Jonathon C. George

The appellant, convicted of drugging and sexually assaulting 14 women and designated a dangerous offender with an indeterminate sentence, appealed his convictions on three counts and his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

The court found no reviewable error in the trial judge's credibility assessments, the use of similar fact evidence (despite a procedural oversight which was deemed harmless), or the determination that a determinate sentence would not adequately protect the public given the appellant's high risk of reoffending due to antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible for attempted murder, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition restricting his travel to Ontario.

He sought to expand travel privileges to Quebec for snowboarding.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding it reasonable given the appellant's significant public safety risk and the potential difficulties in managing his condition or obtaining services out of province.

The court emphasized the deference owed to the Board's risk management decisions.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sought leave to appeal his sentence for offences related to the possession of a loaded handgun.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's determination of reasonable suspicion for investigative detention or the subsequent pat-down search of a satchel.

While the trial judge erred in considering discoverability under the first branch of the Grant analysis for a s. 10(b) Charter breach, the Court found this error did not impact the s. 24(2) analysis, as the evidence would still be admissible.

The Court granted leave to appeal sentence but dismissed the sentence appeal, agreeing that the trial judge erred in relying on a confidential informant tip for an aggravating factor but concluding this error did not impact the sentence imposed, which was at the low end of the range.

The appellant, W.M., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge misapprehended the appellant's evidence regarding the complainant's state of consciousness at the start of the sexual contact.

The trial judge had found the appellant's evidence on this "crucial detail" to be "internally incompatible and exaggerated" and inconsistent with prior statements.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge, concluding that it was open to the trial judge to reject the appellant's evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the absence of DNA evidence (SAEK results).

The Court of Appeal found that while the initial instruction was potentially misleading, the subsequent correction and the charge as a whole adequately conveyed that reasonable doubt could arise from the absence of evidence, not just speculation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, the court dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding that the trial judge correctly determined the appellant was reckless or wilfully blind as to consent, precluding the defence of honest but mistaken belief.

The court also dismissed the appeal against sentence, granting leave but finding the sentence was not demonstrably unfit and that the trial judge appropriately considered mitigating factors, imposing a sentence slightly below the typical range for forced penetration.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible due to mental disorder for attempted murder, appealed the Ontario Review Board's conditional discharge order.

The Board found he continued to pose a significant threat to public safety, rejecting his treating physician's low-risk assessment due to insufficient factual grounding and limited self-reports.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Board did not abdicate its inquisitorial role and its decision was reasonable and supported by the record.

This appeal addresses an insurer's duty to defend and fund defence costs for mixed claims (covered and uncovered).

The Court of Appeal clarified the application of the pleadings rule to determine coverage and whether an insurer can seek equitable contribution from an insured.

The application judge erred in characterizing all claims as covered and in finding equitable contribution inapplicable between insurer and insured.

The Court found that statutory negligence claims were not covered by the Aviva policy, but upheld the initial 100% funding by Aviva, subject to reallocation after trial or settlement, as equitable contribution is only available between concurrent insurers, not from an insured.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application to set aside a NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitration award.

They argued the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by misapplying the causation standard and that the award violated public policy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the narrow scope of judicial review for arbitration awards under the Commercial Arbitration Code.

The court held that the tribunal acted within its jurisdiction and that the award did not conflict with Canadian public policy, which requires a very high standard for intervention.

This is a costs endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario following an appeal.

The court ordered the respondents, Walter Campbell and Olakemi Sobomehin, to pay costs in the amount of $23,856.81 to the appellant, Toronto Standard Condominium Corporation No. 2600.

The respondents had acted in person.

This appeal concerned a failed agreement of purchase and sale (APS) for a residential development, where the appellant (buyer) had an express obligation to obtain severance approval but failed to communicate or take steps for almost five years.

The respondent (seller) subsequently refused access to the property, deeming the APS terminated.

The appellant sought declarations that the APS was valid and for specific performance.

The application judge dismissed the appellant's application, finding the appellant in breach due to inordinate delay and the respondent justified in treating the APS as ended.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, affirming that where an APS has no fixed deadline, performance must occur within a reasonable time, and that inordinate, unexplained delay can constitute a fundamental breach justifying termination without a prior notice of a new deadline, depending on the circumstances.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of two easements: a 15-foot wide right-of-way for ingress and egress, and a right-of-access to a well.

The appellants (servient tenement owners) sought declarations that the right-of-way did not include vehicular turnaround activity and that the well access was null and void.

The respondents (dominant tenement owners) sought declarations affirming their rights, an injunction against obstructions, and damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's findings that the right-of-way included the turnaround area based on latent ambiguity and ancillary rights, and that the right-of-access to the well had not been extinguished.

The appellant, a nurse, was convicted by a jury of attempted murder of her 19-month-old daughter (E.) and her mother (I.F.) by administering insulin, and aggravated assault of E. The attempted murder of E. resulted in severe, permanent brain damage.

The appellant appealed both convictions and sentences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal for the attempted murder of E. and the sentence appeal, finding the life sentence for E.'s attempted murder fit given the severe harm and breach of trust.

However, the Court allowed the appeal for the attempted murder of I.F. and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred in jury instructions by not sufficiently distinguishing attempted murder from aiding suicide, particularly regarding the mens rea and causal link if I.F. had self-administered the insulin.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an appeal.

The respondent sought substantial indemnity costs based on an unaccepted offer to settle.

The Court of Appeal determined that the offer to settle did not automatically trigger costs consequences or justify an extraordinary award of substantial indemnity costs, maintaining its original order for partial indemnity costs.

The appellant, Ian Bush, appealed his conviction for three counts of first-degree murder.

The appeal was based on two grounds: the trial judge's error in admitting evidence seized from the appellant's home without proper individual analysis of probative value versus prejudicial effect, and an erroneous jury instruction on first-degree murder regarding transferred intent.

The Court of Appeal found that both errors occurred.

However, the court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding that the overwhelming evidence, particularly the fact that the murders occurred while the victims were forcibly confined (which automatically elevates murder to first-degree), meant no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Jordan Osborne, appealed his first-degree murder conviction on two grounds: the voluntariness of his police statement and alleged abuse of process by the Crown.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the police statement was voluntary, concluding that no implicit inducement or misrepresentation rendered it involuntary, and that the confession was made due to the strength of the case.

The court also dismissed the abuse of process argument, finding no inconsistency in the Crown's position at trial compared to a co-accused's guilty plea, and no compromise to trial fairness or judicial integrity.

The appellant, J.B., appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by not putting the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent to the jury, failing to correct improper Crown comments, and imposing an excessive sentence.

The Court of Appeal found there was an air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, which should have been put to the jury.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his conviction for breach of trust and his 18-month conditional sentence.

He had been acquitted of sexual assault involving the same complainant.

The appeal challenged the conviction on grounds of insufficient reasons, unreasonable verdict, and inconsistent verdicts, and the sentence on grounds of erroneous "double counting" of aggravating factors and insufficient reasons for rejecting a suspended sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient, the verdict reasonable and reconcilable, and the sentence appropriate.

The appellant, Anna Marlena Butryn, appealed a summary judgment order enforcing minutes of settlement in mortgage enforcement proceedings.

She argued she signed the minutes under undue influence and duress from her husband, John Chetti, and without independent legal advice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no evidence the respondent had knowledge of the alleged undue influence/duress, that the minutes of settlement provided significant benefits to the appellant, and that she was represented by experienced litigation counsel, making independent legal advice from a separate lawyer unnecessary.

The court reiterated that a spousal relationship does not automatically create a presumption of undue influence requiring third-party inquiry unless coupled with a manifestly disadvantageous transaction.

The appellant, a religious organization, appealed a decision affirming that its properties, primarily used for tai chi classes, were not exempt from property tax as "places of worship" under the Assessment Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower courts' findings that the tai chi classes, while integral to the organization's religion, were not primarily "worship" from the perspective of the participants, and that a contemplative garden and sales area were also not tax-exempt.

The court emphasized an objective "primary purpose" test for tax exemptions, considering the intentions of participants, not solely the organizers.