Karen M. Weiler

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal judge's decision dismissing his appeal from a conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level over 0.80.

The appellant argued the trial judge's reasons were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding no clear error by the summary conviction appeal judge and noting the case involved well-settled legal principles with no broader significance to the administration of justice.

The appellant, a car mechanic, issued a Safety Standards Certificate for a truck without conducting the required inspection.

The truck was later involved in a fatal accident.

At the preliminary inquiry, the appellant was discharged on a count of criminal negligence causing death based on a break in the chain of causation.

The Crown successfully applied for certiorari to quash the discharge.

On appeal, the appellant argued there was insufficient evidence that the steering defect existed when the certificate was issued.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding sufficient evidence, including expert testimony and witness accounts, for a properly instructed jury to find the appellant's actions were a significant contributing cause of the death.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a five-year penitentiary sentence imposed after the respondent pleaded guilty to multiple sexual offences against his daughter.

The court considered whether the sentencing judge misapprehended the applicable range for repeated parental sexual abuse and whether the sentence was manifestly unfit in light of prior authorities and the respondent's dated prior sexual offence record.

The court held that the sentencing judge did not treat the earlier authority as binding in a way that precluded a higher sentence and remained alive to both aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

Although the sentence was at the bottom of the applicable range, it was not manifestly unfit.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The receiver of the appellant appealed a motion judge's interpretation of an accounts receivable insurance policy with the respondent insurer.

The motion judge found that buyers' claims for set-off against amounts owing to the appellant constituted a 'dispute' under clause 7 of the policy, which deferred the insurer's liability to pay claims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no ambiguity in the clause and confirming that a dispute is not restricted to claims arising out of the unpaid shipment of goods.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion to quash the plaintiff's notice of appeal to the Court of Appeal on jurisdictional grounds.

The trial judge had dismissed the plaintiff's defamation claim but indicated that if the claim had been allowed, damages would have been assessed at $25,000.

The Court of Appeal held that under s. 19(1.2)(d) of the Courts of Justice Act, the Divisional Court has jurisdiction because the trial judge indicated the award would have been not more than $50,000.

The motion to quash was allowed and the appeal was transferred to the Divisional Court.

The appellant brought a motion to set aside an order of Blair J.A., which denied his request for the province to pay for appeal transcripts and refused a stay of child support pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the single judge's analysis or conclusions and dismissed the motion.

The United States sought the appellant's extradition for fraud-related charges.

Canadian authorities conducted a parallel investigation, obtaining a production order and search warrant under the Criminal Code, and shared the information with American authorities without filing a report to a justice under s. 489.1.

The appellant sought disclosure of the Canadian evidence to pursue Charter claims, which the extradition judge denied.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the extradition judge's findings that the Canadian investigation was valid and information sharing was lawful, but referred the matter back to reconsider the effect of the failure to report under s. 489.1 in light of recent jurisprudence.

The respondent sought to enforce a settlement agreement against the appellants, Glen Grove and Spendthrift, who were not signatories to the agreement but were related to the signatory corporation, 129.

The trial judge found the appellants liable based on a 'privity principle' and common control.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld Glen Grove's liability, finding that 129 acted as its agent in negotiating the settlement and offering security.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding Spendthrift, finding insufficient evidence to bind it to the settlement.

The appellant, a permanent resident, pleaded guilty to robbery and was subsequently deported.

He appealed his conviction, arguing his guilty plea was uninformed due to ineffective assistance of counsel, as his lawyer allegedly failed to advise him of the immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was already subject to a stayed deportation order and knew that further criminal convictions could lead to deportation.

Even if counsel's performance was deficient, there was no miscarriage of justice because the appellant understood deportation was a potential consequence of his plea.

The young person appealed findings of guilt for robbery, weapons dangerous, and possession of stolen property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the robbery conviction, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient and the verdict reasonable based on the appellant's proximity to the robbery, flight from police, and recent possession of stolen property.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to apply the Kienapple principle, staying the findings of guilt for weapons dangerous and possession of stolen property to avoid multiple convictions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the verdict was unreasonable due to the complainant's lack of credibility and that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge meaningfully addressed the frailties in the complainant's evidence, including her criminal record and drug use, and properly found confirmation in other evidence such as her immediate reporting and physical injuries.

The verdict was held to be reasonable.

The parents appealed a summary judgment order granting Crown wardship of their four children and denying them access.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Crown wardship, finding it in the children's best interests.

The court also upheld the no-access order but outlined a therapeutic process that could lead to future access if the children desired it and professionals agreed.

An alternate plan of care proposing the children move to France was rejected.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, acting as power of attorney for his incapacitated father, appealed an application judge's order that released frozen joint funds to the respondent wife, granted her sole authority over a jointly owned Florida property, awarded her $900 per month in spousal support, and ordered the appellant to personally pay $13,500 in costs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part.

The court upheld the release of the joint funds and the personal costs award based on the appellant's litigation conduct.

However, the court ordered the partition and sale of the Florida property nunc pro tunc, finding the appellant had authority to sever the joint tenancy.

The court also reduced the spousal support award to $300 per month, noting the application judge failed to consider the father's capacity to pay.

The appellant pleaded guilty to fraud over $5,000, fraud for the benefit of a criminal organization, and money laundering arising from a 'grandparent fraud' telephone scam.

He was sentenced to six years' imprisonment and a $500,000 fine in lieu of forfeiture.

On appeal, the court granted enhanced pre-sentence custody credit of 1.5:1, reducing his custodial sentence and resulting in his immediate release.

However, the court dismissed the appeal regarding the fine, finding the sentencing judge correctly concluded the appellant had control over the proceeds of the fraud and properly assessed the fine amount based on the value of the property controlled rather than the actual benefit received.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board following a finding that she was not criminally responsible for uttering threats and assaulting a peace officer.

The Board ordered her detained in a Secure Forensic Unit due to active, untreated persecutory delusions and a significant threat to public safety.

On appeal, the appellant and amicus curiae argued the Board relied on inadmissible hearsay and failed to impose the least onerous and least restrictive disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board is entitled to consider hearsay evidence such as police occurrence reports, and that the hybrid detention order was necessary, appropriate, and the least onerous option given the appellant's refusal of treatment and lack of insight.

The appellants appealed an order discharging an $800,000 mortgage registered on a property.

In a prior proceeding, the court interpreted an agreement allowing the respondent to decline paying the mortgage, which gave the appellants an option to repurchase the property.

The respondent declined to pay, and the appellants did not repurchase.

The motion judge granted the discharge, finding it logically flowed from the prior decision.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting the agreement provided the mortgage was deemed satisfied if the transaction failed to close without the respondent's fault.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision striking his statement of claim and dismissing his action regarding two properties.

For the Fergus property, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge proceeded on an incomplete understanding of the facts regarding waiver of conditions and extension of the closing date, and that a ten-year limitation period might apply.

For the Erin property, the Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the claims were barred by res judicata as they had been or should have been resolved in prior proceedings.

The appellant, facing charges under the Provincial Offences Act for failing to comply with property standards orders under the Building Code Act, sought advanced funding to mount a constitutional challenge against the Building Code Act.

He argued the Act violated his section 7 Charter rights by threatening his shelter.

The application judge dismissed the request.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal, finding the constitutional challenge lacked merit because section 7 does not protect property rights and the Building Code Act itself does not authorize the seizure of property.

The respondent, an undischarged bankrupt, brought an application for a declaration that his professional liability insurer was required to indemnify him for a class action.

The insurer brought a motion to strike the application, arguing the respondent lacked legal capacity.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the order was final and that the right to receive an indemnity under an insurance contract is a chose in action that vests in the trustee in bankruptcy.

The appeal was allowed and the application dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and seven-year sentence for historical sexual offences, including indecent assault and buggery, committed against four complainants between 1968 and 1978.

He argued the trial judge made unreasonable credibility findings and failed to address evidentiary conflicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments were reasonable and adequately explained.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, though a lifetime SOIRA order was reduced to 20 years on consent.