John I. Laskin

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence imposed on the respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conditional sentence, and substituted a sentence of 12 months' incarceration followed by two years of probation.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge's finding that he threw a flaming object onto a shopping mall roof was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that there was an ample basis for the trial judge's conclusion and no reason to re-weigh the evidence.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for impaired driving causing bodily harm.

The respondent conceded the sentence was illegal, as the offence is a 'serious personal injury offence' under s. 752 of the Criminal Code, precluding a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and substituted an 18-month custodial sentence.

The Court granted one-for-one credit for the five months and ten days the respondent had already served under house arrest, resulting in a net sentence of 12 months.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that had overturned the respondent's conviction by applying the necessity defence.

The Court of Appeal granted leave and allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge had correctly applied the test for necessity and made factual findings that the defence was not made out.

The summary conviction appeal court judge erred in law by failing to defer to those factual findings and effectively retrying the case.

The convictions were restored.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her motion to extend the time to appeal a Crown wardship order regarding her 14-year-old daughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no explanation for the lengthy delay, no merit to the appeal, and that it was not in the best interests of the child, who had been placed for adoption, to upset her current arrangements.

The appellant appealed his sentence for fraud, arguing the trial judge erred by not permitting him to address the court before sentencing and by finding a conditional sentence inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the failure to allow the appellant to speak was an inadvertent procedural error that would not have changed the outcome, as the judge was already aware of his remorse.

The court further found the sentence was fit given the monetary amount, breach of trust, and lengthy duration of the fraud.

The appellant appealed convictions for multiple sexual offences involving the minor daughter of his former partner.

The trial judge rejected the appellant’s denial largely based on an assumed failure to respond appropriately when the complainant allegedly asked to touch his penis and on a third party’s out-of-court statement implying knowledge of an improper relationship.

The Court of Appeal held that the first finding lacked evidentiary support because the appellant had never been asked about any response, making the inference unfair.

The court also found the statement was inadmissible hearsay and did not meet the requirements of the principled hearsay exception or the state of mind exception.

Because these errors tainted the credibility analysis, the convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of the first degree murder of his estranged wife.

He appealed the conviction, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable as the evidence did not support findings of planning and deliberation or criminal harassment.

He also argued that a decision tree provided to the jury was misleading and that the trial judge failed to give a proper W.(D.) instruction regarding his testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence reasonably supported the verdict on all bases left to the jury, the decision tree was properly contextualized by the trial judge's instructions, and the substance of the W.(D.) principles was adequately conveyed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and related offences, arguing the trial judge failed to scrutinize the complainant's evidence with the same rigour as his own.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not unfairly reject the appellant's evidence and was entitled to accept the complainant's explanation for her incremental disclosure.

The court concluded the trial judge's reasons were adequate to permit meaningful appellate review.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, seeking an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence supported the Board's conclusion that the appellant posed a significant risk to public safety.

The Court also found the Board's decision to detain the appellant on a secure unit rather than a general unit or via a hybrid order was reasonable given concerns about her risk of going AWOL and assaultive behaviour.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, seeking an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged the appellant's efforts to improve his condition but dismissed the appeal as moot because the Board had since issued a later disposition.

The moving party brought a motion pursuant to Rule 59.06 to set aside a previous order of the Court of Appeal.

The court found the motion had no merit, declined to grant an oral hearing, and dismissed the motion.

The court also ordered that the moving party may not file any further documents or communicate with court staff regarding the appeal.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that overturned the accused's conviction for driving over 80.

The summary conviction appeal judge had found that an unexplained 28-minute delay between the first and second breath samples meant the samples were not taken 'as soon as practicable' under the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the trial judge correctly applied the law by looking at the whole chain of events and that the Crown is not required to provide a detailed explanation for every minute the accused is in custody.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Summary Convictions Appeal Court dismissing his appeal from conviction.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding that the proposed appeal did not meet either branch of the test for leave to appeal under R. v. R.(R.).

The publication ban on the complainant's identity was continued.

The appellant, a disabled senior, received an overpayment of ODSP income support due to an innocent reporting error regarding his rent.

The Director ordered full repayment.

The Social Benefits Tribunal reduced the recovery to half the amount, but the Divisional Court overturned this, finding no discretion to forgive a Crown debt.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Director's discretion under section 14(4) of the ODSPA includes the authority to forgo recovery of an overpayment, and that the Tribunal has the same discretion on appeal.

The appellant appealed a decision declaring that the respondent's debt would be released by his discharge from bankruptcy.

The respondent had acted as a 'straw borrower' and co-signed a mortgage application, unaware that the primary borrower had made fraudulent misrepresentations.

The appellant argued the debt should survive bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(e) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act due to false pretences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 178(1)(e) requires a causal connection between the bankrupt's false pretences or fraudulent misrepresentation and the obtaining of the property.

The trial judge correctly found the mortgage funds were advanced based on the primary borrower's misrepresentations, not the respondent's.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a loaded prohibited weapon, arguing that cross-examination on a draft affidavit was improper, the trial judge misapplied the W.D. test, and the trial judge failed to address the mens rea for the firearm offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the cross-examination was fair, the trial judge properly assessed credibility and reasonable doubt, and there was a sufficient evidentiary basis to infer the appellant knew the firearm was loaded.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible (NCR) due to schizophrenia, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that imposed a detention order.

The Board had imposed the detention order primarily because the hospital was conducting a drug reduction program to demonstrate the appellant's need for medication.

The Court of Appeal held that the Board erred by justifying a restriction on liberty based on a risk created by a hospital treatment program rather than considering treatments available in the community.

The Court substituted a conditional discharge, finding it to be the least onerous and least restrictive disposition available given the appellant's progress, lack of prior violence, and family support.

The appellant municipality appealed a Superior Court decision that rescinded a remedial order issued against the respondent property owner for violating a property standards by-law regarding external lighting.

The appeal judge had found the order overly broad and the by-law impermissibly retrospective.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the by-law was prospective in requiring future compliance and clearly intended to affect vested rights.

The Court also found the remedial order was not overly broad, though it amended the wording slightly to conform to the by-law by adding the word 'likely'.

The remedial order was reinstated as amended.

The appellant brought a motion under s. 683(1)(b) of the Criminal Code to compel the complainant to attend for cross-examination in support of a fresh evidence application.

The proposed fresh evidence consisted of an affidavit from the appellant's daughter alleging the complainant lied at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed fresh evidence did not suggest the complainant lied at trial, but rather that she had been deceived by her husband.

The court concluded that cross-examination of the complainant was not in the interests of justice as there was no reasonable possibility it could undermine her credibility on matters material to the harassment allegations.