Karen M. Weiler

The appellant appealed a summary judgment declaring that a May 2014 agreement between the parties was a binding contract and ordering its rectification to remove a clause requiring a future formal agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that the parties' conduct demonstrated an intention to be bound and that the formal agreement clause was included by mutual mistake.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The deceased, a non-swimmer, drowned in Lake Simcoe while visiting the respondents' cottage.

The appellants brought an action in negligence and negligent misrepresentation, alleging the respondents failed to warn the deceased of the lake's dangers and falsely represented that the lake was safe and shallow.

The motion judge dismissed the action on summary judgment, finding no special relationship or duty of care.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing that the respondents did not control the lake, did not create a risky situation, and owed no duty to warn the deceased of obvious dangers removed from their property.

The appellants, unsecured creditors, sought to appeal a motion judge's order approving an amended proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and refusing to adjourn the approval motion to allow further examination of the debtor's president.

The Court of Appeal held that leave to appeal was required because the issues were procedural and did not directly involve property exceeding $10,000.

The Court denied leave, finding the proposed appeal lacked merit, raised no issues of general importance, and the motion judge's conclusions on the reasonableness and good faith of the proposal were unassailable.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order granting summary judgment against them in a debt collection matter.

The motion judge had set aside an initial summary judgment and granted a second one after the appellants failed to file responding materials and were denied a further adjournment.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's refusal to grant an adjournment or in the calculation of the amounts owing.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Following a successful appeal where the appellant was granted leave to amend his statement of claim, the Court of Appeal determined the issue of costs.

The parties agreed the successful party on appeal should receive $5,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The court awarded the appellant $5,000 for the appeal, but upheld the motion judge's $15,000 costs award in favour of the respondent.

The amounts were set off, resulting in a net payment of $10,000 from the appellant to the respondent.

The appellants, whose assets were managed by a court-appointed receiver, were reassessed by the CRA for unpaid taxes arising from shareholder loans.

They sought to sue the receiver for gross negligence in failing to engage in tax planning.

The accounting firm also sought leave to crossclaim against the receiver.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's decision dismissing the actions, finding that leave was required to sue the receiver and that the appellants failed to establish a prima facie case of gross negligence or wilful misconduct.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, which was largely based on a confession obtained during a 'Mr. Big' undercover operation.

During the retrial, the Crown introduced highly prejudicial bad character evidence regarding a separate, severed murder charge.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's charge to the jury was deficient, particularly regarding motive and confirmatory evidence, and failed to present the defence's position fairly.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions on two counts of assault causing bodily harm relating to his two-month-old infant, who suffered 12 rib fractures on two separate occasions.

The appellant argued the first verdict was unreasonable and the trial judge misapplied the W. (D.) principles, and that the second verdict involved an error in applying the test for implied consent during an attempt to administer CPR.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's factual findings reasonable, the W. (D.) principles properly applied, and that the force used during the alleged CPR was excessive, vitiating any defence of implied consent.

An employee of the respondent perpetrated a large-scale fraud by requisitioning cheques payable to six entities and depositing them into accounts he controlled.

Two of the entities were invented, and four were customers not owed money.

The respondent sued the appellant banks for conversion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the banks' appeal, finding they had a valid defence under s. 20(5) of the Bills of Exchange Act.

The court held that the two invented payees were non-existing, and all six payees were fictitious because the respondent's directing minds never formed an intention to pay them.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching in respect of a seven-year-old child.

The appellant argued the trial judge made three errors in assessing the child's credibility, including relying on stereotypical reasoning regarding a sex education book, speculating about the child's ability to operate a camera, and improperly assessing the child's motive to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inferences were grounded in the specific evidence and correctly applied a common sense approach to assessing the child's evidence without rigid stereotypes.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against the Law Society of Upper Canada after his statement of claim was struck out as disclosing no reasonable cause of action and being an abuse of process.

The appellant alleged a long history of unfair treatment, including administrative suspensions, disciplinary proceedings, and bankruptcy opposition.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the individual acts did not give rise to viable causes of action as pleaded and that many claims were settled by prior releases.

However, the Court found the motion judge erred in refusing leave to amend the pleading to properly allege the tort of misfeasance in public office based on a cumulative pattern of bad faith conduct.

The appeal was allowed in part to grant leave to file a fresh as amended statement of claim.

The appellant appealed his eight-year global sentence for six counts of robbery, attempted robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, and flight from police.

He argued the trial judge erred by imposing consecutive sentences, failing to consider prior sentences for related offences, and insufficiently weighing rehabilitation prospects.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the imposition of consecutive sentences and concluding that the trial judge appropriately applied the totality principle and considered the appellant's rehabilitation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, and public mischief arising from a staged two-vehicle collision.

He argued that the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay and in his assessment of witness credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the delay was justified by the complexity of the case and caused no serious prejudice.

The Court also held that the trial judge was entitled to accept or reject parts of the evidence and was not required to give himself a Vetrovec warning in a judge-alone trial.

The defendants appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their motion to stay or dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction or forum non conveniens.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge's conduct gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The motion judge had adjourned the motion on his own initiative to help the plaintiffs, dismissed the motion without hearing oral argument on key issues, made unwarranted findings of abuse of process, repeatedly criticized the defendants' counsel, and released delayed reasons that appeared to be an after-the-fact justification for his decision.

A new hearing before a different judge was ordered.

The appellant applied for leave to appeal a summary conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

The trial judge had acquitted the appellant after excluding evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the police officer delayed administering the approved screening device test due to concerns about fresh mouth alcohol.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court overturned the acquittal, finding the trial judge's conclusion was based on speculation.

The Court of Appeal agreed, holding there was no evidence the officer had such a concern and therefore no Charter breach occurred.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision finding they were not entitled to register a Notice under s. 71 of the Land Titles Act.

The appellants argued that their potential right to become a 50% shareholder in a corporation that owns land, and thereby share in profits from the sale of that land, constituted a registrable interest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that such a potential financial interest is too remote to qualify as an unregistered estate, right, interest, or equity in land under s. 71.

The appellant sought leave under s. 138.8 of the Securities Act to commence an action against the respondent bank for misrepresentations in a corporate circular and prospectus.

The appellant alleged the bank was a 'promoter' and an 'influential person' who knowingly influenced the release of the documents.

The motion judge dismissed the application, finding the appellant failed to offer a plausible interpretation of 'promoter' and lacked sufficient evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that a promoter must play a vital or leading role in the organization or reorganization of an issuer, and that providing conventional banking or advisory services is insufficient.

The appellant employer appealed a summary judgment decision awarding the respondent employee six months' reasonable notice.

The employer argued the notice period was too long and that the motion judge failed to deduct mitigation income.

The Court of Appeal upheld the six-month notice period, finding it was not outside the acceptable range despite the motion judge's emphasis on the availability of comparable employment.

On consent, the court reduced the award by $1,634.62 to account for mitigation income earned during the notice period.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The moving party sought to review a single judge's decision refusing an extension of time to review an earlier order that denied a stay of her eviction.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the refusal, noting the unexplained delay and that the matter was moot since the eviction had already occurred.

The motion was dismissed with no costs awarded.

The appellants appealed their convictions for numerous drug, proceeds of crime, and firearms offences following a jury trial.

The appellant Duncan also appealed his sentence.

The appellants argued that the trial judge's jury instructions were inadequate, particularly in relating the evidence to the legal issues and presenting the defence's position.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals regarding the drug and proceeds of crime convictions, finding the jury instructions adequate.

However, the Court allowed Duncan's appeal on the two firearms convictions, finding the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the elements of trafficking by offer and conspiracy to possess an unauthorized firearm, and erred in applying a reverse onus for the conspiracy charge.

The firearms convictions were set aside and a new trial ordered.

Duncan's global sentence was reduced from 15 years to 14 years to reflect the overturned convictions.