Michael Dineen

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud, arguing that the Crown failed to establish the actus reus because the alleged victim, Legal Aid Ontario, did not rely on the fraudulent conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, applying the principle from R. v. Riesberry that proof of fraud does not always require showing reliance or inducement, provided there is a sufficient causal connection between the fraudulent act and the victim's risk of deprivation.

The appellant was convicted of intentional discharge of a firearm and aggravated assault after shooting an unarmed man in his home following a drug deal gone wrong.

The appellant claimed self-defence, arguing he believed the victim was armed and part of a group that included another man carrying a shotgun.

The trial judge rejected the self-defence claim, finding the appellant's response unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred by holding the appellant to a standard of perfection, failing to consider the fast-paced and stressful context, and making unreasonable factual findings based on a blanket rejection of the appellant's credibility.

The appellant appealed a conviction for luring a child to engage in sexual activity arising from an undercover online investigation.

The principal issue was whether the proceedings should have been stayed for entrapment.

Applying the entrapment framework, the court held that the police had reasonable grounds to suspect criminal activity from the advertisement and ensuing communications, and did not induce the offence.

Additional grounds concerning jury trial, warrant naming errors, medical condition, psychological assessment methodology, and alleged evidence tampering were all rejected.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal sentence was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for offences arising from a high-speed car chase where a police officer was struck and seriously injured.

The main issue at trial was the identity of the driver.

The trial judge admitted an unsworn videotaped statement from a passenger identifying the appellant as the driver, as the passenger claimed no memory at trial due to heroin use.

The Court of Appeal upheld the admission of the statement, finding it met the threshold requirements of necessity and reliability.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court noting the appellant's lengthy criminal record and the deliberate attack on a vulnerable police officer.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a five-year penitentiary sentence imposed after the respondent pleaded guilty to multiple sexual offences against his daughter.

The court considered whether the sentencing judge misapprehended the applicable range for repeated parental sexual abuse and whether the sentence was manifestly unfit in light of prior authorities and the respondent's dated prior sexual offence record.

The court held that the sentencing judge did not treat the earlier authority as binding in a way that precluded a higher sentence and remained alive to both aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

Although the sentence was at the bottom of the applicable range, it was not manifestly unfit.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his four-year sentence for criminal harassment and assault of his former partner.

He argued the trial judge erred by denying 1.5:1 credit for pre-sentence custody, sentencing him to a penitentiary term for treatment, and imposing a demonstrably unfit sentence.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in denying the 1.5:1 credit based on the likelihood of bail denial, applying the Summers principle to grant the enhanced credit.

However, the court dismissed the other grounds, finding the penitentiary sentence was not imposed solely for treatment and the four-year total sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the egregious domestic abuse.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms and drug offences, arguing that the search warrant for his residence was unconstitutional.

The warrant was based largely on information from a confidential informant.

The appellant contended that the redacted Information to Obtain (ITO) did not provide reasonable grounds for the warrant and that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow cross-examination of the ITO affiant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the redacted ITO provided sufficient grounds when read as a whole and that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in refusing cross-examination to protect the informant's identity.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence establishing that a specific incident occurred later than the trial judge had found.

Because the trial judge had relied on the erroneous chronology to distinguish the count on which he convicted from those on which he acquitted, the distinction disappeared.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on impaired driving and excess blood alcohol charges after the trial judge barred the Crown from conducting a voluntariness voir dire concerning the accused’s statement to police.

The appeal court held that, although trial judges have broad authority to manage proceedings efficiently and fairly, that authority cannot be exercised in a manner that unfairly causes irreparable damage to the prosecution.

The court found the parties had notice from the judicial pretrial that the Crown intended to rely on the statement, and any delay or prejudice could have been managed by recalling officers on a limited voir dire.

The exclusion of the statement on trial management grounds was legal error.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of criminal negligence causing death and leaving the scene of an accident, but acquitted of dangerous driving causing death arising from the same conduct.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the verdicts for criminal negligence and dangerous driving to be necessarily inconsistent, as the jury found a marked and substantial departure but not a marked departure.

The conviction for criminal negligence was set aside and an acquittal entered.

The conviction for leaving the scene was also set aside due to a flawed jury instruction on 'evidence to the contrary', and a new trial was ordered on that count.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed on the respondent for sexual offences, arguing the sentencing judge erred in granting 2:1 credit for pre-sentence custody.

The sentencing judge had found that the retrospective application of the Truth in Sentencing Act, which capped credit at 1.5:1, violated the respondent's s. 11(i) Charter right to the benefit of the lesser punishment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that pre-sentence custody constitutes punishment under s. 11(i) and that the statutory cap varied that punishment.

The Court further held that the Crown failed to justify the Charter violation under s. 1, as the transitional provision did not minimally impair the respondent's rights.

The appellants, members of the Bandidos motorcycle gang, appealed their convictions for multiple counts of first degree murder and manslaughter arising from the execution-style killings of eight fellow gang members.

The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in ruling that the common law defence of duress was unavailable to persons charged as parties to murder.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law, as the common law defence of duress remains available to parties to murder.

However, the Court dismissed the appeals, finding no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice because there was no air of reality to the duress defence for any of the appellants on the evidence.

The appellant appealed their conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing alibi and eyewitness evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably characterized the alibi evidence as vague and properly weighed its late disclosure.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's reliance on the recognition evidence from two independent witnesses.

The appellant appealed her conviction for importing cocaine, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting a challenge for cause based on her work in the sex trade and that the Crown's cross-examination on her notebook was unfair.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the discretionary decision to decline the challenge for cause.

The court also found no unfairness in the cross-examination, noting the notebook was admitted on consent and the trial judge provided numerous cautions to the jury.

On a summary conviction appeal from a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol, the appellant challenged the trial judge’s reliance on hearsay evidence to explain delays in obtaining breath samples.

The court held that the trial judge used the hearsay for its truth despite the Crown not tendering it under a principled hearsay framework or established exception.

Because the impugned evidence was central to the finding that the samples were taken as soon as practicable under s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, the conviction could not stand.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered before a different judge.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting his stepdaughter.

At trial, the complainant's mother, who was a police officer, testified that she used trickery to obtain an admission from the appellant.

The trial judge accepted this evidence and found the mother was acting as a police officer, but no voir dire was held to determine the voluntariness of the statement.

The Court of Appeal held that given the trial judge's finding that the mother was acting as a person in authority, a voir dire was required.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

Five criminal appeals arising from a major gang investigation challenged informer-privilege procedures, wiretap authorizations, general warrants, covert searches, no-knock take-down warrants, a warrantless vehicle search, jury instructions, and expert opinion evidence.

The court held that an ex parte, in camera first-stage informer privilege hearing was proper, that Criminal Code ss. 186(1.1) and 487.01 were constitutionally valid, and that the wiretap authorizations and general warrants were lawfully issued and executed.

Although one warrantless vehicle search was conducted in an unreasonable manner and one aspect of the conspiracy jury charge was erroneous, the evidence was properly admitted under s. 24(2) and the charge error caused no substantial wrong.

All convictions were upheld and all appeals were dismissed.

The four applicants, who were convicted of various offences including participating in a criminal organization, applied for the appointment of counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for their appeals.

The Crown conceded the applicants lacked sufficient means but argued their proposed grounds of appeal lacked merit.

The court found that only one applicant, Ms. Neeranjan, had an arguable ground of appeal regarding her conviction for participating in a criminal organization.

Her application was allowed, while the applications of the other three were dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud in relation to a high yield investment scam.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred in admitting expert profiling evidence, giving confusing jury instructions on conspiracy, and admitting preliminary inquiry evidence.

The Court of Appeal found the expert evidence was properly admitted and the preliminary inquiry evidence met the statutory requirements.

However, the trial judge erred in his conspiracy instructions by presenting it as an 'all or nothing' proposition and failing to properly explain the Carter stages.

The conspiracy convictions were set aside.

The court also reduced one appellant's restitution order by two-thirds to reflect the shared responsibility of all three co-accused.

The appellant appealed convictions for multiple sexual offences involving the minor daughter of his former partner.

The trial judge rejected the appellant’s denial largely based on an assumed failure to respond appropriately when the complainant allegedly asked to touch his penis and on a third party’s out-of-court statement implying knowledge of an improper relationship.

The Court of Appeal held that the first finding lacked evidentiary support because the appellant had never been asked about any response, making the inference unfair.

The court also found the statement was inadmissible hearsay and did not meet the requirements of the principled hearsay exception or the state of mind exception.

Because these errors tainted the credibility analysis, the convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.