Michael Dineen

The appellant appealed his convictions for illegal possession of handguns and breach of recognizance, arguing that the search warrant executed at his residence violated his section 8 Charter rights.

The warrant was based on an anonymous Crime Stoppers tip and was executed in the middle of the night.

The Court of Appeal held that the police had sufficiently corroborated the anonymous tip, including the appellant's criminal record and biographical details, to justify the warrant.

The Court also found the nighttime search reasonable given the risk to public safety and the presence of other occupants in the home.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of the respondents, arguing the trial judge erred in finding a breach of section 8 of the Charter and excluding evidence under section 24(2).

The trial judge had excised misleading information from the Information to Obtain (ITO) and concluded the remaining facts could not support the search warrant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that even after removing the misstatements, there remained sufficient reliable evidence connecting the respondents and the searched premises to the robbery to justify issuing the warrant.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed her convictions for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and heroin, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing her motion to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The contraband was found during a warrantless search of her knapsack after police responded to a 911 call about a hostage situation.

The Court of Appeal found that the search violated the appellant's s. 8 Charter rights, as it was not justified by exigent circumstances or the Waterfield doctrine.

However, applying the Grant framework, the Court concluded the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) because the police acted in good faith in a chaotic situation and the law regarding police powers in such circumstances was uncertain.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder based on strong DNA evidence linking his blood to the crime scene.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the use of the appellant's pre-trial statements, specifically by failing to give an O'Connor instruction and by incorrectly stating that prior inconsistent exculpatory statements were not evidence unless adopted at trial.

The Court of Appeal found no error in omitting the O'Connor instruction given the independent evidence of concoction.

While the court agreed the trial judge erred in his instruction on prior inconsistent statements, it applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding the error caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice given the overwhelming DNA evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after stabbing the deceased.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in ruling that adducing evidence of the deceased's attempt to recruit young boys for armed robberies would put the appellant's own propensity for violence in issue.

He also argued the trial judge misdirected the jury on the adoption of prior inconsistent statements by witnesses who had no present recollection of the events.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the evidentiary ruling was correct and that while the jury instruction on prior statements was erroneous, it caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The young person appealed her conviction and sentence for robbery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's use of after-the-fact conduct evidence.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

The trial judge had imposed a sentence exceeding the recommendations of both the Crown and defence.

The Court found the sentence excessive and reduced it to time served (two-and-a-half months) while maintaining the $350 restitution order.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that his failure to call or report to the police could be considered as consciousness of guilt.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the direction infringed the holding in R. v. Turcotte.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso as the Crown's case was not overwhelming and the error could have impacted trial fairness.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his firearm convictions, arguing that the police violated his rights under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The police had detained the appellant after observing suspicious movements in a parked car and recalling an officer safety alert indicating he might be armed and wearing a bulletproof vest.

After a pat-down search revealed a bulletproof vest, the police searched a bag in the vehicle and found a handgun, which the appellant had abandoned before fleeing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the investigative detention lawful, that the appellant lacked standing to challenge the search due to abandonment, and that the search of the bag was justified for officer safety.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the trial judge made several errors in his charge to the jury.

The appellant contended the trial judge failed to review the position of the defence, erred in responding to a jury question about an alternative suspect, introduced a speculative theory of planning and deliberation, and gave an inadequate Vetrovec warning regarding the key Crown witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge's failure to explicitly set out the defence position was ill-advised, the charge as a whole conveyed a sufficient understanding of the issues.

The court also found no reversible errors in the response to the jury question, the instructions on planning and deliberation, or the Vetrovec warning.

The appellant, an aboriginal first offender, pleaded guilty to fraud over $5,000 for her participation in a large-scale welfare fraud scheme on the Fort William First Nation.

She was sentenced to 16 months' incarceration and ordered to pay $96,000 in restitution.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in his application of the Gladue principles by requiring the appellant to establish a causal link between systemic background factors and the commission of the offence.

The Court allowed the appeal, reducing the sentence to 10 months' incarceration followed by two years' probation, noting the appellant's lesser role, her gambling addiction, and her responsibilities as a caregiver to a disabled child.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder for the death of his friend, and acquitted of second degree murder for the death of his estranged wife in a separate trial.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructions regarding intoxication, propensity evidence, Vetrovec warnings, and an 'honest witness' presumption.

The Crown appealed the acquittal, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding evidence of the friend's subsequent murder as after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the jury instructions in the first trial were adequate overall despite minor errors, and the trial judge in the second trial made no reversible error in balancing the probative value and prejudicial effect of the excluded evidence.

The accused appealed convictions arising from historical allegations of physical and sexual abuse against two complainants, and the Crown appealed sentence.

The court held that the trial judge's rejection of the accused's evidence rested on speculative reasoning, including unsupported findings about anger, alcohol-related memory impairment, and an impermissible assumption that the accused had a motive to lie to avoid criminal liability.

The court further held that the reasons failed to grapple with a significant contradiction between the complainants on a key issue.

The conviction appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

In light of that disposition, the sentence appeal was not addressed.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on firearms offences after the trial judge excluded evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the police lacked objective reasonable grounds for arrest.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by failing to give weight to the informer's credibility and by compartmentalizing the surveillance evidence.

The Court found that the totality of the circumstances, including the reliable tip and corroborating surveillance of a rental car and suspicious handling of a shoebox, provided reasonable grounds for the arrest and subsequent search.

The appellant appealed his convictions arising from an armed robbery, arguing the trial judge erred by using his pre-trial silence upon arrest to reject his exculpatory testimony.

The Court of Appeal agreed that using the appellant's constitutionally protected silence to assess credibility was a serious error in law.

However, the Court applied the curative proviso and dismissed the appeal, finding that the Crown's circumstantial case was overwhelming and the appellant's testimony was entirely implausible, such that no reasonable trier of fact could have reached a different verdict.

The witness, an alleged victim of historical sexual assaults, sought to wear a niqab while testifying at a preliminary inquiry.

The accused objected, arguing it would impair their right to make full answer and defence by preventing effective cross-examination.

The preliminary inquiry judge ordered the witness to remove the niqab, finding her religious belief was not strong enough.

The Superior Court quashed this order on certiorari.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that a preliminary inquiry judge has jurisdiction to regulate proceedings and balance competing Charter rights.

The Court established a framework for reconciling a witness's freedom of religion with an accused's right to a fair trial, requiring a fact-specific inquiry.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the matter was remitted to the preliminary inquiry judge to conduct a proper inquiry.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm offences, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting a statement he made to police during the execution of a search warrant.

The appellant, who was handcuffed, cold, and shivering after stun grenades were deployed, was asked by police where his coat was, leading to the discovery of a firearm.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge made three errors in assessing voluntariness: erroneously finding a partial caution was given, failing to consider the cold as an inducement, and misapprehending evidence about whether the appellant was offered other jackets.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant pleaded guilty to sexual exploitation and was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, he adduced fresh evidence that he was subject to a deportation order and had lost his right to appeal it because his sentence was two years or more.

The Court of Appeal found that while the original sentence was not unfit, the certainty of deportation to a country where he had no ties, combined with his rehabilitation and the fact he had nearly completed his sentence, justified reducing the sentence to two years less a day to preserve his right to appeal the deportation.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He argued the trial judge failed to address peripheral evidence and erred in finding he was in a position of trust.

He also sought an intermittent sentence for his 45-day term.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence peripheral and the position of trust supported by the record.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder and home invasion.

The Crown's case relied on statements made by the appellant during a 'Mr. Big' operation, cell phone records, and a tacit admission to a friend.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by permitting prohibited propensity reasoning, ruling that the defence violated the rule in Browne v. Dunn, and instructing the jury on the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no impermissible propensity reasoning, upholding the Browne v. Dunn ruling as fair, and concluding the hearsay instruction caused no prejudice.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and aggravated assault, and his 10-year sentence, following a stabbing incident.

He argued the trial judge erred regarding evidence of his right to silence, prior consistent statements, and post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal found that while the Crown made minor errors regarding the right to silence and prior statements, they caused no substantial prejudice and the curative proviso applied.

The court stayed the aggravated assault conviction under the Kienapple principle but otherwise dismissed the conviction and sentence appeals.