George R. Strathy

The appellant sought to overturn a trial decision regarding the distribution of life insurance proceeds from a deceased parent's estate.

The policy, initially benefiting both the appellant and the respondent sibling, was later altered to name the respondent as the sole beneficiary as part of estate planning.

The appellant contended that a binding agreement existed to reduce the policy's value and ensure equitable inheritance.

The trial judge found no such agreement, concluding that the parent's intentions for equal treatment had evolved.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings or assessment of evidence, thereby upholding the conclusion that the agreement did not mandate a policy reduction or impose a duty on the respondent to disclose decisions regarding the policy's maintenance.

The appellants, Melissa Hart and Patricia Hart, appealed the dismissal of their motion to set aside a default judgment obtained by Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC).

The motion, brought under Rule 59.06(2), alleged fraud or newly discovered facts.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the appellants failed to act with diligence in seeking to set aside the judgment and did not provide cogent evidence to support their allegations of fraud or new facts.

Previous actions by the appellant Melissa Hart based on similar facts had been dismissed as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01.

This appeal concerns the interpretation of a will granting trustees absolute discretion to encroach on capital for the income beneficiary's comfort and well-being.

The primary issue was whether the trustees improperly considered extraneous factors in exercising their discretion.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred in characterizing the trustees' distrust of the beneficiary's living arrangement as extraneous, as due diligence was warranted.

However, the court upheld the finding that the trustees' personal dislike of the beneficiary was an extraneous factor, justifying judicial intervention.

The appeal regarding the monthly encroachment was dismissed, but the arrears calculation was adjusted to reflect when sufficient financial disclosure was provided.

This appeal concerned the conviction of Elaine Biddersingh for second-degree murder.

The appellant raised three grounds: the trial judge erred in dismissing her application for a judge-alone trial due to negative pretrial publicity, erred in ruling certain statements admissible, and erred in refusing to instruct the jury on an intervening act of drowning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the conviction.

The Crown's cross-appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant, G.M.C., appealed his convictions for assault and compliance charges, following a 12-day trial.

The appeal was based on three grounds: the trial judge's alleged improper judicial notice of "memory science" uneven scrutiny of evidence (including credibility assessment, demeanour, and use of bad character evidence), and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding that the trial judge's observations on memory were common sense, that there was no reversible error in the credibility assessments or application of different standards, and that the isolated incidents did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court affirmed the convictions.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario reversed a motion judge's decision that a debt arising from misappropriation of trade secrets would survive bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(e) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA).

The motion judge erred by interpreting "false pretences" too broadly, including lying during discovery and generally morally objectionable conduct, rather than requiring a deceitful statement by which the debtor obtained property or services.

The Court clarified that s. 178(1)(e) requires a direct causal link between a deceitful statement and the obtaining of property/services.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the declaration regarding s. 178(1)(e) and varying the stay of proceedings to allow quantification of claims for bankruptcy purposes and enforcement of injunctive relief, but not monetary judgments outside of bankruptcy.

J.T. appealed convictions for possessing and making child pornography available, arguing two errors by the trial judge: admitting expert evidence without qualification regarding file downloading, and committing a Sekhon error by relying on anecdotal evidence that child pornography does not automatically appear on computers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the first point did not require expertise as it was mundane factual evidence, and the second was not a Sekhon error as the testimony explained technical operation, not guilt, and did not reverse the burden of proof.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, raising multiple grounds including errors in evidence assessment, failure to give a Vetrovec warning, failure to address honest but mistaken belief in consent, and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's credibility findings and rejecting arguments based on stereotypical victim behaviour.

The court found no air of reality for the honest but mistaken belief defence and no evidence of judicial bias, concluding that the verdict was reasonable.

The appellant, Stericycle ULC, appealed an order dismissing its application for a declaration that it, rather than Daniels Sharpsmart Canada Limited, was the primary supplier for Provincial Health Services Authority (PHSA) under a public tendering process.

Stericycle argued that the application judge erred in contract interpretation, allowing impermissible bid repair, and failing to properly apply the duty of good faith.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's interpretation of the "Six Month Provision" or the contract start date.

The court also found no breach of the duty of good faith or honest performance by HealthPRO or PHSA, as their actions were consistent with the contract's purpose and Stericycle's reasonable expectations.

This decision addresses two appeals by an accused found not criminally responsible (NCRMD) from disposition orders of the Ontario Review Board (ORB).

The first appeal (C68888) challenged a 2020 detention order with community living privileges, which was ultimately adjourned as moot due to a subsequent disposition.

The second appeal (C69217) arose from a 2021 ORB hearing following the revocation of the accused's community living privileges and his re-detention due to new harassment incidents.

A central issue in the second appeal was the ORB's new practice of issuing general detention orders to a "Forensic Service" without specifying the security level of the unit.

The Court of Appeal expressed concern that this practice might hinder the ORB's ability to ensure the least onerous and least restrictive disposition, emphasizing the need for specificity regarding conditions and security levels.

The Court admitted fresh evidence regarding the accused's transfer to a secure unit and the withdrawal of criminal charges.

The Court maintained the 2021 disposition and dismissed the second appeal.

Mr. Ojaghi appealed a detention order issued by the Ontario Review Board, arguing it was unreasonable and seeking a conditional discharge.

He also challenged the Board's removal of a travel provision from his previous disposition.

The Court of Appeal upheld the detention order, finding it reasonable and necessary for public safety given the applicant's non-compliance with medication.

However, the court found that the Board breached its duty of procedural fairness by removing the travel provision without notice or inviting submissions, and therefore reinstated that provision.

The appellant, Richard Walker, sought leave to appeal his sentence for accessing, possessing, and making child pornography available.

He raised three grounds: (i) the trial judge erred in deeming lack of insight an aggravating factor; (ii) the trial judge erred in failing to reduce the sentence due to COVID-19 collateral consequences; and (iii) these errors rendered the sentence unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that lack of insight is distinguishable from lack of remorse and can be considered for future dangerousness, the trial judge correctly applied the law regarding COVID-19's minimal mitigating impact, and the sentence was fit given the gravity and nature of the child pornography offences, particularly the egregious content and victim ages.

A minor correction to the s. 161 order was made on consent.

The appellant, Timothy Massey-Patel, appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge's verdict was unreasonable, that she erred in assessing witness evidence, and that she relied on impermissible stereotypes and applied uneven scrutiny.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were reasonable, her assessment of evidence sound, and that she did not rely on stereotypes or apply uneven scrutiny.

The court affirmed that a reasonable doubt on one aspect of the alleged assault (penile penetration) did not invalidate the conviction for other sexual touching and digital penetration, as the doubt arose from reliability concerns, not credibility of the complainant.

The appellant, L.C., appealed his conviction for sexual interference and sexual assault, seeking a new trial based on proposed fresh evidence.

The fresh evidence, consisting of two affidavits from the appellant's sister, aimed to challenge the credibility of one of the complainants by suggesting prior discussions (collusion) among the complainants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, refusing to admit the fresh evidence.

The court found the appellant's sister's evidence lacked credibility due to her bias and inconsistencies, and it was not sufficiently probative to undermine the trial judge's finding that the complainant's testimony was untainted by collusion.

This appeal addresses the role of "public correction" in secondary market misrepresentation class actions under s. 138.3 of the Securities Act.

The appellant sought leave to pursue a statutory remedy, which the motion judge denied by requiring a discrete and identifiable public correction that explicitly revealed the misrepresentation.

The Court of Appeal, following its own decision in *Barrick OCA*, found that the motion judge applied an unduly onerous standard for public correction.

The Court clarified that public correction does not require "facial symmetry" with the misrepresentation and must be understood in context by the secondary market.

The appeal was allowed, and the leave motion remitted for redetermination.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal where the appellants (defendants) successfully challenged the sanction (judgment in the action) imposed by the motion judge for contempt, due to procedural flaws.

The Court of Appeal upheld the initial costs award for the contempt finding, but set aside the costs for the sanctions hearing and the action, and ordered no costs for the appeal, acknowledging the appellants' underlying contemptuous conduct as the root cause of the proceedings.

The Court of Appeal heard motions for leave to intervene from the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) and the Income Security Advocacy Centre (ISAC) in a class action appeal concerning the Basic Income Pilot Project.

The CCLA's unopposed motion was granted, allowing it to file a factum and present oral arguments under specific terms.

The ISAC's motion was dismissed without costs because its direct involvement in shaping the factual matrix of the Basic Income Pilot Project, including consultations and advice to participants, made it too closely associated with the potential class members and the underlying factual issues, thus compromising its role as an intervener.

The Crown appealed the Stage One and Stage Two decisions regarding the interpretation of the Robinson-Huron and Robinson-Superior Treaties of 1850.

The trial judge found that the Treaties' augmentation clause imposed a mandatory obligation on the Crown to increase the perpetual annuities if the economic circumstances of the ceded territories warranted it, without a hard cap of $4 per person.

The Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the trial judge's conclusion that the Crown has an obligation under the honour of the Crown to diligently implement the augmentation promise and that its discretion is not unfettered.

The Court unanimously set aside the trial judge's finding of an ad hoc fiduciary duty and her specific remedial directives regarding a 'fair share' of net resource revenues.

The Court also unanimously dismissed the Crown's limitations defence.

The Court split on the standard of review for historical treaties and whether the trial judge made extricable errors of law in her interpretation, but the majority upheld her core interpretation of the augmentation clause.

The appellants appealed a decision concerning damages from an interim injunction they obtained against the respondents and compensation for work the respondents were obliged to complete under a 2010 court order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's assessment of damages, which included interest rate differentials and lender's amendment fees due to the injunction, and the compensation for expenditures related to the 2010 order.

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and deferred to his interpretation of the 2010 order.

The moving party, Aziz Elguindy, sought to reverse an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal that refused to extend time to appeal the dismissal of a Rule 59.06 motion.

The Rule 59.06 motion aimed to set aside a trial costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, confirming that the dismissal of the Rule 59.06 motion was an interlocutory order, not a final order, and therefore not appealable to the Court of Appeal without leave to the Divisional Court.