George R. Strathy

J.T. appealed convictions for possessing and making child pornography available, arguing two errors by the trial judge: admitting expert evidence without qualification regarding file downloading, and committing a Sekhon error by relying on anecdotal evidence that child pornography does not automatically appear on computers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the first point did not require expertise as it was mundane factual evidence, and the second was not a Sekhon error as the testimony explained technical operation, not guilt, and did not reverse the burden of proof.

The appellant, Stericycle ULC, appealed an order dismissing its application for a declaration that it, rather than Daniels Sharpsmart Canada Limited, was the primary supplier for Provincial Health Services Authority (PHSA) under a public tendering process.

Stericycle argued that the application judge erred in contract interpretation, allowing impermissible bid repair, and failing to properly apply the duty of good faith.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's interpretation of the "Six Month Provision" or the contract start date.

The court also found no breach of the duty of good faith or honest performance by HealthPRO or PHSA, as their actions were consistent with the contract's purpose and Stericycle's reasonable expectations.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, raising multiple grounds including errors in evidence assessment, failure to give a Vetrovec warning, failure to address honest but mistaken belief in consent, and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's credibility findings and rejecting arguments based on stereotypical victim behaviour.

The court found no air of reality for the honest but mistaken belief defence and no evidence of judicial bias, concluding that the verdict was reasonable.

This decision addresses two appeals by an accused found not criminally responsible (NCRMD) from disposition orders of the Ontario Review Board (ORB).

The first appeal (C68888) challenged a 2020 detention order with community living privileges, which was ultimately adjourned as moot due to a subsequent disposition.

The second appeal (C69217) arose from a 2021 ORB hearing following the revocation of the accused's community living privileges and his re-detention due to new harassment incidents.

A central issue in the second appeal was the ORB's new practice of issuing general detention orders to a "Forensic Service" without specifying the security level of the unit.

The Court of Appeal expressed concern that this practice might hinder the ORB's ability to ensure the least onerous and least restrictive disposition, emphasizing the need for specificity regarding conditions and security levels.

The Court admitted fresh evidence regarding the accused's transfer to a secure unit and the withdrawal of criminal charges.

The Court maintained the 2021 disposition and dismissed the second appeal.

Mr. Ojaghi appealed a detention order issued by the Ontario Review Board, arguing it was unreasonable and seeking a conditional discharge.

He also challenged the Board's removal of a travel provision from his previous disposition.

The Court of Appeal upheld the detention order, finding it reasonable and necessary for public safety given the applicant's non-compliance with medication.

However, the court found that the Board breached its duty of procedural fairness by removing the travel provision without notice or inviting submissions, and therefore reinstated that provision.

The appellant, Richard Walker, sought leave to appeal his sentence for accessing, possessing, and making child pornography available.

He raised three grounds: (i) the trial judge erred in deeming lack of insight an aggravating factor; (ii) the trial judge erred in failing to reduce the sentence due to COVID-19 collateral consequences; and (iii) these errors rendered the sentence unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that lack of insight is distinguishable from lack of remorse and can be considered for future dangerousness, the trial judge correctly applied the law regarding COVID-19's minimal mitigating impact, and the sentence was fit given the gravity and nature of the child pornography offences, particularly the egregious content and victim ages.

A minor correction to the s. 161 order was made on consent.

The appellant, Timothy Massey-Patel, appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge's verdict was unreasonable, that she erred in assessing witness evidence, and that she relied on impermissible stereotypes and applied uneven scrutiny.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were reasonable, her assessment of evidence sound, and that she did not rely on stereotypes or apply uneven scrutiny.

The court affirmed that a reasonable doubt on one aspect of the alleged assault (penile penetration) did not invalidate the conviction for other sexual touching and digital penetration, as the doubt arose from reliability concerns, not credibility of the complainant.

The appellant, L.C., appealed his conviction for sexual interference and sexual assault, seeking a new trial based on proposed fresh evidence.

The fresh evidence, consisting of two affidavits from the appellant's sister, aimed to challenge the credibility of one of the complainants by suggesting prior discussions (collusion) among the complainants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, refusing to admit the fresh evidence.

The court found the appellant's sister's evidence lacked credibility due to her bias and inconsistencies, and it was not sufficiently probative to undermine the trial judge's finding that the complainant's testimony was untainted by collusion.

This appeal addresses the role of "public correction" in secondary market misrepresentation class actions under s. 138.3 of the Securities Act.

The appellant sought leave to pursue a statutory remedy, which the motion judge denied by requiring a discrete and identifiable public correction that explicitly revealed the misrepresentation.

The Court of Appeal, following its own decision in *Barrick OCA*, found that the motion judge applied an unduly onerous standard for public correction.

The Court clarified that public correction does not require "facial symmetry" with the misrepresentation and must be understood in context by the secondary market.

The appeal was allowed, and the leave motion remitted for redetermination.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal where the appellants (defendants) successfully challenged the sanction (judgment in the action) imposed by the motion judge for contempt, due to procedural flaws.

The Court of Appeal upheld the initial costs award for the contempt finding, but set aside the costs for the sanctions hearing and the action, and ordered no costs for the appeal, acknowledging the appellants' underlying contemptuous conduct as the root cause of the proceedings.

The Court of Appeal heard motions for leave to intervene from the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) and the Income Security Advocacy Centre (ISAC) in a class action appeal concerning the Basic Income Pilot Project.

The CCLA's unopposed motion was granted, allowing it to file a factum and present oral arguments under specific terms.

The ISAC's motion was dismissed without costs because its direct involvement in shaping the factual matrix of the Basic Income Pilot Project, including consultations and advice to participants, made it too closely associated with the potential class members and the underlying factual issues, thus compromising its role as an intervener.

The appellants appealed a decision concerning damages from an interim injunction they obtained against the respondents and compensation for work the respondents were obliged to complete under a 2010 court order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's assessment of damages, which included interest rate differentials and lender's amendment fees due to the injunction, and the compensation for expenditures related to the 2010 order.

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and deferred to his interpretation of the 2010 order.

The moving party, Aziz Elguindy, sought to reverse an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal that refused to extend time to appeal the dismissal of a Rule 59.06 motion.

The Rule 59.06 motion aimed to set aside a trial costs order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, confirming that the dismissal of the Rule 59.06 motion was an interlocutory order, not a final order, and therefore not appealable to the Court of Appeal without leave to the Divisional Court.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a judgment dismissing his claims for malicious prosecution, nervous shock, false imprisonment, negligence, and other collateral claims, and an extension of time to appeal that judgment.

He also sought leave to appeal a subsequent costs order of $75,000 and leave to file fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no bona fide intention to appeal within the relevant time, no explanation for the delay, and that the proposed appeal lacked merit, which would prejudice the responding parties.

The court also found no error in principle in the trial judge's costs award, noting its reasonableness given the trial length, the moving party's conduct, and unfounded allegations.

This appeal addressed whether the trial judge erred in awarding eight months' damages for wrongful dismissal.

The appellant argued the trial judge improperly considered the respondent's prior service and the time it took him to find new employment.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's decision, finding the eight-month notice period reasonable and within an acceptable range, emphasizing deference to the trial judge's assessment and the holistic application of Bardal principles.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Jo-Ann Bodnar, appealed a summary judgment order in favour of the respondent, the Estate of Peter Boban, concerning an outstanding mortgage.

The motion judge found no triable issue regarding the interest rate or the application of part performance or promissory estoppel.

On appeal, the appellant did not challenge the interest rate finding but argued that the respondent had agreed to limit its remedies to foreclosure based on a 1996 mortgage action and subsequent consents.

The Court of Appeal found no evidence to support this claim.

The appellant also raised new arguments regarding issue estoppel, cause of action estoppel, abuse of process, and laches, which were not pleaded or argued below.

The court refused leave to raise these new arguments as no reasonable explanation was provided for their late introduction and the respondent would be prejudiced.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, TELUS Communications Inc., appealed a Superior Court decision regarding the constitutional validity of the Wireless Services Agreement Act 2013 (WSAA) and a class action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's findings that the WSAA was within provincial legislative jurisdiction and was not rendered inoperative by paramountcy or interjurisdictional immunity.

The court also rejected the appellant's request to stay the class action for CRTC determination, confirming the Superior Court's jurisdiction.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario ordered the appellant, Narwhal International Limited, to pay costs to the respondent, Teda International Realty Inc., in the amount of $7,500, inclusive of disbursements and all applicable taxes, after considering written submissions from both parties.

The appellants, found in contempt for multiple failures to disclose assets and account for misappropriated investment funds, appealed the motion judge's decision to grant judgment against them for approximately $9 million as a sanction for contempt.

The Court of Appeal held that while striking a defence or barring participation can be a sanction for contempt, final judgment is not directly available as a punishment for contempt under Ontario's Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court found that the motion judge erred by relying on the merits of the action to grant judgment while simultaneously barring the appellants from addressing those merits.

The judgment was set aside, and the matter remitted to a different judge for a new sentencing hearing.

The appellant, Gordon Dunk Farms Ltd., appealed a summary judgment decision that found its action for negligence and breach of contract against the respondents (designers, contractors, and concrete workers) was statute-barred due to the expiration of the limitation period.

The action stemmed from the collapse of a hog barn.

The motion judge found that the appellant's principals knew or ought to have known the material facts constituting their claim by May 12, 2014, more than two years before the action was commenced on May 24, 2016.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that a "claim" under the Limitations Act, 2002, does not require knowledge of every specific act or omission, but rather sufficient facts to draw a plausible inference of liability.

The appeal was dismissed, confirming the action was statute-barred against all respondents.