Drug trafficking

On appeal from convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and breach of recognizance, the appellant challenged the trial judge's rejection of his Charter claims.

The trial judge found an arbitrary detention under s. 9 based on the precipitous arrest for breach of recognizance (the officer failed to verify that the cellphone prohibition remained in force), but rejected the appellant's racial profiling claim.

The trial judge also rejected the s. 8 unreasonable search argument and admitted the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in his analysis of the racial profiling claim and in his s. 24(2) analysis, and ordered a new trial.

Two appellants appealed their convictions for conspiracy to traffic heroin and cocaine, and their sentences.

The appellants argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, rendering the verdicts unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal upheld all convictions and sentences, finding that the trial judge properly applied the three-stage test from R. v. Carter for the co-conspirators exception to the hearsay rule.

The court found sufficient evidence that both appellants were members of the conspiracies, with McGean playing an instrumental role and Lucas acting as an enforcer.

The court also rejected arguments regarding the quantum of drugs and the scope of the conspiracy.

Victim surcharges were set aside for both appellants.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking in cocaine.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on circumstantial evidence, including surveillance observations and items seized from vehicles.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in finding the only reasonable inference was guilt; (2) the trial judge failed to provide sufficient reasons; and (3) the verdict was unreasonable and unsupported by evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the Villaroman standard for circumstantial evidence and that the verdict was supportable on a reasonable view of the evidence.

The court also allowed an appeal of sentence and set aside the victim surcharge.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a sentence of 26 months imprisonment, less four months credit for pre-trial custody, plus two years' probation for possession of hydromorphone for the purpose of trafficking.

The appellant argued the sentence was excessive given the small quantity of drugs, his addiction status, and rehabilitation efforts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly considered all relevant factors, including the appellant's addiction and rehabilitation attempts, but reasonably concluded that exceptional circumstances did not exist.

The court noted the appellant had failed to complete a residential treatment program, continued using opiates, committed further offences while on bail, and failed to appear for sentencing.

The appellant appealed his conviction for importation and possession of over 100 kilograms of heroin and possession of approximately $650,000 as proceeds of crime.

The Crown's case was based on evidence from a controlled delivery of heroin, authorized searches of storage units, and testimony from a courier.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: inadequate jury instructions regarding identification evidence, improper qualification of an expert witness regarding FINTRAC reports, and improper curtailment of cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding the trial judge's rulings were appropriate and the Crown's case was overwhelming.

The appellant appealed his conviction for conspiracy to import heroin and possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, as well as his sentence of 11 years and 3.5 months.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal regarding conviction: (1) inadequate jury instruction on the limited use of a co-accused's out-of-court statement, and (2) failure to hold a jury inquiry due to alleged juror bias.

The appellant also appealed the sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to give effect to rehabilitation and failed to consider the lower purity of the heroin as a mitigating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's instructions, no reasonable apprehension of bias, and no manifest unfitness in the sentence imposed.

The accused was charged with firearm offences, possession for the purposes of trafficking in crack cocaine, and breach of a recognizance.

The Crown sought detention on secondary and tertiary grounds, arguing the accused presented a substantial likelihood of re-offending and that public confidence in the administration of justice required detention.

The accused proposed release on a recognizance with a live-in surety (his mother), house arrest, and electronic monitoring.

The court found the accused met the reverse onus by demonstrating the proposed conditions would adequately reduce the risk of re-offending on the secondary ground and would maintain public confidence on the tertiary ground, despite the serious nature of the allegations and the accused's extensive criminal record.

A young person was charged with second degree murder in connection with the death of S.K., who died from a single stab wound to the chest during a marijuana trafficking transaction that went wrong.

The accused admitted holding the knife that caused the fatal injury but claimed he was acting in self-defence and that the stabbing was accidental.

The Crown alleged intentional stabbing with either intent to kill or intent to cause bodily harm known to be likely to cause death.

The court found the accused not guilty of murder but guilty of unlawful act manslaughter, finding that while self-defence was not established, the accused did not have the specific intent required for murder.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and breach of probation.

The central issue was whether police lawfully detained the appellant and his luggage for approximately one hour and forty-five minutes pending the arrival of a drug-sniffer dog, based on a confidential informant's tip.

The trial judge found the detention reasonable; the Court of Appeal found it violated the appellant's Charter rights under section 9 but declined to exclude the evidence under section 24(2).

The conviction was upheld.

The appellant also appealed his 12-month sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in treating him as a repeat offender and failing to apply sentencing principles for first-time offenders.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge made an error but upheld the sentence.

Appeal from conviction and sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown conceded that the two convictions for possession of proceeds of crime could not stand and those convictions were set aside with acquittals entered.

The convictions for possession for the purpose of trafficking were upheld as the trial judge had a reasonable basis to uphold the warrant issuance and police had reasonable grounds to arrest and conduct searches incident to arrest.

The sentence was reduced from 14 months on each count to 6 months less one day on each count running consecutively, resulting in a global sentence of 12 months less two days, to account for the appellant's risk of deportation and demonstrated rehabilitation.

The accused was charged with trafficking in cocaine under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence from an undercover operation (Project O'Tamper) targeting a steroid dealer.

The Crown alleged the accused supplied cocaine to the target through a brief, unobserved encounter in a parking lot.

The court found the evidence created strong suspicion but did not prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted due to insufficient evidence directly connecting him to possession or trafficking of cocaine, and the existence of reasonable alternative inferences consistent with innocence.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and related firearms offences following his arrest on March 19, 2014.

He appealed on the grounds that his arrest was unlawful because it lacked reasonable and probable grounds, and that evidence seized incident to arrest should be excluded under the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the arrest was lawful based on a reliable confidential informant's tip that was corroborated by independent police observation.

The court also rejected the appellant's argument regarding misapprehension of evidence concerning the seizure of a cellular phone.

The appellant was convicted of drug trafficking following a search of his residence conducted pursuant to a warrant issued under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The warrant did not specify a date for execution but authorized entry "at any time." The appellant appealed, arguing the warrant was invalid because it failed to specify an execution date, rendering the search a violation of Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that while the warrant did not expressly state an execution date, an execution date could be implied from the date of issuance.

The court rejected the appellant's characterization of the warrant as expressly non-expiring and held that the absence of an express date was a technical fault that did not invalidate the warrant.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 15 months' imprisonment plus two years' probation for possession of 28 grams of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The appellant had pled guilty and was admitted to the Halton Drug Treatment Court program but was expelled after testing positive for cocaine on three occasions and lying about the circumstances of his relapse.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by treating the appellant's failure to fully engage in the program and his dishonesty as aggravating factors.

The court allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to nine months' imprisonment, maintaining the probation and section 109 order.

The accused brought a motion to quash three search warrants and exclude evidence obtained from their execution.

The warrants were issued based on an Information to Obtain (ITO) that relied primarily on an unconfirmed tip from a confidential informant regarding drug dealing outside a bar, supplemented by limited surveillance observations and an undercover entry into the accused's apartment.

The court found that the ITO lacked sufficient credible and reliable evidence to establish reasonable and probable grounds for the warrants.

Additionally, the manner of execution—including an unannounced forced entry and ramming of doors—was unreasonable.

The court excluded all evidence obtained from the searches under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute due to inadequate police disclosure, sloppy investigative work, and excessive force during execution.

The defendant brought a Garofoli motion to exclude evidence obtained pursuant to the execution of a search warrant at his mother's residence, alleging a violation of section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The defendant challenged both his standing to bring the motion and the sufficiency of grounds in the Information to Obtain the warrant.

The court found that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the residence and therefore had standing.

The court also found that while the Information contained some deficiencies in disclosure, there was sufficient reliable evidence to support the issuance of the warrant.

Even if the warrant was issued without reasonable and probable grounds, the court would have admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, as the administration of justice would not be brought into disrepute.

The accused was sentenced for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking following a guilty plea.

A general warrant executed at his residence revealed involvement in methamphetamine production and drug trafficking.

The Crown and defence jointly recommended 15 months' incarceration.

The key issue was whether a sentence reduction should be granted for the accused's surrender of significant contraband items, including a machine gun, methamphetamine, ephedrine, and GBL, valued at approximately $165,000.

The court distinguished between cooperation with police that leads to arrests or investigations versus mere surrender of items, ultimately imposing a nine-month sentence with a six-month credit for the surrender.

The accused was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking and breaches following his arrest on June 14, 2006.

The court conducted a blended voir dire and trial to determine whether the arrest was lawful and whether evidence obtained from a search incident to arrest should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused moved to exclude evidence based on alleged breaches of s. 7, 8, and 9 of the Charter.

The court found that the arrest was unlawful and the detention arbitrary, as the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds based on an unreliable confidential informant tip and minimal corroborating observations.

The court excluded the evidence seized, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The applicants brought applications pursuant to Section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms challenging the validity of a production order directed to Telus, two Part VI wiretap authorizations, and search warrants executed in connection with Project Lancaster, an investigation into firearms trafficking and drug offences in Ottawa.

The applicants challenged the type of order used to obtain text messages, the sufficiency of grounds for the authorizations and warrants, and sought exclusion of evidence under Section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court dismissed all applications, finding that a production order was the appropriate mechanism for obtaining stored text messages, that the authorizing judges had sufficient grounds based on reliable and corroborated confidential informant information, and that the search warrants were properly issued.

The accused brought an application to exclude intercepted communications obtained pursuant to two Part VI authorizations under the Criminal Code and to exclude evidence obtained from two search warrants issued under section 487 of the Criminal Code.

The accused challenged the sufficiency of grounds, investigative necessity, and alleged bias on the part of the issuing Justice of the Peace.

The court found that the first authorization had sufficient grounds and that investigative necessity was established.

However, the court found a reasonable apprehension of bias due to a familial and commercial connection between the accused and the issuing Justice of the Peace.

While the search warrants were found to be invalid due to this bias, the court admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that exclusion would not serve the interests of justice given the good faith of police and the serious nature of the charges.