Mahmud Jamal

The appellant, convicted of participating in a criminal organization, conspiracy to transfer firearms, possession of property obtained by crime, and unauthorized firearm possession, sought bail pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the appellant's release would pose substantial public safety concerns due to his leadership in gun trafficking and stated intent to commit further offences.

The court also determined that releasing a convicted gun trafficker and head of a criminal organization would significantly undermine public confidence in the administration of justice, emphasizing the strong enforceability interest given the seriousness of the offences.

The applicant, Alexander Sangster, sought bail pending his conviction and sentence appeal for aggravated assault, assault causing bodily harm, firearm offences, and breach of recognizance.

He was sentenced to seven years and seven months.

The Crown opposed bail, arguing detention was necessary in the public interest.

The court granted bail, finding that the applicant had made substantial progress in managing his addiction, reducing public safety risk, and that the public interest in reviewability outweighed the enforceability interest, especially given the length of sentence already served and the arguable grounds of appeal.

The appellant, a lawyer, sued the respondents (a law firm and individuals) for alleged breach of solicitor-client privilege.

The respondents successfully moved to strike the action based on issue estoppel, a decision the appellant appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the three-part test for issue estoppel was met.

The Master in an earlier, unrelated proceeding had squarely addressed and decided the privilege issue, finding it waived, and that decision was final due to the appellant's withdrawal of the appeal.

The appellants, Desiree McNeill and John Waechter, appealed their convictions for jointly possessing heroin and crystal methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.

A central issue was whether police required a second warrant to examine a seized cellphone belonging to an individual not initially targeted by the investigation, given the broad authorization in the initial search warrant for electronic devices found in a suspected drug trafficking hub.

The Court of Appeal held that the initial warrant, supported by a comprehensive Information to Obtain (ITO), provided sufficient reasonable grounds to authorize the examination of any electronic device found in the premises, including those of unknown individuals, without requiring a second warrant.

The court also found no basis to challenge the reasonableness of the convictions, concluding that the trial judge's finding of joint constructive possession was reasonable based on the totality of the evidence.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellants, Conroy and Kharla Rose, appealed their convictions for possession of proceeds of crime and money laundering.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals from conviction and ordered a new trial on two main grounds: the trial judge erred in dismissing an additional juror without random selection, thereby improperly constituting the jury, and erred in admitting evidence of Conroy's prior convictions in the form of judicial reasons without proper balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect and inadequate jury instructions.

Kharla Rose's separate appeal regarding unreasonable trial delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter was dismissed, as the delay was deemed reasonable under the pre-Jordan Morin framework.

The appellant, M.D., appealed a conviction for sexual assault.

The primary ground of appeal was that the trial judge erred in law by rejecting the appellant's evidence on the basis that it appeared "tailored" to the Crown's evidence and disclosure.

The Court of Appeal found this constituted a legal error, as it improperly used the appellant's constitutional rights to disclosure and presence at trial as a basis to impugn credibility.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial, emphasizing that such an error goes to the heart of trial fairness and the right to make full answer and defence.

The appellant, a dangerous offender, appealed an indeterminate sentence imposed for breaching his long-term supervision order (LTSO).

The breach involved pursuing a young woman without reporting contact, a behaviour similar to his past criminal harassment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly considered the principles of proportionality and mitigating factors, and reasonably concluded that an indeterminate sentence was necessary for public protection given the appellant's high risk of recidivism and history of non-compliance with treatment.

The court did, however, set aside a victim surcharge in accordance with R. v. Boudreault.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for aggravated assault.

He sought to admit fresh evidence, a hospital report confirming broken fingers, to support his self-defence argument.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the fresh evidence were admitted, it would not change the result because there was no basis for a self-defence claim during the second altercation, which was the basis of the charge.

The trial judge had already found that the appellant escalated the conflict and that his actions were not in response to a threat.

The appellant, Wayne Thomas Hill, appealed his conviction and sentence for two counts of attempted abduction of a child and two counts of breaching a prohibition order.

The appeal raised two issues: a request to vary a blanket lifetime internet ban imposed as part of his sentence, and the requirement for registration in the sex offender registry.

The Court of Appeal varied the internet prohibition order to a more specific set of restrictions, aligning with the nature of the order granted in R. v. Brar, but dismissed the appeal regarding the sex offender registry and all other issues.

The appellant, Mathew Hayes, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, raising nine grounds of appeal.

These grounds included allegations of police trickery in obtaining his statement, errors in denying third-party suspect applications, failure to disclose a Crimestoppers tip, denial of a directed verdict of acquittal, and misdirections in jury instructions regarding circumstantial evidence and the proper use of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the conviction, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's decisions or jury instructions.

The appellant, O'Neil Thompson, appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found that the trial judge erred in not finding an arbitrary detention under s. 9 of the Charter when police boxed in the appellant's car without reasonable grounds.

The Court also confirmed a serious breach of s. 10(b) due to a systemic issue within the Peel Regional Police regarding the immediate provision of the right to counsel.

Applying the s. 24(2) Charter analysis, the Court concluded that the serious nature of the Charter breaches, particularly the arbitrary detention and the systemic delay in advising of the right to counsel, outweighed society's interest in the admission of the evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and an acquittal directed.

The appellant, Roch St. Denis, appealed his sentence.

On consent of both parties, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to 324 days.

This adjustment was made to enable the appellant to immediately apply for parole under s. 127(3) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.

The appellant appealed his first-degree murder conviction, challenging the trial judge's decisions regarding expert evidence on the cause of death.

The primary expert opinion suggested drowning based on diatom analysis, but an alternate theory of starvation was also presented.

The appellant argued that the alternate theory lacked sufficient evidentiary basis and caused confusion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the expert's opinion on an alternate cause was properly admitted given the scientific controversy surrounding diatom analysis and other evidence supporting starvation.

The court affirmed that the jury, as the trier of fact, could consider all evidence and was not bound by expert opinions, especially when alternative explanations had an "air of reality."

The appellants, Orville Campbell and Stanton David, appealed their convictions for first-degree murder.

They argued the verdict was unreasonable due to insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation and alleged errors in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal found the first-degree murder verdict unreasonable, concluding that the evidence did not establish planning and deliberation beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly given the rapid sequence of events.

The court substituted the convictions with second-degree murder.

It dismissed all grounds for a new trial on second-degree murder, finding no reversible errors in the jury instructions regarding post-offence conduct, the Vetrovec warning for a key witness, pathology evidence, or the use of the deceased's criminal record.

The appellant, Marvin Rubner, appealed a lower court decision that found no binding settlement agreement had been reached between him and his brother, Joseph Rubner, regarding their real estate business interests.

The application judge had concluded that Joseph's counsel had limited authority to negotiate only the minutes of settlement, not the "Deal Points," and that Marvin's counsel was aware of this limitation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the application judge's interpretation of the agreement and application of the test for ostensible authority were questions of mixed fact and law, reviewable only for palpable and overriding error, which was not demonstrated.

The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal from a motion judge's order granting specific performance for breach of contract.

The appellate court found that the motion judge erred in law by awarding specific performance without evidence or a finding that the property was unique, which resulted in a windfall for the respondent.

The matter was remitted for trial.

This is an appeal from a trial judge's decision to discharge a mortgage.

The appellant claimed a loan was secured by a mortgage on the respondent's home, which was later re-loaned but remained secured.

The trial judge, unable to determine witness credibility, relied on documentary evidence to find the mortgage had been repaid and effectively redeemed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that the issue of redemption was properly before the court via counterclaim, that the appellant waived technical compliance by admitting repayment, and that the trial judge was entitled to rely on documentary evidence given credibility issues.

This appeal arose from a long-standing, high-conflict family law dispute.

The appellants challenged a motion judge's order that clarified spousal support obligations, addressed the impact of bankruptcy on an equalization payment secured by a letter of credit, and apportioned trial costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's clarifications that periodic support continued due to the husband's failure to exercise a lump sum option, that the letter of credit securing equalization and support created an equitable trust not extinguished by bankruptcy, and that the allocation of trial costs was appropriate.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's conclusion that the officer had subjective reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, finding it supported by evidence and objectively reasonable.

The allegation of negligent investigation was dismissed because the appellants failed to present expert evidence on the standard of care to rebut the police's evidence.

The court affirmed that summary judgment in favour of a defendant was appropriate in this case.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCR) for violent offences, appealed the Ontario Review Board's (Board) decision to maintain a detention order, seeking a conditional or absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's finding that the appellant still posed a significant threat to public safety.

However, the Court found the Board's decision to impose a detention order, rather than a conditional discharge, unreasonable because it failed to adequately explain why the appellant's risk could not be managed under a conditional discharge, particularly given the Hospital's recommendation for a conditional discharge and expert evidence regarding medication compliance and monitoring.

The matter was remitted to the Board for a rehearing.