Gary T. Trotter

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for the shooting death of Troy Hutchinson.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant was the actual shooter, but the jury was also instructed on liability as an aider or abettor.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the mens rea required for aiding or abetting murder.

Specifically, the jury was not properly instructed that an aider or abettor must know that the principal actor has subjective foresight of death.

The error was repeated multiple times throughout the charge and was compounded by an incorrect definition of recklessness and an inadequate answer to the jury's final question.

The curative proviso was not applied because the jury's final question demonstrated that at least one juror had a reasonable doubt about the appellant being the principal actor, making it impossible to conclude that conviction was inevitable.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant, a self-represented litigant with extensive litigation experience, sought to review a decision by Justice Nordheimer declining to set aside the Registrar's order dismissing his appeals for failure to perfect.

The appellant had filed seven appeals in response to a single order and failed to provide adequate reasons for the delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to review, finding no error in Nordheimer J.A.'s discretionary decision.

The court also denied the appellant's last-minute request for an adjournment based on medical grounds and Charter arguments.

Costs were awarded to the respondents on a partial indemnity scale.

The appellant insurer appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice regarding insurance policy interpretation.

The insurer argued that there was no "Claim" against an "Insured Person" for a "Wrongful Act" nor was there a "Loss" within the policy's definitions.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's interpretation of the governing principles or the policy language, and dismissed the appeal.

The respondent was awarded costs of $16,000.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision in which the respondents successfully recovered funds they had lent to Glocap Management Inc. The appellants argued that they could not be held liable due to their failure to obtain necessary approvals, and raised issues regarding guarantees and material alteration of risk.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the appellants could not rely on their own failures to avoid their obligations, that there was no evidence of unilateral alteration of risk, and that the appellants failed to meet their burden of establishing the quantum of credit they sought.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

This appeal concerns a dispute between two insurers regarding the payment of statutory accident benefits (SABS) to an injured claimant.

The central issue is whether an insurer's failure to notify the claimant of a priority dispute between insurers within 90 days of receiving the SABS application precluded the insurer from pursuing the dispute.

The arbitrator determined that while notice to the claimant was mandatory, no specific time limit was prescribed by regulation.

The Superior Court reversed this decision, applying a correctness standard of review.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the reasonableness standard of review applies to arbitrator decisions on SABS priority disputes, even where questions of law are engaged.

The arbitrator's interpretation that late notice did not bar the priority dispute was reasonable.

The appellants challenged an application judge's decision denying them interest on legacies under their father's will.

The testator's final will left monetary legacies of $530,000 each to his two daughters and the residuary estate to his son.

The daughters challenged the will on grounds of undue influence but were unsuccessful.

They then claimed entitlement to interest on their legacies under the common law "rule of convenience," which provides for interest on legacies delayed beyond one year from the testator's death.

The application judge exercised discretion to deny interest, citing the daughters' status as estate trustees and their role in causing delay through the will challenge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the "rule of convenience" applied and that the application judge erred in principle by linking entitlement to interest to the reasonableness of distribution within the executor's year, by giving undue weight to the will challenge, and by characterizing interest as a reward or penalty.

The appellant appealed his conviction on a single ground: that the trial judge erred in dismissing his motion to stay proceedings for breach of s. 11(b) of the Charter (right to trial within reasonable time).

The appellant had been arrested on five counts of criminal harassment in November 2008 and subsequently re-arrested six times over three years on similar charges.

After a lengthy and complex procedural history spanning over four years, the appellant pleaded guilty to five counts and was sentenced to probation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on two bases: first, that the appellant's guilty plea barred him from challenging the pre-trial s. 11(b) ruling under the Fegan doctrine; and second, on the merits, that even under the Jordan framework (which post-dated the trial judge's decision), the delay did not constitute a breach of s. 11(b) when defence delay and transitional exceptional circumstances were properly accounted for.

The appellant appealed a 12-month sentence imposed for failure to comply with a probation order and failure to comply with a recognizance.

The breaches involved possessing internet-capable devices in violation of orders prohibiting such possession, which were imposed following the appellant's second conviction for possession of child pornography.

The appellant argued the sentence was outside the proper range as it was his first breach and he was not a long-term offender, and that he did not download illegal material.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding the offences were flagrant, planned, deliberate, and occurred shortly after release.

The court found no errors in law or principle and determined the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break and enter and failure to comply with probation.

He argued that the trial judge erred in failing to consider his specific circumstances when assessing his credibility and intent, and that the trial judge improperly relied on his after-the-fact conduct of fleeing the daycare as evidence of guilt.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was aware of the appellant's personal circumstances and made credible findings that were not subject to appellate interference.

The court also found that the trial judge properly considered the appellant's after-the-fact conduct as circumstantial evidence.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

This appeal concerns the division of a Canadian Forces pension as family property under the Family Law Act.

The appellant sought to divide her pension through monthly payment splits at source, while the respondent sought an immediate lump-sum transfer.

The trial judge ordered a lump-sum transfer to satisfy an equalization payment of $313,002.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding that the Pension Benefits Division Act only permits lump-sum divisions of federal pensions and that section 10.1(5) of the Family Law Act does not preclude lump-sum transfers when a pension is in pay.

The court dismissed the appeal and awarded costs to the respondent.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for criminal harassment, breach of recognizance, and breach of probation.

He sought to strike his guilty pleas, arguing they were not voluntary.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to strike the pleas, noting that the appellant was represented by counsel, personally entered his guilty pleas, addressed the court before sentencing, and was actively involved in the proceedings.

The court held that the appellant's dissatisfaction with the sentence did not undermine the voluntariness of his pleas.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery with firearm and disguise with intent, arguing the conviction was unreasonable.

The case was circumstantial, turning on the identity of the robber.

The trial judge found that a leather jacket and gloves were used in the robbery and abandoned near the scene.

The appellant's DNA was found on the jacket, and exclusively on the gloves.

The trial judge also found that the appellant had worn the same jacket approximately one month earlier in a booking video.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's findings supported the conclusion that there was no other reasonable inference to be drawn, and the verdict was reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and related offences arising from events on May 8, 2013, and his sentence of eight years imprisonment.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's handling of a section 276 application and her treatment of the underlying issues in her reasons for judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly appreciated the complainant's inconsistency regarding her relationship with an acquaintance and correctly concluded that further details would not have advanced the defence's motive theory.

The trial judge's reasons were thorough and well-grounded in the evidence.

The appellant was convicted of significant fraud involving the preparation of fraudulent tax returns for 241 taxpayers claiming non-existent business losses to obtain tax refunds from the Canada Revenue Agency.

The fraud resulted in wrongful federal tax refunds exceeding $2.7 million, with the appellant receiving over $149,000 for his role.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence, raising numerous grounds of appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding no errors in the trial judge's handling of search warrant issues, Charter rights claims, jury charge, or sentencing.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual offences against his wife's granddaughter.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal and proceeded only with the sentence appeal.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of six years' imprisonment.

The appellant argued the sentence was outside the appropriate range, citing the gap between his last conviction and the recent offences, and invoking the jump principle given his longest previous sentence was two years less a day.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding it was fit and that the trial judge properly balanced the relevant factors, particularly the appellant's extensive record for sexual offences and the principles of denunciation and general deterrence.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board decision concerning whether the Royal Ottawa Mental Health Centre was required to notify the Board of a significant increase in restrictions on the appellant's liberty when she was transferred from the Secure Forensic Rehabilitation Unit (FRU) to the Secure Forensic Assessment Unit (FAU).

The appellant, found not criminally responsible in 2004, had been abusing substances while on the FRU, leading to the transfer.

The Board was divided on whether notice was required under s. 672.56(2) of the Criminal Code, but unanimously concluded that the transfer constituted the least onerous and least restrictive measure available.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, establishing a framework for determining when notice of significant increases in restrictions on liberty is required.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and his sentence.

The assault occurred outside a McDonald's restaurant in Ottawa.

The main issue at trial was identification.

The trial judge provided detailed reasons supporting her conclusion that the appellant was identified as the assailant beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge adequately addressed the conflicting evidence and the verdict was reasonable.

On sentence, the court found the sentence was not unfit given the serious and cowardly nature of the attack, the victim's serious injuries requiring reconstructive surgery, and the appellant's serious criminal record for violent offences.

The court rejected a parity argument, noting significant differences between the appellant and a co-accused, including the co-accused's early guilty plea and minor record.

Both the conviction appeal and sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The appellant challenged the grounds for his arrest and the basis for issuance of a search warrant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's application of the Debot criteria, finding ample basis for both the arrest and warrant based on police surveillance evidence.

The trial judge made no errors in sentencing or in calculating pre-trial custody.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, a pastor, appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual offences against his 14-year-old step-daughter.

He argued the trial judge placed undue reliance on the complainant's demeanour when assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly analyzed the substance of the evidence and did not overemphasize demeanour.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as no submissions were made and the sentence was fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment, breach of recognizance (x2), and pointing a firearm, as well as his sentence.

The appellant pled guilty to all offences except pointing a firearm, which proceeded to trial.

The trial judge found the appellant's testimony not credible and convicted him based on the evidence.

The appellant raised concerns regarding territorial jurisdiction, misuse of his criminal record, and the trial judge's assessment of the victim's credibility.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to disturb the trial judge's conclusions and dismissed the appeal from conviction.

The appellant also sought a one-month sentence reduction to complete his remaining time in a provincial institution, which the Court of Appeal declined to grant.

The appeal from sentence was also dismissed.