Karen M. Weiler

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their legal malpractice action against the respondent lawyers.

The action alleged the respondents delayed applying for catastrophic impairment benefits and failed to advance Family Law Act claims for the injured party's brothers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellants failed to put their best foot forward by providing evidence of damages not compensated by the underlying $1.4 million settlement.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment ordering him to pay $814,318.26 and deliver possession of a residential property to the respondent mortgagee.

The appellant argued there were genuine issues for trial regarding the principal amount he assumed and the respondent's allocation of his mortgage payments.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusions that the appellant assumed the full mortgage amount and that his payments were insufficient to bring the mortgage into good standing.

The appellants asserted an oppression claim under s. 248 of the Business Corporations Act, alleging misappropriation of funds from a widely held public company and seeking to recover those funds for the company.

The motion judge struck the claim, finding it was solely that of the company and had to be pursued as a derivative action with leave of the court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that where a claim seeks to recover solely for wrongs done to a public corporation and does not allege harm to the complainant's individualized personal interests, it must be pursued as a derivative action.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering her to pay damages and costs for fraudulent misrepresentations made to obtain a mortgage loan.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in evaluating the evidence, rejecting her claim that she was an innocent dupe in a mortgage fraud scheme, and failing to assist her as a self-represented litigant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility findings were supported by the evidence and that the appellant had participated fully at trial without any failure of assistance by the judge.

Costs of the appeal were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant was seriously injured in a motor scooter accident and suffered brain injuries.

At trial, 16 years later, she provided a different account of the accident than in her statement of claim.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding she had not proven the respondent caused or contributed to the accident, relying in part on defence expert evidence regarding retrograde amnesia.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting the expert evidence, assessing reliability, and applying the standard of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's reliance on the expert evidence, assessment of reliability, or application of the balance of probabilities standard.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder and accessory after the fact to murder.

At trial, the Crown called the common-law spouses of two of the appellants as witnesses and introduced out-of-court statements made by one of the spouses shortly after the shooting.

The appellants appealed, arguing the spousal incompetency rule should be extended to common-law spouses under s. 15(1) of the Charter, and that the out-of-court statements were inadmissible hearsay.

The Court of Appeal held that while failing to extend the spousal incompetency rule to common-law spouses violates s. 15(1) of the Charter, the limitation is justified under s. 1.

The court also upheld the admission of the out-of-court statements under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, Teranet Inc., appealed a Divisional Court decision certifying a class action brought by the respondent land surveyor for copyright infringement.

The respondent alleged that the appellant's provision of electronic copies of land surveys to the public for a fee infringed the surveyors' copyright.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Divisional Court did not err in allowing the respondent to revise its class definition and common issues on appeal, as the changes were not fundamental and did not prejudice the appellant.

The Court further upheld the certification, concluding that the revised class definition was not merits-based, the common issues would significantly advance the litigation, and the respondent was a suitable representative plaintiff despite not relying on the appellant's services.

The applicant, a permanent resident detained as a flight risk and danger to the public under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, appealed the dismissal of his habeas corpus application.

Pending the appeal, he brought a motion for a stay of any potential future deportation order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding it premature as no deportation order had yet been made, and holding that the appeal did not raise a serious issue to be tried because the IRPA provides a complete and comprehensive scheme for reviewing detention.

The applicant mother brought a motion to stay an order requiring her to return her two children to Egypt pending her appeal of a custody decision.

The respondent father brought a cross-motion for security for costs.

Applying the RJR-Macdonald test, the Court of Appeal granted the stay, finding a serious issue to be tried regarding whether the father was actually exercising custody rights under Article 13 of the Hague Convention when the children were removed.

The court also found irreparable harm to the children if their school year was disrupted, and that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The father's cross-motion for security for costs was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to production of marijuana and received an absolute discharge.

No mandatory firearms prohibition order was made, but police refused to return his firearms.

The appellant appealed to set aside his guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown erroneously elected to proceed summarily on an exclusively indictable offence, and the trial judge failed to put the appellant to his election for mode of trial.

This failure deprived the trial court of jurisdiction, which could not be cured on appeal.

The Court also clarified that a mandatory firearms prohibition does not take effect without a judicial order.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants' action was administratively dismissed for delay after their solicitors failed to receive a status notice sent to the wrong address.

The motion judge refused to set aside the dismissal, finding the appellants failed to adequately explain the delay or prove a lack of prejudice to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reinstated the action, holding that the motion judge failed to give sufficient weight to the non-receipt of the status notice and erred in his assessment of prejudice by ignoring the respondent's own passivity in the litigation.

The appellant pleaded guilty to assaulting his wife with a weapon and assaulting his adult son, and was sentenced to 25 days in jail.

He appealed his convictions, seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas on the basis that they were equivocal, involuntary, and uninformed due to stress, lack of sleep, and a misunderstanding of the appeal process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge conducted a proper plea comprehension inquiry, the appellant made unequivocal admissions of guilt, and his ability to make a conscious choice was not impaired.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued her insurer for caregiver benefits and extra-contractual damages.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding it was statute-barred because it was commenced more than two years after the insurer's clear refusal to pay benefits.

The trial judge also found the appellant failed to establish entitlement to caregiver benefits beyond the 104-week period and dismissed her claims for bad faith and mental distress.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, including his evidentiary ruling that medical reports in a document brief not referred to by witnesses were inadmissible for the truth of their contents.

The appellant sub-tenant appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay $18,060.42 in realty tax arrears to the respondent Township.

The appellant argued that the sublease did not permit retroactive tax collection, that the Township lacked authority to sue for the arrears, and that the claim was barred by the doctrine of laches.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sublease clearly made the appellant responsible for all applicable realty taxes, the Township sued properly under the contract, and the delay in assessment was caused by the Municipal Property Assessment Corporation rather than the Township.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for damages arising from a 2009 fire.

The motion judge had dismissed the action as statute-barred because the statement of claim was issued in September 2013, outside the two-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the discoverability principle did not assist the appellant as he was aware of his psychological difficulties by July 2011.

The appellant appealed convictions relating to child pornography and voyeurism, arguing principally that the trial judge improperly admitted and relied on similar fact and disposition evidence without a voir dire.

The court held that the impugned extrinsic evidence concerning the hidden webcam, neighbourhood children, and other voyeuristic recordings was admissible because its probative value on identity and situation-specific propensity outweighed any prejudicial effect.

Count-to-count evidence was also properly used as circumstantial evidence of identity and context.

The court found no prejudice from the absence of a formal admissibility ruling and dismissed the appeal.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the appellant's appeal on the basis that the underlying decision—a refusal to remove opposing counsel and a related refusal to grant an adjournment—was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the refusal to grant an adjournment was intertwined with the interlocutory refusal to remove counsel.

The motion to quash was granted and the cross-motion was dismissed.

The appellant, a permanent resident, was convicted of aggravated assault after burning her ten-year-old child with a hot iron.

She appealed her 20-month sentence, seeking a reduction to five months to preserve her right to appeal a removal order under immigration law.

The Court of Appeal found that while the sentencing judge erred by failing to expressly consider the specific immigration consequences, the 20-month sentence remained fit and proportionate given the egregious breach of trust and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of assault with a weapon and possessing a dangerous weapon following a street fight.

His summary conviction appeal was dismissed.

He sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding that the proposed grounds of appeal either did not raise questions of law alone, lacked general significance to the administration of justice, or did not reflect a clear error amounting to a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant mortgagor appealed a judgment granting the respondent mortgagees $876,797.55 owed under a mortgage agreement.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by granting judgment instead of directing an accounting, as the amounts were contested.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge had sufficient evidence to substantiate the claims and the appellant failed to provide evidence to confirm the amounts owed.

The court noted that any arithmetical errors should have been addressed by returning to the motion judge for directions.