Michael Grossman

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision ordering him to pay $25,000 to his former common-law partner for unpaid loans and living expenses.

He argued the trial judge failed to credit him for certain payments and that his debt should be reduced because the respondent had entered into a consumer proposal with her creditors.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings.

The court also held that the respondent's consumer proposal did not reduce the value of the debt the appellant owed to her.

The accused was charged with impaired driving by drugs.

Prior to trial, the defence raised two Charter issues: (1) whether the toxicologist's testing of bodily fluids for a broad range of drugs violated section 8 Charter rights when the Drug Recognition Evaluator had only identified narcotic analgesics as the suspected impairing substance, and (2) whether the DRE tests lacked scientific basis and thus violated section 7 Charter rights, rendering the tests and evidence inadmissible.

The court rejected both arguments, finding that the legislation does not limit toxicological testing to the specific drug suspected by the DRE, and that the applicant failed to meet the burden of establishing on a balance of probabilities that the 12-step DRE evaluation lacks scientific support.

Following a trial where the plaintiff was awarded $41,900, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs of $47,711.63, while the defendant suggested partial indemnity costs of up to $25,181.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs of $30,434.14, noting that neither party's offer to settle triggered Rule 49 consequences.

The court reduced the plaintiff's costs due to a non-compliant expert report under Rule 53 and the failure to disclose acceptance of the defendant's expert quantification prior to trial.

The accused was charged with operating a vehicle while impaired by drug following a RIDE spot check on May 11, 2014.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial.

The court found that the accused displayed multiple indicia of impairment including poor balance, dilated pupils, slurred speech, confusion, unusual behavior, delayed responses, and signs of drowsiness.

Toxicological analysis revealed the presence of lorazepam and THC-COOH (the inactive metabolite of marijuana) in the accused's urine.

The accused admitted to smoking marijuana on the day of arrest and the day before.

A Drug Recognition Evaluation officer opined that the accused's ability to drive was impaired.

The court rejected the defence arguments that the Crown must prove a specific quantity of drugs in the accused's system at the time of driving, that tiredness must be negated as a cause of impairment, and that overwhelming signs of impairment are required.

The court found that the totality of the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to drive was impaired by drug consumption.

The accused brought a motion for severance of two break and enter charges.

The Crown's case relied solely on video surveillance evidence for identification purposes under the Nikolovski test.

The defence argued that a trial judge should not make more than one Nikolovski determination for the same accused, and that the interests of justice required severance.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while there was minimal factual nexus between the counts, there was a legal nexus, no prejudice to the accused, and the Crown's wide discretion under section 591(1) of the Criminal Code supported a joint trial.

The accused brought a motion to quash three search warrants and exclude evidence obtained from their execution.

The warrants were issued based on an Information to Obtain (ITO) that relied primarily on an unconfirmed tip from a confidential informant regarding drug dealing outside a bar, supplemented by limited surveillance observations and an undercover entry into the accused's apartment.

The court found that the ITO lacked sufficient credible and reliable evidence to establish reasonable and probable grounds for the warrants.

Additionally, the manner of execution—including an unannounced forced entry and ramming of doors—was unreasonable.

The court excluded all evidence obtained from the searches under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute due to inadequate police disclosure, sloppy investigative work, and excessive force during execution.