John I. Laskin

A 16-year-old appellant was convicted of first-degree murder in the death of his 14-year-old cousin.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that his statements to police were admitted in breach of section 146(2) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) and section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The trial judge conducted a voir dire and admitted all statements.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made two fatal legal errors: (1) he improperly shifted the burden of proof regarding detention from the Crown to the appellant, and (2) he erred in concluding that section 146(2) protections did not apply because the appellant's detention related to a different offence (obstruction of police) than the ultimate charge (first-degree murder).

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant was psychologically detained and entitled to the protections of section 146(2), which were not provided.

The statements were therefore improperly admitted, and the conviction was set aside with a new trial ordered.

The Ontario Media Development Corporation (OMDC) denied Pong Marketing and Promotions Inc.'s application for a digital media tax credit on the grounds that its sweepstakes games were developed primarily to promote the sale of phone cards rather than to educate, inform, or entertain users.

The Divisional Court majority found the OMDC's decision unreasonable, holding that "primary purpose" must be assessed from the user's perspective rather than the developer's motivation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the OMDC's appeal, finding that the OMDC's interpretation was reasonable and that the Divisional Court erred in applying a residual presumption in favour of the taxpayer.

The City of Thunder Bay appealed a decision dismissing its application for a declaration that Canadian National Railway Company breached a 1906 agreement by refusing to reopen the James Street Swing Bridge for motor vehicle traffic following a 2013 fire.

The bridge is a combined railway and roadway structure.

The application judge found that the parties intended the bridge to be maintained only for the type of traffic existing in 1906 (streetcars, horses, and carts), not modern motor vehicles.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the application judge's interpretation was unreasonable and tainted by extricable errors of law.

The court held that the perpetual right to cross the bridge for "vehicle traffic" and the obligation to maintain it "in perpetuity" must include modern motor vehicles, not merely those existing in 1906.

The court also found the application judge erred in placing the onus on Thunder Bay to provide specific proposals for making the bridge safe for vehicles, when that obligation rested with CN as the bridge operator.

A reference from the Minister of Justice concerning convictions entered in 1987 for break and enter, assault causing bodily harm, and overcoming resistance by strangulation.

The case turned entirely on eyewitness identification evidence from the victim, which suffered from significant frailties including a procedurally flawed courtroom identification.

Fresh evidence revealed that the victim and a police officer involved in the identification procedure were in a personal relationship that was not disclosed to the defence.

The court found that fairness required disclosure of this relationship and that there was a reasonable possibility the non-disclosure impacted the trial outcome.

The convictions were quashed and a new trial ordered.

This is a costs endorsement following the Court of Appeal's decision allowing an appeal by the Estate of Gabriel Zimmerman regarding its entitlement to be added as a party to the underlying action.

The court determined the costs payable by the respondents to both the Estate and the defendants for the motion heard in the lower court.

The Estate was awarded its actual partial indemnity costs, and the defendants were also awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis despite not participating in the appeal, as they benefited from the appellate decision.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder in the shooting death of Glen Davis in a Toronto parking garage.

The appellant's nephew orchestrated the murder and recruited the appellant and others to carry it out.

The appellant's defence was that he had a last-minute change of heart and did not shoot Davis, but rather his co-accused did.

The appeal raised three grounds: that the trial judge unjustifiably curtailed cross-examination of key Crown witnesses; that the trial judge erred in giving a Browne v. Dunn instruction; and that the trial judge erred in his charge regarding post-offence conduct.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that despite some questionable interventions, the trial was fair and the conviction was supported by compelling evidence.

The appellant, a psychologist, was convicted by jury of two counts of impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm following a two-vehicle collision.

She appealed on multiple grounds, including Charter violations, credibility assessments, jury charge errors regarding straddle evidence, and prosecutorial misconduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no Charter breaches, no reversible credibility errors, and no miscarriage of justice despite some improper prosecutorial conduct.

This is a costs endorsement on appeal from a Superior Court judgment.

The appellants achieved substantial success on the appeal.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellants $15,000 in costs of the appeal including taxes and disbursements.

The trial judge's costs order was set aside and the issue of trial costs was remitted to the trial judge for fresh assessment after damages on the mainstream agreement have been determined.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for the shooting death of Troy Hutchinson.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant was the actual shooter, but the jury was also instructed on liability as an aider or abettor.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the mens rea required for aiding or abetting murder.

Specifically, the jury was not properly instructed that an aider or abettor must know that the principal actor has subjective foresight of death.

The error was repeated multiple times throughout the charge and was compounded by an incorrect definition of recklessness and an inadequate answer to the jury's final question.

The curative proviso was not applied because the jury's final question demonstrated that at least one juror had a reasonable doubt about the appellant being the principal actor, making it impossible to conclude that conviction was inevitable.

A new trial was ordered.

An appeal from a motion judge's order staying custody proceedings in Ontario and ordering the return of three adolescent children to Nigeria, their place of habitual residence.

The motion judge found that an Ontario court lacked jurisdiction under section 22 of the Children's Law Reform Act because the children were habitually resident in Nigeria and a custody application was pending there.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that although section 22 did not provide jurisdiction, section 23 of the CLRA permitted Ontario to exercise jurisdiction because the children would suffer serious harm if returned to Nigeria.

The serious harm was based primarily on evidence of physical discipline with objects by the father and the children's mature objections to returning.

The court granted interim custody to the mother with generous access to the father pending a full hearing on the merits.

Appeal from a trial judge's decision granting sole custody of a child to the respondent mother and permitting relocation from Toronto to Nova Scotia.

The appellant father challenged the custody award, relocation decision, access schedule, and costs award.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decisions on custody and relocation, finding they were supported by the record and within the trial judge's discretion.

The court modified the access schedule by removing a four-hour restriction on overnight visits with the child's grandparents, finding it inconsistent with the trial judge's own findings regarding the child's relationship with the paternal grandparents.

The costs award was upheld as within the trial judge's discretion.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 14.5 years incarceration (plus 6 months time served) for armed bank robbery, carrying a weapon, wearing a disguise with intent, and money laundering.

The trial judge imposed a parole ineligibility order under section 743.6 of the Criminal Code, requiring the appellant to serve at least half the sentence before parole eligibility.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence demonstrably unfit as it departed from the principle of proportionality and resulted from errors in principle, including overemphasis on deterrence and public safety while dismissing rehabilitation prospects despite the appellant's substance abuse and mental health issues.

The court reduced the sentence to 10 years inclusive of time served.

Two shareholders of a holding company that owns a commercial property brought an action against defendants for their full share of annual rental income.

The property manager held back part of the funds based on acknowledgements allegedly signed by the shareholders in 2002, which purported to give a deceased property manager a 25% interest in their entitlements.

The defendants moved to add the estate of the deceased manager as a necessary party.

The motion judge dismissed the motion on the basis that the estate's claim was statute barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the estate's claim was not statute barred because the defendants never pleaded a limitations defence and had in fact invited the estate to assert its claim.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board decision concerning whether the Royal Ottawa Mental Health Centre was required to notify the Board of a significant increase in restrictions on the appellant's liberty when she was transferred from the Secure Forensic Rehabilitation Unit (FRU) to the Secure Forensic Assessment Unit (FAU).

The appellant, found not criminally responsible in 2004, had been abusing substances while on the FRU, leading to the transfer.

The Board was divided on whether notice was required under s. 672.56(2) of the Criminal Code, but unanimously concluded that the transfer constituted the least onerous and least restrictive measure available.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, establishing a framework for determining when notice of significant increases in restrictions on liberty is required.

The appellants, Cana International Distributing Inc. and Micheline Ciolli, appealed a trial judgment dismissing their claim for breach of an exclusive distribution agreement with Standard Innovation Corporation for the distribution of the We-Vibe product.

The appellants claimed separate agreements existed for both the mainstream retail market and the adult industry market.

The trial judge found no binding agreements existed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that a binding mainstream agreement was reached when the parties signed a term sheet in counterpart in August-September 2009, and that the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors of fact and an extricable error of law in finding otherwise.

The Court upheld the trial judge's finding that no adult industry agreement was reached.

The Court also dismissed the appellants' arguments regarding quantum meruit and qualified privilege defences.

The appellant, injured in 1997 while unloading goods from a truck, brought a civil action against the Workplace Safety & Insurance Board and the Workplace Safety & Insurance Appeals Tribunal seeking compensatory damages of $1,710,455 and punitive damages of $15 million.

The respondents moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and to strike the pleadings as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The motion judge granted the motions, holding that the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction over claims against these bodies and that relief must be sought through judicial review.

The appellant appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in dismissing the claim for lack of jurisdiction and in striking the pleadings for failing to disclose a cause of action for bad faith or misfeasance in public office.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory scheme under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Board and Tribunal, and that circumventing this scheme through a civil action constitutes an abuse of process.

The court also held that bad faith is not independently actionable and that the pleadings failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action for misfeasance in public office.

The appellant appealed a decision declaring that no valid Agreement of Purchase and Sale existed between a builder and a purchaser.

The builder agreed to construct a home in Welland.

The purchaser made unilateral amendments to Schedule D of the agreement (striking out "builder's samples" in six places) without the builder's knowledge or consent.

When a dispute arose over the choice of kitchen cabinet supplier, the application judge found no meeting of the minds due to the parties' fundamentally different understandings of the contract terms, particularly regarding supplier selection.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding the application judge's factual findings were entitled to deference and that the builder had acted reasonably throughout the dispute.

An appeal from a Superior Court order directing the transfer of ownership of a motor home from a debtor to a purchaser.

The appellant, appearing self-represented, sought an adjournment to obtain counsel and filed an application to introduce fresh evidence regarding a property purchase from 1979 and requesting transfer of the matter to a Metis Clan Mother.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the adjournment request and the application for fresh evidence, finding the proposed evidence would not have affected the result.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision granting an order for security.

The appellant argued that damages would be an adequate remedy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the respondent had bargained for security, which differs fundamentally from damages.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision finding them liable under the oppression remedy.

The appellants conceded that Tam and the pharmacy were liable but argued that the motion judge erred in finding the landlord and RTM Resources liable.

The appellants contended that the statement of claim pleaded intent to defeat the claim, which could not be decided on a motion, and that the respondent failed to prove the defendants were affiliates.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that under the oppression remedy, effect rather than intent is determinative, and that the motion judge's findings sufficiently established that both entities were affiliates controlled by the same person.