Eleanore A. Cronk

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching on the sole ground of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

He alleged his counsel incompetently refused to allow him to testify, failed to prepare him to testify, and failed to call a witness regarding an alleged prior false complaint.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant failed to establish the factual basis for his claims or demonstrate any prejudice resulting from his counsel's conduct.

The appellants were charged with trading in real estate as brokers without being registered.

The justice of the peace acquitted them, providing ambiguous reasons regarding whether they possessed the requisite mens rea or were acquitted based on perceived unfairness.

The summary conviction appeal judge reversed the acquittals and entered convictions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that both the justice of the peace and the appeal judge provided inadequate reasons that foreclosed meaningful appellate review on the mens rea component of the offences.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention in a Secure Forensic Unit with the possibility of transfer to a General Forensic Unit.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence showing the appellant had absented himself from the hospital for four months before surrendering the day before the appeal hearing.

The Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence of elopement and the resulting flight risk concerns were sufficient to sustain the Board's hybrid disposition, while urging an expedited fresh review by the Board.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of three years' imprisonment for multiple drug and firearms offences, arguing it was unfit after his conviction for possession of a loaded firearm was overturned on a previous appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding that the combination of drugs and guns is a serious aggravating factor and the three-year sentence remained fit and appropriate to achieve denunciation and deterrence.

The court also upheld the 30-day concurrent sentence for breaching a recognizance condition prohibiting cellphone possession.

The appellant, a foster parent, was convicted of sexual assault, sexual exploitation, and sexual interference against his foster child.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, particularly regarding his erectile dysfunction, the complainant's inconsistent statements, the improbability of the allegations, and the rejection of his own testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or factual findings.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months' incarceration for possession of oxycodone for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the sentence was manifestly unfit and that the sentencing judge failed to adequately explore the principle of restraint for youthful first offenders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the appellant was 29 years old and the trial judge properly considered and rejected a conditional sentence due to the harm caused by the drug.

The court found the sentencing judge balanced general deterrence and rehabilitation, and provided adequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the fixed amount of $1,000, inclusive of disbursements and all applicable taxes.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months' incarceration for domestic assault and a concurrent three months for breaching probation.

He argued the sentencing judge erred by rejecting a joint submission and failing to consider the 'jump' principle.

The Court of Appeal found it was not a joint submission case but agreed the sentencing judge erred by significantly exceeding the Crown's proposed sentence without giving counsel an opportunity to make submissions, and by failing to allow the appellant to speak before sentencing.

The Court varied the sentence to 12 months' imprisonment for the assault and three months concurrent for the breach, followed by three years' probation.

The appellant appealed from orders granting summary judgment and dismissing her claims against the Crown and Seneca College.

She alleged wrongful denial of student aid funding and an improperly assigned failing grade in a nursing course.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's findings that student aid was discretionary and restricted due to an unrefunded overpayment, and that the appellant failed the course despite numerous opportunities to rewrite the exam.

The appeal was dismissed, and fresh evidence was not admitted.

The appellant husband appealed an order declaring that each party had an equal interest in the former matrimonial home, which was located on an Indian reserve.

The appellant sought sole ownership and exclusive possession of the home.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Derrickson, the Court of Appeal held that provincial courts lack the authority to make orders concerning the possession, ownership, or disposition of property on a reserve governed by the Indian Act.

The appeal was allowed in part to vary the lower court's order, clarifying that the equal interest in the home was for equalization purposes only.

The appellant appealed his convictions for careless storage of a firearm and his sentence of 12 months' imprisonment and a five-year weapons prohibition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the marked departure standard of care.

The sentence appeal was allowed, as the trial judge erred in treating rehabilitative prospects as a neutral factor and failed to explain why consecutive sentences were justified.

The sentence was varied to time served and the prohibition order was reduced to two years.

The appellant, who acted as guardian of property for his mother, appealed a judgment dismissing his application to pass accounts and ordering him to repay misappropriated funds and unjustified legal expenses to the estate.

The application judge also deprived him of compensation due to his shocking conduct and blatant disregard of his fiduciary obligations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the majority of the application judge's findings, rejecting arguments of unfairness and insufficient reasons.

The appeal was allowed in part only to permit the estate to reimburse the appellant for a portion of legal fees if it successfully collects a specific costs award.

The appellant employee and respondent employer entered into a framework agreement containing four sub-agreements to resolve various disputes.

The employer breached the employment sub-agreement by terminating the employee, who then sued for wrongful dismissal and claimed the entire framework agreement was voided.

The motion judge granted summary judgment for wrongful dismissal but held the sub-agreements were severable, dismissing the employee's claims under the other sub-agreements and staying execution of the wrongful dismissal judgment pending the employer's counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the conclusion that the sub-agreements were independent and severable, nor in the discretionary decision to grant a stay.

The self-represented appellant brought a motion to set aside or vary a previous panel order that dismissed his motion to review a case management judge's order regarding transcript costs.

The appellant filed affidavits containing intemperate language and unsupported accusations of professional misconduct against opposing counsel.

The Court of Appeal struck the affidavits as scandalous and vexatious under Rules 4.06(2) and 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The motion was dismissed for lack of merit and evidence, with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to set aside a Mareva injunction and receivership order.

They argued that because the underlying trial judgment was stayed pending appeal, only the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to grant such relief under Rule 63.03(1).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the injunction and receivership were granted in a separate, new action to preserve assets, and did not constitute steps to enforce the stayed trial judgment.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for breach of fiduciary duty and dismissing his counterclaim.

The appellant argued he was not a fiduciary, that any such relationship had terminated, that the respondent had unclean hands, and that his counterclaim should have succeeded because no defence was filed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that a trust relationship existed and continued, that the unclean hands doctrine did not apply, and that the appellant still bore the burden of proving his counterclaim despite the lack of a defence.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their claims for oppression, breach of good faith, and misrepresentation regarding the cost base of certain shares.

The appellants alleged they were not informed that shares were acquired on a tax-deferred basis.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the cost base was specifically listed in the circular, which the individual appellant had approved as a director and CFO.

The appeal was dismissed as entirely without merit, with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to set aside a default judgment sounding in fraud and negligence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's application of the test for setting aside a default judgment.

Although the first two branches of the test may have been satisfied, the appellant failed to establish any arguable defence on the merits to either the fraud or negligence claims.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $2,000.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their oppression claim against the respondents.

The claim was based on the respondent's refusal to appoint the individual appellant as a co-director of a corporation when he sought to exercise an option to re-acquire shares.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellant had no statutory, contractual, or tort-based entitlement to a directorship.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his claim that the respondent's actions caused a corporation to lose its business and deprived him of management fees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the corporation was placed in liquidation by consent court order, which required its replacement as general partner.

The loss of business was occasioned by the consent liquidation, not by any actions of the respondent.