Mark C. Halfyard

The appellant appealed his conviction for historical sexual assault, arguing the trial judge failed to properly address discrepancies between the complainant's evidence and that of her sister, and misapprehended evidence regarding the complainant's demeanour upon disclosure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's brief reasons were responsive to the issues and disclosed no misapprehension of evidence.

The trial judge was entitled to find that discrepancies were explained by the passage of time and to rely on the consistent evidence of the complainant's emotional upset during disclosure to support her credibility and reliability.

The appellant, convicted by a jury as a party to a commercial robbery for acting as the getaway driver, challenged both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal held that the circumstantial evidence, including cellphone searches, call activity, her links to the robbers before and after the offence, and her role in transporting the robbers and stolen property, reasonably supported the inference that she knew in advance that a robbery involving violence or threats would occur.

The court also held that although Crown counsel's reconstructed dialogue in closing submissions was improper and should not be used, the tactic did not render the trial unfair in light of the qualifications given, the evidentiary foundation for the inferences, and the trial judge's corrective instruction.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed because no error in principle or factual error was shown and there was no basis to interfere with the custodial sentence.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction arising from historical allegations involving a complainant who was under 14 during the charge period.

He argued that the trial judge failed to resolve material inconsistencies between the complainant and another Crown witness, improperly treated inconsistent evidence as confirmatory, misstated the application of the W.(D.) rule to exculpatory Crown evidence, and failed to explain the impact of frailties in one allegation on the complainant's overall reliability.

The court held that the alleged inconsistencies were either not borne out by the record or concerned immaterial details, and that the shared details between independent witnesses could properly reinforce the accepted account.

Although the trial judge described the W.(D.) rule too narrowly, the reasons showed that exculpatory Crown evidence was in fact used to generate doubt on one incident.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime following a high-risk takedown arrest and the execution of a search warrant at his home.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred by finding the police used reasonable force during his arrest, by engaging in impermissible after-the-fact reasoning regarding a delay in his right to counsel, and by refusing to exclude evidence seized from his home under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the police use of force was justified given the appellant's history, the trial judge's reasons were not improper after-the-fact justifications, and the evidence seized from the home was not obtained in a manner that infringed the Charter because the search was temporally and causally disconnected from the unlawful police interview.

The appellant sought an order to prevent police from continuing to examine electronic devices seized under search warrants, pending an appeal of a decision dismissing an application for certiorari to quash the warrants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no serious issue to be tried, as certiorari is discretionary and exceptional in ongoing investigations.

The court also found no irreparable harm, as remedies remain available on appeal or at trial, and the balance of convenience favoured allowing the investigation to continue.

The moving party sought a stay of an order dismissing his application for certiorari to quash search warrants related to a child sexual abuse material investigation.

The motion judge questioned whether a single judge of the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to grant the requested stay under the Criminal Code, the Courts of Justice Act, or the court's ancillary jurisdiction.

Given the unsettled jurisdictional law, the motion judge referred the motion to a full panel for determination and adjourned the hearing.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of child sexual abuse and exploitation material and was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment followed by three years' probation.

On appeal, he sought a conditional sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in assessing his mental health issues, treating the involvement of children as an aggravating factor, and evaluating his risk of reoffending.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's application of sentencing principles or her conclusion that the appellant's mental health issues were not operative at the time of the offence.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and imposed a conditional sentence, finding the sentencing judge failed to properly account for the appellant's serious mental illness.

The appellant appealed jury convictions for historical sexual offences against a family member, alleging errors in the jury charge concerning the W.(D.) framework, eyewitness identification, and defence submissions about recovered memory.

He also sought to file fresh evidence consisting of a post-verdict juror Facebook message and a foreperson's note to argue a reasonable apprehension of jury bias.

The court held that the charge, read as a whole, adequately instructed the jury on reasonable doubt and the frailties of identification evidence, and that the trial judge's narrow corrective instruction on recovered memory was proper.

Although the fresh evidence was admitted because it bore on trial fairness, it did not rebut the presumption of juror impartiality.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder arising from a single gunshot fired during a melee in a bar parking lot.

He argued that the verdict was unreasonable due to inconsistencies between the video evidence and the medical evidence regarding the bullet's trajectory, and that the trial judge misapplied the mens rea for attempted murder by convicting on the basis of recklessness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusions on identity and intent were firmly grounded in the video evidence and that the trial judge correctly applied the requirement of specific intent to kill.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the trial judge erred by refusing to quash a vehicle search warrant and denying leave to cross-examine the affiant of the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The appellant contended that the ITO relied on an uncorroborated confidential informant tip and speculative police surveillance, and was drafted with gross negligence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the surveillance evidence sufficiently corroborated the tip to establish reasonable grounds for the warrant, and that the alleged drafting deficiencies did not amount to bad faith or warrant cross-examination.

The appellant pleaded guilty to firearms offences after taking possession of a loaded gun from an intoxicated individual to prevent danger to the public.

He kept the gun in a safe for two and a half months while attempting to contact a lawyer, during which time police seized it.

The sentencing judge imposed a seven-month conditional sentence, declining to grant a discharge due to the appellant's criminal record, existing weapons prohibitions, and lack of diligence in divesting the weapon.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's assessment of mitigating and aggravating factors or the calculation of pre-sentence credit.

The applicant sought release pending appeal from manslaughter conviction and sentence.

The court accepted the appeal was not frivolous, surrender and safety concerns were manageable, and public confidence favored review before immediate enforcement in the circumstances.

Release pending appeal was ordered on agreed terms.

A young person was convicted of sexual assault, sexual touching, and invitation to sexual touching of his stepsister.

On appeal, the court found two critical errors: (1) the trial judge improperly discontinued cross-examination of a key witness based on insufficient medical evidence and then relied on that witness's testimony to support the conviction, and (2) the trial judge placed undue weight on the appellant's demeanour to reject his evidence as untruthful, despite initially finding him credible.

The appeal was allowed, convictions on two counts were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder following a jury trial and sentenced to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility of 15 years and 9 months.

He appealed both conviction and sentence on multiple grounds, including challenges to the trial judge's Corbett application ruling regarding his criminal record, the adequacy of jury instructions on propensity reasoning and post-offence conduct, the sufficiency of corrective measures following inflammatory Crown closing arguments, and the application of Gladue principles in sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in principle by the trial judge and upholding both the conviction and sentence.

Appeal from a conviction for second-degree murder.

The appellant admitted to being the shooter and guilty of manslaughter but contended that his intoxicated state and the suddenness of events should have created reasonable doubt as to whether he possessed the requisite mens rea for murder.

The trial judge provided a rolled-up instruction to the jury on the cumulative effect of evidence regarding intoxication on the mental element for murder.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to adequately describe evidence of his intoxication from a bartender and evidence of a brewing altercation inside the bar.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's approach and upheld the conviction, applying the curative proviso based on the overwhelming Crown case.

The applicant was convicted of sexual interference, internet luring, and two counts of failing to comply with a release order.

He was sentenced to six years and ten months imprisonment.

The applicant applied for bail pending appeal of his convictions.

The motion judge refused bail, finding that while the appeal was not frivolous, it barely met that threshold.

The enforceability considerations arising from the grave nature of the offences—ongoing sexual abuse of a 13-year-old child—outweighed the weak grounds of appeal.

The motion judge concluded that release would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and counselling to commit murder after his ex-girlfriend was shot with a concealed crossbow.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on the appellant's strong financial and emotional motive, his request to an ex-biker friend to find a hitman, and his counter-surveillance conduct after the attack.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence, no palpable and overriding error in assessing the victim's testimony, no improper reliance on police opinion evidence, and that the verdicts were reasonable given the compelling circumstantial evidence.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction acquittal in an impaired driving case.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by drugs following a serious motor vehicle collision.

The trial judge excluded evidence of the accused's urine sample analysis and observations by police officers, finding insufficient reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest and demand for a drug recognition expert evaluation.

The appellate court allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the arresting officer possessed reasonable and probable grounds based on the totality of circumstances, including the serious nature of the collision, observations of impairment, a 911 call about an impaired driver, and the negative breath sample result.

The court also found the trial judge breached natural justice by acquitting the accused without hearing submissions from the Crown on the remaining admissible evidence.

Summary conviction appeal from convictions on two counts of sexual assault and one count of criminal harassment.

The appellant, a massage therapist, was convicted of sexually assaulting a client during a massage therapy session on April 24, 2018.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant intentionally and inappropriately touched the complainant's breasts and vaginal area.

The trial judge accepted the complainant's testimony over the appellant's defence that any contact was accidental and part of legitimate treatment.

The appeal raised three grounds: failure to reconcile material inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony, uneven scrutiny applied to the appellant's evidence compared to the complainant's, and insufficient reasons regarding the essential elements of sexual assault.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed B.N.'s application for bail pending appeal from convictions for sexual assault and related offences.

The court found that, although the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel clearly surpassed the "not frivolous" standard, public safety concerns—given B.N.'s extensive history of breaches and violence—outweighed reviewability and enforceability interests.

The decision applies the Oland/Farinacci framework for bail pending appeal and emphasizes the stand-alone importance of public safety in intimate partner violence cases.