Karen M. Weiler

The appellant appealed his global sentence of 14 months and 28 days for six offences, including possession of hydromorphone for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the sentencing judge failed to weigh mitigating factors such as his mental health and addiction, and that the sentence was harsh and excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the judge's consideration of the appellant's significant criminal record and noting that hydromorphone trafficking attracts serious sentences.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing the Board erred in concluding he continues to pose a significant threat to the safety of the public.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable based on all the circumstances.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of 14 years' imprisonment for multiple offences arising from a violent home invasion and possession of a prohibited firearm.

He argued the sentence was crushing and demonstrably unfit given his youth, minor prior record, and rehabilitative efforts in custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was within the appropriate range.

The court emphasized the gratuitous physical violence, permanent psychological damage inflicted on the victims, and the terrorization of the family, which included holding a loaded gun to a child's head.

The appellant applied to rescind an order dismissing his appeal of a dangerous driving conviction as abandoned, and to set aside his guilty plea on the basis that he was misinformed by trial counsel regarding the length of his licence suspension.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, noting that the guilty plea was part of a broader plea bargain involving other charges.

The dismissal was without prejudice to the appellant applying to set aside all of his convictions, as the interests of justice require a full consideration of the entire plea bargain.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received income replacement benefits.

After the insurer terminated her benefits, she signed a full and final release in exchange for a lump sum.

She later sued the insurer for breach of contract, bad faith, and mental distress without first returning the settlement funds or proceeding to mandatory mediation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissing her action, confirming that her claims were 'in respect of' statutory accident benefits and therefore subject to the mandatory mediation scheme under the Insurance Act.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her motor vehicle accident claim as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion judge had granted summary judgment because the appellant failed to plead facts relevant to discoverability in her statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a limitations defence must be pleaded in a statement of defence, and discoverability should be addressed in a reply, not anticipated in the statement of claim.

The court found a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding when the claim was discovered and granted the appellant leave to deliver a reply.

Following a successful appeal in a complex tax case, the appellant sought costs of the trial and appeal totaling over $1.3 million.

The respondent agreed costs should follow the event but argued the amounts were excessive.

The Court of Appeal declined to apply a 25% bump-up for a non-Rule 49 settlement offer, noting the respondent's obligation to protect the public purse in a test case.

The Court awarded the appellant costs of the appeal and trial fixed at $925,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The moving parties sought an extension of time to appeal an order dismissing their motion for a declaration that a civil judgment for assault survives the responding party's bankruptcy.

The motion judge had relied on a lower court decision that was subsequently reversed by the Court of Appeal after the appeal period expired.

Applying the test for extending time, the court found that despite an unsatisfactory explanation for part of the delay, the strong merits of the proposed appeal and the interests of justice warranted granting the extension.

The motion was allowed, with costs awarded to the responding party for the indulgence.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment enforcing his payment obligations under a Share Purchase Agreement.

He argued the business was illegal and that the agreements contemplated an ongoing supply of movies, raising credibility issues requiring a trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant provided only bald statements without supporting evidence, and upheld the motion judge's decision.

The appellant appealed the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the motion judge and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent in the amount of $4,200.

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident when the pickup truck he was a passenger in went through a red light and was struck by a transport truck going through a green light.

The jury found the driver of the pickup 95% liable and the driver of the transport truck 5% liable.

The appellants (the transport truck driver and owners) appealed, arguing the jury verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge misdirected the jury on causation, and there was improper cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding evidence supported the jury's conclusion that a reasonably prudent driver should have been aware of the hazard, the jury charge was not in error when read as a whole, and the improper cross-examination was not serious enough to undermine trial fairness.

Permanent resident applicants challenged the citizenship oath requirement to swear allegiance to the Queen, alleging infringements of freedom of expression, freedom of conscience and religion, and equality rights under the Charter.

The court held that, purposively interpreted, the oath is not allegiance to the Queen in her personal capacity but a symbolic commitment to Canada's form of government and the unwritten constitutional principle of democracy.

Applying the Irwin Toy framework, the court concluded there was no infringement of s. 2(b), and in the alternative any infringement would be justified under s. 1.

The court also held that the oath is secular and does not violate s. 2(a), and that the equality claim failed because it was premised on a mistaken understanding of the oath's meaning.

Appeal dismissed and cross-appeal allowed.

This was a costs endorsement arising from an appeal concerning costs at first instance on a motion for summary judgment.

After receiving written submissions from counsel, the court ordered that those costs be costs in the cause.

The amount was not fixed by the appellate court and was left to the summary judgment judge or trial judge, as the case may be.

The appellant, a young person convicted of manslaughter, challenged the constitutionality of s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code after being denied legal aid and state-funded counsel for his appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 684 is an ameliorative, case-specific mechanism that does not infringe the equality guarantee in s. 15 and does not violate ss. 7, 10(b), or 11(d) of the Charter.

The court held that where liberty interests are engaged, state-funded appeal counsel may be constitutionally required only when necessary to make the right of appeal meaningful and effective.

Requiring an indigent appellant to demonstrate an arguable appeal for appointment of counsel to present the appeal is not unfair.

The appellant challenged reassessments imposing Ontario corporate income tax and corporate minimum tax on interest received under specialty debt instruments created through an inter-corporate refinancing designed to reduce provincial tax.

The court held the interest was income from property, not income from business, because the appellant's activity was minimal and the debt instruments were not employed or risked in any separate business.

Applying GAAR principles, the court found that even if the transactions generated a tax benefit or constituted avoidance transactions, they were not abusive because the statutory scheme deliberately distinguished between business income and property income for foreign-incorporated corporations with an Ontario permanent establishment.

The court also held the specialty debt instruments were not property situated in Canada because, under the settled common law situs rule, specialty debts are located where the instruments are physically found, here the British Virgin Islands.

The appeal was allowed and the reassessments were to be vacated.

The parties entered into a separation agreement in 2005 to share the children's special expenses equally instead of following the Child Support Guidelines.

The appellant father defaulted in 2008 and sought to terminate his contractual obligations, claiming a material change in circumstances due to declining income and an inability to liquidate capital.

The application judge dismissed his request, finding the circumstances were foreseeable when the agreement was signed.

The Superior Court and the Court of Appeal upheld this decision, confirming that foreseeability is central to the test for varying contractual child support obligations.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after the victim was beaten to death with a baseball bat in the appellant's home.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding joint involvement, the Vetrovec warning for an unsavoury witness, the W.(D.) instruction, and post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that while the trial judge could have given a joint party liability instruction, the failure to do so did not result in a miscarriage of justice and was cured by the proviso.

The court also found the Vetrovec, W.(D.), and post-offence conduct instructions were sufficient.

The sentence appeal regarding the 13-year parole ineligibility period was also dismissed.

The appellants sued the City of Oshawa for negligence, alleging the City incorrectly advised them that no building permit was required for a deck, and subsequently negligently investigated and prosecuted them under the Building Code Act.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the City acted reasonably.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, confirming the trial judge applied the correct standard of care for negligent investigation.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on costs, reducing the trial judge's award from substantial indemnity to partial indemnity, as the appellants' conduct was not reprehensible.

The respondent purchased a residential property from the appellant and later discovered it had previously been used as a marijuana grow-op and contained mould.

The respondent successfully obtained partial summary judgment on liability.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the judgment, finding that the motion judge's brief endorsement failed to provide any legal analysis or findings of fact regarding the existence of mould at the time of closing, thereby preventing meaningful appellate review.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order requiring them to pay an additional $528,113 pursuant to a settlement agreement.

The appellants argued the motion judge erred in accepting the evidence of the respondents' expert accountant regarding management fees, professional fees, and benefits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's factual findings or his decision to prefer the expert's evidence over that of an interested party, especially since the appellants did not object to the report's admissibility or file their own expert report.