Michael Dineen

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for sexual offences, including rape.

He argued that the trial judge misused discreditable conduct evidence, erred in a severance ruling, and that the Crown's cross-examination was improper.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's careful reasons and ample reason to disbelieve the appellant.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was fit given the serious nature of the offences, the vulnerability of the victims, and the appellant's prior record for sexual assault.

The appellant pleaded guilty to arson and was sentenced to nine months' imprisonment, probation, and a $40,537.50 restitution order in favour of the insurance company.

He appealed the restitution order.

The Court of Appeal held that while an insurance company can be the subject of a restitution order under s. 738(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, the sentencing judge erred by failing to consider the appellant's inability to pay and the unfairness of the order given that the co-perpetrators who initiated the arson and received the insurance money were not ordered to pay restitution.

The appeal was allowed and the restitution order was set aside.

The appellants appealed their convictions for a home invasion, arguing that the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding circumstantial evidence, specifically the victim's description of the perpetrators' accents and the continuity of a durag found at the scene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly instructed the jury on how they could use the victim's statements and fairly reviewed the evidence concerning continuity.

The appellant, an ordained minister, appealed his conviction for sexual assault and his four-year sentence.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately correct the Crown's misstatement that a relationship of trust alone vitiates consent under s. 273.1(2)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions as a whole correctly required proof of an abuse of the position of trust.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed; although the trial judge misapprehended some evidence, the four-year sentence remained fit given the serious breach of trust against a vulnerable complainant.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and related offences.

At trial, the defence called a witness who testified that the appellant was with her and not involved in the robbery.

The trial judge characterized this as an alibi defence and instructed the jury that they could draw an adverse inference from the defence's failure to disclose the alibi prior to trial.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law, as the defence was not an alibi but rather an admission of some involvement in the events coupled with a denial of the crimes.

The Crown did not need advance notice to investigate the witness, who was already known to them.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possessing a loaded restricted firearm and being present in a motor vehicle with a firearm.

He was arrested during a fake drug deal where he and two others intended to rob an undercover officer.

The trial judge found him guilty as a party under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of common intention to rob but applied the Kienapple principle to stay the less serious firearms charge.

The appellant appealed her convictions for criminal negligence causing bodily harm and aggravated assault for transmitting HIV to her husband through unprotected sex.

She argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding her belief that she was HIV-negative following a Canadian immigration medical assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that while the trial judge misapprehended some evidence, it did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the two-year sentence by one day to preserve the appellant's right to appeal a potential deportation order under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The appellant appealed his sentence for impaired driving causing death and bodily harm.

His blood alcohol readings were over three times the legal limit, and this was his third drinking and driving offence.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence fit and upheld the lifetime driving prohibition, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction by a Superior Court of Justice judge sitting without a jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it to be essentially fact-driven and concluding that the trial judge did not err in his analysis or conclusion.

In an addendum to a sentence appeal decision, the Court of Appeal corrected an illegal probation order it had previously imposed.

The appellant's new sentence of two years was consecutive to a previous sentence of five years and nine months.

Because the total merged sentence exceeded two years, a probation order was not legally available under the Criminal Code.

The court exercised its inherent jurisdiction to correct the accidental error and struck the probation order.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding the police officer's evidence reliable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that there was no basis to find the officer's evidence unreliable.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault and sexual exploitation.

He appealed on the grounds that the trial judge's jury instructions failed to review the evidence, relate it to the positions of the parties, and adequately outline factors relevant to the complainant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by not reviewing the evidence for each discrete count and failing to instruct the jury to treat each count separately.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, a stranger to the complainant, jumped out from behind bushes, blocked her path, and chased her down a dark street while she was jogging.

He was convicted of criminal harassment and sentenced to three years in prison.

On appeal, the court upheld the conviction, finding that a single incident of highly threatening and persistent conduct can constitute criminal harassment.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the sentence to two years' imprisonment, finding the original sentence disproportionate to the conduct.

In a subsequent addendum, the court struck a probation order it had initially imposed, as the totality of the appellant's sentences exceeded two years.

The appellant was stopped for stunt driving and his vehicle was impounded under the Highway Traffic Act.

During an inventory search of the vehicle, police opened a bag and found cocaine and marijuana.

The appellant appealed his drug convictions, arguing the search violated his s. 8 Charter rights because inventory searches should be limited to itemizing visible property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that police are entitled to search and itemize the contents of bags and containers during an inventory search to properly safeguard the property.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application to quash their committal for trial.

They argued a denial of natural justice regarding the preliminary inquiry judge's use of hearsay evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no denial of natural justice, noting that counsel had the opportunity to make submissions on the issue and that the absence of a voir dire did not constitute jurisdictional error.

The court also found sufficient evidence of knowledge and control of a gun to warrant committal, based on the location of the child, the car seat, and the visibility of the gun.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellants appealed their convictions.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in foreclosing the appellants from challenging the factual underpinnings of the counselling to commit murder charges for which the appellant Vanderheyden stood convicted.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting that the counselling convictions provided a significant boost to the credibility of two unsavoury witnesses.

The court found that the curative proviso could not be applied, as it could not be satisfied that Vanderheyden would not have testified had the trial judge ruled differently.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder following a fatal altercation outside a bar where the victim was struck with a baseball bat.

The appellant appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge made several errors in the jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred by instructing the jury they could use a witness's prior videotaped statement for the truth of its contents without proper adoption, failing to give a Vetrovec warning for a key Crown witness with credibility issues, improperly dismissing the intoxication defence, and failing to correct the Crown's breach of the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants were convicted of offences relating to the theft and sale of firearms.

They appealed their convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in applying the W. (D.) framework to the accused's testimony, improperly treated a lack of memory as an undisclosed alibi, and failed to exercise sufficient caution when accepting the evidence of an unsavoury witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the trial judge properly applied the burden of proof, appropriately cautioned himself regarding the unsavoury witness, and provided adequate reasons in accordance with R. v. R.E.M.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of ecstasy.

During a vehicle stop, police found cocaine under the passenger seat where the appellant was sitting, and further drugs during a pat-down and subsequent strip search.

The trial judge found Charter breaches and excluded the drugs found during the strip search under s. 24(2), but admitted the other drugs.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to properly weigh an officer's untruthful testimony in the s. 24(2) analysis and erred in applying the rule in Brown v. Dunn.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis was entitled to deference and her credibility findings were reasonable.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault against a young family member.

He argued the trial judge erred by allowing improper cross-examination and improperly attributing a motive to lie when assessing his credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge had valid, independent grounds for rejecting the appellant's evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed; although the trial judge improperly characterized certain factors as aggravating, the sentence of two years less a day remained fit given the serious nature of the offence.