three years' imprisonment after police found a substantial quantity of drugs hidden in a garage where he was present.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in assessing the circumstantial evidence of possession and that the sentence was excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the test for circumstantial evidence and reasonably inferred the appellant exercised primary control over the drugs for distribution.

The sentence was upheld as fit given the nature and quantity of the drugs.

The appellant appealed a decision upholding a Consent and Capacity Board finding that she was incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment.

The appellant argued that her symptoms were caused by physical ailments rather than a mental condition, and that the Board misapplied the test for capacity from Starson v. Swayze.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board applied the correct legal test and reasonably concluded that the appellant was unable to appreciate the consequences of refusing treatment because she could not recognize the possibility that she was affected by a mental condition.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for counselling murder.

While in jail for sexual assault, the appellant solicited a fellow inmate to kill the complainant so she could not testify against him.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on the testimony of the fellow inmate and surreptitiously recorded conversations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the offence of counselling was complete upon solicitation and the trial judge did not err in relying on the unsavoury witness's evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the nine-year sentence (reduced to five years for pre-trial custody) was proportionate given the aggravating factor that the target was a justice system participant.

A commercial premises was largely destroyed by fire, causing the tenant to cease operations and stop paying rent.

The landlord sought coverage for lost rental income from its insurer, who denied the claim on the basis that the tenant remained legally obligated to pay rent.

The motion judge found the lease was frustrated and ordered the insurer to pay.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the result but for different reasons, finding that the loss of anticipated rental income triggered the business interruption coverage regardless of the tenant's continuing legal obligations.

The insurer was required to pay the claim and could subsequently pursue the tenant via subrogation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms and drug offences, as well as his sentence of eight years' imprisonment.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a W.(D.) instruction regarding defence witnesses, by finding he lacked standing to challenge a search under section 8 of the Charter, and by denying enhanced pre-trial custody credit for harsh lockdown conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no W.(D.) instruction was required, the appellant was merely a privileged visitor with no reasonable expectation of privacy in the searched residence, and there was no evidence of adverse effects from the lockdown conditions to warrant enhanced credit.

Sobeys appealed a decision finding it contractually obligated to directly fund a pension plan deficit following the termination of a warehousing and transportation agreement with Tibbett.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that the parties had entered into a new agreement for Sobeys to assume direct responsibility for the deficit, that Tibbett had acted with due diligence, and that the claim was not statute-barred because Tibbett was not notified of Sobeys' refusal to fund the deficit until 2013.

The appeal was dismissed.

The infant respondent was struck by a vehicle while crossing a street on his way to school.

The trial judge found the appellant municipality liable because the accident occurred during the time a crossing guard was required to be present but was absent.

The trial judge also found the infant respondent was not contributorily negligent.

The municipality appealed, challenging the trial judge's factual findings regarding the timing of the accident and the assessment of contributory negligence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or application of the standard of care for children.

The appellant tenant commenced an application for a declaration of a valid lease after the respondent landlord terminated the tenancy and took possession of the premises.

Three years later, the appellant moved to direct a trial of the issues and amend its pleadings to claim damages for wrongful termination and loss of inventory.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the proposed amendments raised new causes of action that were statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the proposed damages claim was an alternative remedy arising from the same factual nexus originally pleaded in the application and supporting affidavit, and therefore did not constitute a new cause of action.