Michael Dineen

The applicant sought to reopen his sentence appeal after being declared a dangerous offender and receiving an indeterminate sentence.

He argued that based on a subsequent Supreme Court of Canada decision, the sentencing judge erred by not considering the long-term offender provisions.

The Court of Appeal held it had jurisdiction to reopen the appeal because the merits were not previously decided.

The court found it was in the interests of justice to reopen the appeal due to the serious error of law and the possibility of a different result at a new sentencing hearing.

The appellant appealed his conviction for pointing a firearm without lawful excuse.

At trial, the appellant testified that he was a drug dealer and an active participant in a 'gangster' lifestyle.

The trial judge gave a limiting instruction regarding the appellant's criminal record but failed to provide any instruction on how the jury was entitled to deal with the bad character evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that the complete absence of instructions on the issue of bad character evidence constituted reversible error, as there was a real risk the jury could infer guilt based on character.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a lawyer who had power of attorney over a deceased client's affairs, was convicted of theft over $1,000 for failing to notify an insurance company of the client's death and continuing to collect annuity payments.

He appealed the conviction and the dismissal of his pre-trial motion for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter for unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal found that while the application judge erred in attributing certain periods of delay, the total institutional and Crown delay of ten months fell within acceptable limits.

The court also found sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant had the requisite mens rea.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his first-degree murder conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on how his alcohol consumption related to the issue of planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that alcohol consumption was a minor feature of the defence's case, which primarily relied on expert evidence regarding a major depressive episode.

The court found that the trial judge had referred to the alcohol evidence several times in the charge, and the lack of objection from experienced trial counsel indicated the instructions were fair.

The appeal was dismissed.

The young person appealed their convictions for robbery and related offences.

The trial judge had recognized that the eyewitness identification evidence was insufficient on its own and relied on the similarity of signatures on credit card slips as confirmatory evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that this reliance constituted a misapprehension of the evidence, as the early morning slips were not tendered and the expert report stated there were insufficient comparable features.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence after being convicted of sexual assault, choking, unlawful confinement, uttering threats, assault, and failing to comply with a probation order.

The sentencing judge found the appellant to be a long-term offender and imposed a 9-year determinate sentence for the sexual assault and related offences, plus consecutive sentences for other offences and a 10-year supervision order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the sentence appropriate given the appellant's extensive record and the horrific circumstances of the offences.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm, impaired driving, obstructing a peace officer, failing to stop, and public mischief after causing a collision on Highway 401 and falsely reporting her vehicle as stolen.

She appealed her convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in relying on the appellant's prior inconsistent videotaped statement for the truth of its contents, the error did not warrant a new trial given the overwhelming evidence against her.

The court applied the Kienapple principle to stay the conviction for obstructing a peace officer, as it arose from the same false report as the public mischief charge.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed, and the sentence was upheld as fit.

The appellant appealed a restitution order imposed as part of her sentence.

The sentencing judge had imposed the order primarily to save the victim the expense of civil litigation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the restitution order, noting that the appellant was unemployed and bankrupt, and therefore had no ability to pay.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking conspiracy, criminal organization offences, and possession of a prohibited weapon.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence from a cooperating witness, failed to consider the mens rea for the criminal organization counts, and erred in finding possession of a punch dagger.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these grounds, finding sufficient corroboration for the witness's testimony and that the conspiracy findings established the requisite mens rea.

However, the appeal was allowed in part to stay three counts based on the Kienapple principle, as conceded by the Crown.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of trafficking cocaine based on police eyewitness identification.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge's charge to the jury was deficient.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury to consider the identification evidence for each count separately, and by failing to relate the general caution on eyewitness identification to the specific weaknesses in the evidence raised by the defence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred in allowing the Crown to introduce evidence of his general propensity for violence.

The appellant's defence was that the victim's boyfriend, who had a history of violence against the victim, was the actual killer.

The trial judge ruled that because the defence's strategy would expose the boyfriend's propensity for violence, the Crown could introduce similar evidence against the appellant to ensure fairness.

The Court of Appeal held that this ruling was erroneous and highly prejudicial, as the defence had specifically undertaken not to explore the boyfriend's general propensity for violence against third parties.

The Court also found that the trial judge erred in admitting opinion evidence from a police officer regarding the exclusion of other suspects.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences and his 21-month sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the s. 11(b) Charter challenge regarding unreasonable delay.

However, the Court found the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the appellant's knowledge that the restricted weapon was loaded, setting aside that conviction and substituting it with possession of a restricted weapon, which was then stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The conviction for possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose was upheld.

The sentence appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to time served.

The appellant, who had nine prior convictions for impaired driving, was sentenced to four and a half years' imprisonment for his tenth conviction.

The sentencing judge initially failed to specify whether the sentence was concurrent or consecutive to the three and a half year sentence the appellant was already serving.

After the warrant of committal was signed, the judge clarified that the sentence was consecutive.

On appeal, the appellant argued the judge was functus officio and that the consecutive sentence violated the totality principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the judge had jurisdiction to clarify her manifest intention without reconsidering the sentence, and that the consecutive sentence was fit given the paramount need to protect the public from a repeat offender.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery with a firearm and aggravated assault, as well as his sentence.

The charges arose from a group attack where the victim was shot and paralyzed.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing evidence of his finger wound, relying on a co-accused's statement, and finding he knew a real firearm was used.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the accumulation of evidence and the error regarding the co-accused's statement was harmless.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed due to the severe aggravating factors.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that evidence of a handgun and cocaine discovered during a search incident to arrest should have been excluded.

The appellant claimed he was unlawfully detained when police questioned him after observing him riding a bicycle on the sidewalk and fleeing.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that there was no psychological detention.

Furthermore, the Court held that even if the arrest lacked objective reasonable and probable grounds, the evidence was admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter because the officers acted in good faith, the search was minimally intrusive, and the offences were serious.

The appellant appealed a matter to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

A publication ban was ordered prohibiting publication until the end of the trial.

No reasons for decision or outcomes are provided in the available text.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing for a conditional sentence and that the sentence was manifestly excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these arguments, noting the appellant's record for similar offences and that he was on probation for assaulting the same victim.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part because the trial judge failed to credit the appellant for pre-trial custody on a 2:1 basis.

The sentence on count 3 was reduced to two months consecutive.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The trial judge had imposed conditional discharges.

The Court of Appeal held that a discharge is not legally available for the offence of dangerous driving causing death.

The appeal was allowed, the conditional discharges were set aside, and suspended sentences with probation were substituted.

The appellant appealed convictions for indecent assault arising from a jury trial on multiple sexual offence counts involving family members.

The appeal turned on whether the trial judge properly admitted similar fact evidence from an additional witness and whether the evidence on each count was admissible across all other counts.

Applying the post-trial framework in the Supreme Court authorities on similar fact evidence, the court held that the issue had been defined too broadly as credibility and that the alleged acts lacked the necessary persuasive degree of connection across all counts.

The prejudicial effect of the impugned evidence outweighed its probative value on several counts.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence imposed on the respondent, arguing it was too light for a serious offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reason to interfere with the trial judge's exercise of discretion given the very favourable pre-sentence report.