Michael Dineen

The appellant appealed his sentence for unauthorized use of credit card data, challenging the imposition of house arrest and curfew terms as conditions of probation.

The appellant argued these conditions were unreasonable and not authorized under section 732.1(3)(h) of the Criminal Code as they were punitive rather than rehabilitative.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged the traditional rehabilitative purpose of probation but noted the sentence resulted from a joint submission accepted by the sentencing judge.

The court declined to strike the conditions as illegal given the unique circumstances and the limited record before it, though it noted the sentencing judge should have articulated the basis for accepting the impugned terms.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence of two years less one day imprisonment plus two years' probation following his guilty plea to assault causing bodily harm.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle in the sentencing judge's reasons and determined the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The court noted that the appellant, then 23 years old, had sucker-punched a 55-year-old victim causing significant injury, and that such conduct must be both deterred and denounced.

The appeal was dismissed and the warrant of committal was amended to reflect the lesser but included offence.

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant failed to identify any error made by the trial judge, and the court found no basis to interfere with the conviction.

On the sentence appeal, duty counsel argued that the trial judge failed to give sufficient weight to mitigating factors, but the court rejected this submission, finding that the trial judge had carefully considered the mitigating factors and imposed a sentence within the range suggested by defence counsel.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the stabbing death of Nighisti Semret in downtown Toronto on October 23, 2012.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: (1) that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury that after-the-fact conduct had no probative value in distinguishing between levels of culpability; (2) that the trial judge failed to provide an O'Connor instruction regarding the appellant's false statements to police and medical personnel; and (3) that evidence of the appellant's trip to Germany should not have been admitted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant was convicted of breaking and entering with intent, sexual assault with a weapon, robbery, unlawful confinement, and possession of the proceeds of crime arising from a planned home invasion robbery against two women.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of 9 years imprisonment, falling between the Crown's submission of 12-15 years and defence counsel's submission of 5-7 years.

The appellant appealed, arguing that if the trial judge erred in treating aggravating factors, a 7-year sentence would be more proportionate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the 9-year sentence was fully reasoned, within the appropriate range, and within the trial judge's proper discretion.

The appellants were convicted by jury of aggravated assault following an attack on a victim in a parking lot in Barrie.

Both appellants conceded presence at the scene but disputed participation in the assault.

The appellants appealed on multiple grounds relating to jury instructions, including eyewitness identification evidence, aiding and abetting liability, jury questions, the definition of bodily harm, and self-defence.

The Court of Appeal found multiple errors in the trial judge's instructions, particularly regarding the inadequacy of the eyewitness identification caution given the specific frailties in the evidence, insufficient guidance on aiding and abetting, discouragement of jury questions, failure to define bodily harm, and reversal of the burden of proof on self-defence.

The court allowed the appeals and ordered a new trial.

Four appellants appealed their convictions for various offences arising from a large-scale credit card fraud and money laundering scheme operating over several years.

The appellants were convicted of fraud over $5,000, participation in a criminal organization, identity theft, possession of property obtained by crime, and money laundering.

The appellants raised multiple grounds of appeal, including challenges to the single transaction rule, sufficiency of reasons, and the legal test for criminal organization.

The Court of Appeal dismissed most appeals but quashed certain convictions against one appellant that were entered without being charged, and corrected typographical errors in the trial judgment.

The appellant was convicted at trial of being an accessory after the fact to murder, obstructing police, and public mischief.

She appealed only the accessory conviction.

The trial judge found that the Crown had failed to prove that Joshua Barreira, the alleged principal, was guilty of murder.

However, rather than acquitting the appellant, the trial judge convicted her on the basis that she had assisted Chad Davidson (the actual shooter) by serving as a witness to his wedding.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the conviction was based on a theory of liability that fell outside the scope of the indictment, which was limited to the appellant's conduct in relation to Joshua Barreira.

The court entered an acquittal.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of his wife at his second trial, following a hung jury at his first trial.

The appeal was allowed on the basis that the trial judge erred in law by refusing to remove trial counsel from the record when counsel sought removal on grounds of ethical concerns and breakdown of the client-solicitor relationship.

The trial judge's refusal to grant the removal application created an appearance of unfairness and constituted a miscarriage of justice, requiring a new trial.

The court also addressed several other grounds of appeal relating to the admissibility of third-party suspect evidence, demeanour evidence, police officer opinion evidence, and hearsay statements, providing guidance for the retrial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud, arguing that the application judge erred in dismissing his section 11(b) Charter application regarding trial delay.

The appellant contended that the application judge erred in his Morin analysis.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding that the delay was reasonable under the Morin framework.

The delay arose from the Crown's decision to join co-accused, and even on the appellant's argument, the excess delay was only one month.

The court found no prejudice to the appellant's liberty interest or ability to make full answer and defence, and noted the serious nature of the fraud and societal interest in bringing the case to trial.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 5 years and 1 month (34.5 months to serve after credit) imposed for six counts of robbery, assault, and sexual assault committed against three women in a random attack lasting minutes.

The appellant challenged three aspects of the sentencing: the trial judge's treatment of lack of remorse as an aggravating factor, the minimal credit given for the guilty plea, and the calculation of pre-disposition custody credit.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the third ground only, finding the trial judge erred by failing to account for 50 days of pre-disposition custody served between the sentencing hearing and judgment delivery, reducing the sentence to 32 months.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder after a jury trial.

He appealed on two grounds: (1) that the trial judge erred in admitting a hearsay statement made by the deceased victim identifying the appellant as the shooter under the principled hearsay exception, and (2) that the trial judge erred by failing to give a "no probative value" instruction regarding the appellant's post-offence flight.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding that the hearsay statement should have been admitted under the spontaneous statement exception and that a no probative value instruction was unnecessary in the circumstances.

The appellant was convicted of attempting to intimidate contrary to section 423(1)(b) of the Criminal Code and two counts of breach of probation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant on all counts.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant's purpose in attempting to intimidate the complainant was to compel the complainant to abstain from proceeding in public without fear.

The trial judge's findings that the appellant's actions did not make the complainant fearful and the prior friendly relationship between the parties supported an alternative inference that the appellant's purpose was merely to vex, disquiet, or annoy the complainant.

The court also questioned whether "proceeding in public without fear" constitutes a lawful right within the meaning of section 423(1)(b), but declined to address this issue of statutory interpretation as the appeal was disposed of on other grounds.

The appellant was convicted of importing 830 grams of cocaine dissolved in two bottles of ginger wine that she carried on a flight from Jamaica to Toronto.

She appealed her conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in his findings of fact and credibility assessments and gave unsupportable reasons for rejecting her evidence.

The appellant claimed she was an innocent dupe unaware of the cocaine in the bottles.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly assessed credibility, made reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence, and that the value and manner of the cocaine smuggling supported an inference that the appellant was a knowing participant rather than a blind courier.

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and dangerous driving.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's s. 24(2) Charter analysis regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained following a police take-down.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Grant factors.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal on the basis that the trial judge failed to adequately consider the appellant's exceptional physical condition and the disproportionate impact of incarceration on him.

The sentence was varied to make the dangerous driving sentence concurrent rather than consecutive to the firearm sentence.

The applicant was convicted of first-degree murder of his wife following a jury trial.

He sought judicial interim release pending appeal, which was initially denied.

Three years later, he brought a second application for bail, citing new grounds of appeal, fresh evidence regarding a potential third-party suspect, and the passage of time as material changes in circumstances.

The Crown conceded that the appeal was arguable but opposed release on public interest grounds.

The court granted the application, finding that the interests of reviewability outweighed the interests of enforcement, particularly given the serious new ground relating to defence counsel's removal from the record, the substantial fresh evidence regarding an alternative suspect, the applicant's four years of incarceration pending appeal, and the imminent scheduling of the appeal hearing.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine.

The trial judge had found the appellant in possession of cocaine concealed under the driver's seat of the vehicle he was driving.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in considering that the appellant was in the presence of a person known to be an active member of the drug trade.

The Court of Appeal applied the proviso, finding that the other factors established beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was in possession of the cocaine.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of attempted murder by a jury, based primarily on the recognition evidence of the victim.

They appealed their convictions, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable due to frailties in the identification evidence and the victim's lack of credibility.

They also argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a Vetrovec warning, providing an insufficient jury charge on eyewitness identification, and admitting cellular telephone records.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the verdicts reasonable, the jury instructions adequate, and the cellphone records properly admitted as voluntary statements.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal for trial on a charge of first-degree murder, arguing there was no evidence of planning and deliberation.

The preliminary inquiry judge had committed the applicant based on circumstantial evidence, including the applicant bringing a knife to collect a debt from the deceased.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge engaged in impermissible speculation and conjecture, as there was no evidence of how the fatal altercation began or that the killing was planned.

The application was granted, the committal for first-degree murder was quashed, and the matter was remitted for committal on second-degree murder.

The appellants, a father, mother, and son, were convicted of four counts of first-degree murder after four family members were found drowned in a submerged vehicle.

On appeal, the son sought to introduce fresh evidence claiming he was a young person at the time of the offences, thereby challenging the adult court's jurisdiction.

The appellants also appealed on grounds relating to the admission of expert evidence on honour killings, instructions on post-offence conduct, the admission of ante-mortem hearsay statements, and the Crown's theory of liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application to introduce fresh evidence, finding the proposed documents lacked threshold reliability.

The Court also dismissed all conviction appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.