Michael J. Moldaver

The appellant appealed an order committing him for extradition to the United States on charges of conspiracy and attempt to launder proceeds of crime obtained by trafficking in a controlled substance.

The Court of Appeal found that while the evidence supported an inference that the cash was from illicit activity, there was no evidence specifically linking it to drug trafficking.

The Court rejected the respondent's argument that the specific offence named in the Authority to Proceed was mere surplusage, holding that section 29(1) of the Extradition Act requires evidence justifying committal for the specific offence set out.

The appeal was allowed and the appellant discharged.

The appellant appealed his convictions for rape and indecent assault, seeking to introduce fresh evidence of a letter authored by the complainant which she denied writing at trial.

The Court of Appeal admitted the evidence, finding that trial counsel exercised due diligence and the interests of justice compelled its admission.

The court held the evidence could have affected the verdict on all counts by impacting the complainant's credibility.

The court also noted the trial judge failed to provide an adequate limiting instruction regarding moral prejudice reasoning between the counts.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant consented to the dismissal of the appeal on the basis that there would be no costs in the Court of Appeal or the court below.

The Court of Appeal ordered the dismissal on consent.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing he did not have care and control of the vehicle.

The trial judge applied the law from R. v. Toews and found a real risk that the extremely impaired appellant could have woken up and driven the vehicle.

The summary conviction appeal court judge upheld this finding as not unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found no error of law and dismissed the appeal.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after the trial judge refused an adjournment.

A subpoenaed witness had left the courthouse.

The Court of Appeal held that the refusal to allow the adjournment was arbitrary and calculated to bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed her conviction for possession of heroin, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and that she was improperly cross-examined on a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdict was open to the trial judge based on the evidence.

Although the cross-examination on the conditional discharge was improper, the court concluded it played no role in the trial judge's rejection of the appellant's incredible evidence.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's disposition was consistent with expert medical opinion and supported by the evidence, and therefore not unreasonable.

The appellant's arguments regarding disclosure and consistency of allegations relating to the index offences were rejected.

The appellant appealed their conviction and sentence for possession of heroin.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding ample evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant possessed the heroin.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding that the disparity between the appellant's five-year sentence and the co-accused's four-year sentence constituted an error in principle.

The appellant's sentence was varied to four years.

The appellants, retail employees and corporate retailers, were charged with working in or carrying on a retail business on a holiday contrary to the Retail Business Holidays Act.

They challenged the constitutionality of the 1993 amendments to the Act, arguing it infringed their freedom of religion under s. 2(a) and equality rights under s. 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Act's purpose remains the secular one of providing common pause days for retail employees, and that it does not significantly burden religious freedom.

The court also held that any differential treatment was based on occupational status, not an enumerated or analogous ground under s. 15, and therefore did not constitute discrimination.

The appellants were injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits.

The insurer required them to undergo a Designated Assessment Centre (DAC) assessment, which concluded the requested treatments were not reasonable or necessary.

The appellants sued the DAC and its assessors for negligence and bad faith.

The motion judge struck the claims, finding no duty of care and applying witness immunity.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, holding that while policy considerations preclude a claim for simple negligence against DAC assessors, it is not plain and obvious that claims based on bad faith or breach of a duty of neutrality should be struck, nor does witness immunity necessarily apply to their role as decision-makers.

The appellant contractor sued the respondent bank for misrepresentation after the bank failed to advance a $150,000 loan to a mall owner to pay for renovations.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the bank had informed the contractor that the loan was conditional on a guarantor's signature.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge misapprehended the evidence.

The bank had represented that the loan was a sure thing and that the signature was a mere formality, knowing this was untrue and that the contractor would rely on it.

Judgment was entered for the contractor for the undisputed contract amount plus costs.

The appellants, two political candidates, were forcibly arrested by mall security guards for trespassing after soliciting in a shopping centre.

At trial, a jury found the arrest lawful but awarded damages to one appellant for excessive force.

The appellants appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury to consider whether a forcible arrest was a reasonable course of action in the first place, as required by the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Asante-Mensah.

The appellant appealed his sentence of two years less a day and three years' probation for sexual assault and uttering threats.

He argued the sentencing judge erred in finding him a danger to the community and failing to impose a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the violence of the assault and the subsequent threats, which required denunciation and deterrence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order refusing a motion to extend the time to appeal a child protection order and dismissing the appeal.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusion that there was an unexplained delay in ordering transcripts and no merit to the appeal.

The court emphasized that delay is of particular concern in child protection proceedings where expeditious resolution is in the child's best interests.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant insurer appealed an order appointing an appraiser under s. 128(5) of the Insurance Act, arguing the policy was void due to a material change in risk under Statutory Condition 4.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that liability remained a live issue because the insurer chose not to cross-examine the insured on her affidavit asserting a valid policy.

The court noted that even if a breach occurred, relief from forfeiture might be available, making the appraisal process appropriate for resolving valuation issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for oral reasons given.

Costs of the appeal were awarded to the respondent in the fixed amount of $4,000 all inclusive.

The father appealed an order refusing to vary custody and access, and varying child support and costs.

The mother cross-appealed seeking additional retroactive child support for 2003.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, finding no error in the application judge's conclusions that there was no change in circumstances regarding custody and access, and that the limitation on retroactive support was within the judge's discretion given the father's other financial obligations.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence of two years less a day imposed on the respondent following a two-day armed standoff with police.

The respondent pleaded guilty to possessing a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace and possessing a firearm while prohibited.

The Court of Appeal found that while the sentencing judge erred and a custodial sentence was initially warranted, the respondent's successful compliance with the conditional sentence and significant rehabilitative progress over the past five and a half months meant that a custodial sentence was no longer in the interests of justice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence of six months' imprisonment.

The conviction appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

On the sentence appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in principle by treating the appellant's lack of remorse as an aggravating factor and by failing to explain why general deterrence could not be met with a conditional sentence.

The court allowed the appeal and imposed a 12-month conditional sentence with 40 hours of community service.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment concerning a business sale transaction, a management consultant agreement, and a promissory note.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the sale was governed by the June 5, 2000 Agreement and that there was no actionable misrepresentation.

The court affirmed the $8,300 award under the management consultant agreement but varied the judgment to hold only the corporate appellant liable.

The court also varied the interest calculation on a $70,000 promissory note on consent.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.