Robert A. Blair

The appellant appealed his sentence for break and enter to commit theft and break and enter with intent.

He had pleaded guilty and received a suspended sentence with two years' probation, with pre-sentence custody credited at 1.5:1 (198 days from 132 days).

The enhanced credit resulted in a custodial sentence exceeding 180 days, triggering mandatory deportation as a convention refugee and barring him from appealing the deportation order.

Fresh evidence on appeal demonstrated that trial counsel failed to appreciate the immigration consequences of the enhanced credit.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on consent of the Crown and reduced the pre-sentence custody credit by 19 days to 179 days, thereby avoiding the immigration consequences.

The appellant alleged she was sexually assaulted by a taxi driver employed by the respondent taxi company.

She sued the taxi company on grounds of vicarious liability, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing all claims against the taxi company.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the dismissal of her vicarious liability claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the alleged sexual assault was only coincidentally linked to the taxi company's activities as a taxi dispatching business and did not meet the test for vicarious liability established in Bazley v. Curry.

A police officer with the Niagara Regional Police was convicted of conspiracy to smuggle cheese into Canada from the United States without paying required duties, related customs offences, and breach of trust by a public official.

The appellant organized a scheme with another constable to smuggle approximately $133,000 worth of cheese across the border, evading approximately $325,000 in duties.

The appellant was sentenced to three months' imprisonment for the smuggling offences and one month consecutive for breach of trust.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his breach of trust conviction and sought leave to appeal both sentences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge's inferences regarding the CPIC query were reasonable and the sentences were fit.

The appellant was convicted of unlawfully importing cocaine into Canada contrary to s. 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

He appealed on two grounds: that the trial judge failed to address his defence meaningfully and failed to undertake proper analysis under the third step of the R. v. W.(D.) inquiry.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge adequately addressed the defence theory that the appellant was an unwitting "blind mule" and properly applied the reasonable doubt standard.

The evidence established that cocaine was found in the appellant's luggage, and the only live issue was knowledge.

The trial judge rejected the defence assertion that unknown baggage handlers planted the drugs, finding it speculative and unsupported by evidence.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice referring his solicitor's account dated February 28, 2016 for assessment under the Solicitors Act.

The Court of Appeal determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the order was interlocutory rather than final in nature.

The order concerned a preliminary procedural matter directing referral for assessment, not the substantive determination of the account's quantum.

The appellant retained the right to defend the quantum of his account during the assessment process.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed.

This appeal concerns whether a partial stay of proceedings should be granted in favour of arbitration in a class action involving both consumer and non-consumer claims against TELUS Mobility for alleged undisclosed billing practices (rounding up calls to the next minute).

The appellants argued that the motions judge erred in refusing to stay the non-consumer claims pursuant to section 7(5) of the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The appellants contended that the Court of Appeal's decision in Griffin v. Dell Canada Inc. had been overtaken by the Supreme Court's decision in Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that Griffin remains binding authority in Ontario and has not been overtaken by Seidel, as the two cases were decided in materially different legislative contexts.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime after police discovered drugs and cash following an anonymous call reporting a break-in at his residence.

The appellant sought to exclude the evidence, alleging that police had staged the break-in and made the anonymous call in breach of his Charter rights.

The pre-trial judge dismissed the application, finding the appellant had not met the burden of proving the illegality of the warrantless entry.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on two grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in finding he lacked authority to permit the defence to record testimony with a high-quality microphone for voice identification analysis; and (2) the trial judge erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant rather than the Crown to justify the warrantless entry.

The appellant was convicted of sexual touching by the Superior Court of Justice following a trial without jury.

The complainant, the appellant's 16-year-old daughter, testified that while intoxicated and in her bedroom, she was sexually assaulted by the appellant.

The appellant appealed on four grounds: that the trial judge applied different standards of scrutiny to the evidence, failed to properly apply the W(D) principles, failed to critically analyze the Facebook message evidence, and failed to consider the absence of medical or forensic evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge properly analyzed the evidence, applied the correct legal principles, and that the complainant's testimony was sufficient to ground the conviction.

The appellant appealed a ten-year sentence imposed following his guilty plea to robbery, wearing a disguise, and aggravated assault (times two) arising from the robbery of a jewellery store.

The appellant and a co-accused, disguised with masks, entered the store and attacked the proprietors with a hammer, inflicting 32 hammer strikes and causing serious permanent injuries.

The appellant had an extensive criminal record of 44 offences, including violence and weapons offences, and was bound by two active probation orders at the time of the robbery.

The co-accused received a three-year sentence.

The appellant argued the sentence was disproportionate and failed to account for his surrender and guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence justified given the gravity of the crime, the appellant's criminal history, and the lasting impact on the vulnerable victims.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation imposed by the trial judge on January 15, 2013.

The Court of Appeal upheld the designation, finding that the trial judge properly applied the test under s. 753 of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge found that the appellant met the criteria for dangerous offender status based on a pattern of repetitive behaviour showing a failure to restrain his conduct, and that this failure created a likelihood of causing injury to others.

The trial judge also found a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour demonstrating substantial indifference to the foreseeable consequences of his actions.

The trial judge exercised her discretion to reject the long-term offender designation, concluding that the public threat could not be reduced to an acceptable level through a determinate sentence or long-term supervision order.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's findings were open to her on the record and entitled to deference, and her determination was reasonable.

The appellant appealed his conviction for home invasion-related charges involving a firearm, including armed robbery, aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, discharge of a firearm with intent to endanger life, and unlawful confinement.

The trial judge convicted the appellant on April 8, 2015, and imposed a global sentence of nine years and six months, less three years and four months credit for pre-sentence custody on June 30, 2015.

The Court of Appeal upheld both the convictions and the sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of identification evidence and rejecting the argument that the sentence was too harsh for a youthful offender.

The appellant appealed from orders of the Superior Court striking her claims against Crown Defendants and dismissing them without leave to amend, and striking her claims against Ms. Santone with leave to amend to pursue only a breach of privacy claim.

The appellant's pleading alleged damages of $8.4 million arising from treatment by various state officials spanning from 1970 to 2011, including claims for conspiracy, misfeasance in public office, breach of trust, intentional infliction of mental distress, and various statutory violations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the pleading disclosed no reasonable cause of action, lacked material facts to support the allegations, and that the Crown Defendants were protected by statutory and common law immunity.

The court also rejected the appellant's allegation of judicial bias.

An appeal under the Child and Family Services Act was dismissed as moot.

The appellant acknowledged that the appeal was not about the return of the child and involved a question of law considered in the absence of a concrete dispute between the parties.

The Court of Appeal found no overriding and palpable error in the lower court's discretionary decision to refuse to entertain the appeal on mootness grounds.

The lower court properly applied the factors set out in Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General).

The trustee in bankruptcy appealed a motion judge's decision declining to find the bankrupt in contempt for refusing to execute a power of attorney regarding her interest in Croatian property.

The motion judge instead granted the trustee authority to sign the power of attorney on behalf of the bankrupt, with a minor redaction preventing assignment of powers to third parties.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's discretionary decision, finding no error in prioritizing a practical remedy over a contempt finding, while emphasizing the seriousness of disobeying court orders.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment motion in favour of the respondent bank for recovery of $58,126.03 on an outstanding line of credit account.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the motion judge relied on a 1988 line of credit agreement when the statement of claim referenced a 1994 agreement; (2) the respondent's affiant relied on hearsay evidence and failed to provide proper notice of business records; and (3) the motion judge failed to provide reasons for awarding post-judgment interest at a rate higher than the statutory rate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the summary judgment.

Two purchasers of condominium units in Trump Tower sought to rescind their agreements of purchase and sale and recover their deposits based on material changes to a hotel unit maintenance agreement disclosed years after the initial purchase agreements.

The respondent developer argued that the purchasers' notices of rescission did not comply with statutory requirements because they used the word "terminate" rather than "rescind" and did not explicitly reference the relevant statutory provision.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, holding that the Condominium Act, as consumer protection legislation, must be interpreted generously in favour of consumers.

The court found that the notices sufficiently conveyed the purchasers' intention to undo the transactions based on material changes, and that the ten-year limitation period under the Real Property Limitations Act applied to claims for return of deposits.

The applicant and respondent were former spouses who entered into an oral agreement that the respondent would pay premiums on a life insurance policy and receive the proceeds upon the deceased's death.

The deceased subsequently designated the applicant as an irrevocable beneficiary under the policy without informing the respondent, who continued paying premiums.

Upon the deceased's death, the respondent claimed entitlement to the proceeds based on unjust enrichment and sought a constructive trust.

The application judge ruled in the respondent's favour, finding an equitable assignment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the application judge erred in relying on the doctrine of equitable assignment, which was neither pleaded nor argued.

The court found that the irrevocable beneficiary designation provisions of the Insurance Act provided a valid juristic reason for the applicant's receipt of the proceeds, making unjust enrichment unavailable.

The appellant was convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit an indictable offence and sexual assault.

He appealed on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically that trial counsel failed to adequately advise him of his right to elect his mode of trial under s. 536 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded by indictment on the break and enter charge, which triggered the appellant's right to elect between trial in Superior Court (with preliminary inquiry) or Ontario Court of Justice.

Trial counsel made the election without providing the appellant with adequate advice regarding his options or their respective advantages and disadvantages.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant's fundamental right to make an informed election regarding mode of trial had been violated, constituting a miscarriage of justice that undermined the fairness of the trial proceedings.

The appellants appealed the motion judge's decision to strike paragraph 25 of their statement of claim, which alleged that the respondent West Face distributed a defamatory report to unnamed third parties whose identities were known to West Face.

The appellants had already established a prima facie case of defamation by alleging publication to named persons at a specified time and place.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in striking the paragraph, finding that the appellants had demonstrated they were proceeding in good faith with a prima facie case and were not on a fishing expedition.

The court allowed the appeal and set aside the order striking paragraph 25.

The appellant was convicted after a judge-alone trial of dangerous driving while racing causing bodily harm and dangerous driving while racing causing death.

The Crown's case was that the appellant and Tyler Dodd were racing their vehicles on Highway 21 near Owen Sound when Dodd lost control, crossed into oncoming traffic, and struck another vehicle, killing Dodd and injuring the other driver.

The appellant appealed his convictions on three grounds: challenging the finding that the vehicles were racing at the time of the accident, challenging the admissibility of his statement to police, and challenging the causation finding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding all findings of the trial judge.