Eleanore A. Cronk

The appellants appealed a summary judgment ordering them to pay the respondent for the redemption of preference shares.

The appellants argued that an oral collateral agreement delayed the payment obligations until the completion of a separate share sale, and that the respondent's interference in that sale justified equitable set-off.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the alleged collateral agreement contradicted the clear terms of the written redemption agreement and guarantee, which included an entire agreement clause.

The court also found that equitable set-off was expressly precluded by the guarantee and that the motions judge did not exceed her jurisdiction in granting summary judgment.

Following the release of reasons for judgment, the court received written submissions on costs of the cross-appeal.

On consent of the appellant in the cross-appeal, the court awarded costs of the cross-appeal to the respondents in the cross-appeal on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $2,000 each.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for offences related to an incendiary fire and insurance fraud.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's financial motive and his alteration of an alarm system certificate to maintain insurance coverage.

The verdict was deemed reasonable.

The custodial sentence was upheld as being within the acceptable range.

The restitution order of $473,000 was reduced by $170,000, representing the agreed amount realized from the sale of the lands by the insurer.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that overturned the respondent's sexual assault conviction and ordered a new trial.

The lower court had ordered a new trial based on inconsistencies between a police officer's notes and the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that mere differences between the notes and testimony did not automatically warrant a new trial without further exploration of the inconsistencies.

The Court also rejected the respondent's fresh evidence alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

The conviction was restored and the matter remitted for a sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexually assaulting his eight-year-old niece.

He argued that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate and that the trial judge erred by allowing the Crown to split its case by recalling him for further cross-examination on a prior statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the reasons were adequate under the Sheppard functional analysis and that the procedural irregularity of recalling the appellant caused no prejudice in a judge-alone trial.

In an addendum on costs following an appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario awarded the respondents their costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $13,099.75 inclusive of disbursements and GST, having regard to their success on appeal, the complexity of the issues, and their Bill of Costs.

The appellants and respondents owned cottage properties on Lake Erie.

The trial judge found the appellants had acquired prescriptive easements for parking and a pier on the respondents' land, but applied equitable proprietary estoppel to impose annual licence fees.

The Court of Appeal held the trial judge erred in applying the equitable doctrine without a finding of unconscionability, setting aside the licence fees.

The Court dismissed the respondents' cross-appeal, upholding the findings that parking was reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the dominant tenements, and that proprietary estoppel was established for a well and concrete blocks.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued an endorsement on costs following an appeal.

The court ordered no costs for the motion before Carthy J.A., but awarded the respondents their costs of the appeal fixed at $26,000, inclusive of disbursements and GST.

Before marriage, the respondent wife purchased land using a housing loan under the Income Tax Act and built a house that became the matrimonial home.

Upon separation, the husband argued that the housing loan should be deducted from the marriage date value of the wife's property when calculating her net family property, which would increase her net family property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision that the housing loan, like a mortgage, should not be deducted from the marriage date value of the property, as doing so would impose an unfair double burden on the spouse bringing the matrimonial home into the marriage.

The appellant developer appealed a judgment granting specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a residential condominium unit.

The application judge had found the developer breached the agreement by improperly setting confirmed occupancy dates and terminating the agreement due to delay.

The Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred in interpreting the agreement and in making factual findings based on inference without a trial.

The judgment was set aside, and the application was converted into an action to proceed to trial on the disputed factual issues.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of s. 117.04(1) of the Criminal Code, which authorizes search warrants for weapons on public safety grounds, arguing it violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal held that the provision violates s. 8 because it lacks a requirement that the peace officer have reasonable grounds to believe that weapons are likely to be found on the person or premises to be searched, and that such grounds be presented to the issuing justice.

The Court found this omission allowed for overbroad searches and could not be saved under s. 1.

The provision was declared of no force or effect, with the declaration suspended for six months, and the search warrant for the appellant's residence was quashed.

The defendants brought a motion for directions to determine whether the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs' appeal from an order dismissing their cross-motion for partial summary judgment, alongside their appeal from the final order granting the defendants summary judgment and dismissing the action.

The Court of Appeal held that the order dismissing the partial summary judgment motion was interlocutory.

Therefore, the plaintiffs must first obtain leave to appeal to the Divisional Court before the Court of Appeal can assume jurisdiction over both matters under section 6(2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The defendants' motion for directions was denied.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing her solicitor negligence claim against her former family law lawyer.

She alleged the lawyer negligently consented to a non-depletion order, preventing her from selling the matrimonial home at the peak of the real estate market.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the lawyer did not consent to the order, the order could have been varied if a sale was desired, and the appellant did not actually intend to sell the home at that time.

The plaintiffs, Ontario residents, were injured in a motor vehicle accident in New York State involving a vehicle driven by a New York resident.

The plaintiffs sued in Ontario.

The defendant moved to determine the applicable law.

The Court of Appeal held that the substantive law of New York (lex loci delicti) applies, while the procedural law of Ontario (lex fori) applies.

The Court determined that costs and the cap on non-pecuniary damages are procedural matters governed by Ontario law, whereas pre-judgment interest is a substantive right governed by New York law.

The appellant was arrested for sexual assault during an undercover police operation targeting public sex in a park.

After the criminal charge was withdrawn, the appellant sued the police for negligence, malicious prosecution, and Charter breaches.

The trial judge dismissed the action.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in rejecting proposed expert evidence, failing to consider his section 15(1) Charter discrimination claim, and dismissing the malicious prosecution claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the expert evidence was unnecessary, the trial judge properly considered and rejected the Charter claim, and there was no evidence of malice to support malicious prosecution.

The Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal appealed a Superior Court decision quashing its interim order that allowed a subset of tenants to testify on behalf of over 300 tenants in a rent abatement application.

The Superior Court had ruled the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to authorize what it characterized as a representative action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal's order did not create a representative action but rather approved an expeditious procedural method for introducing oral evidence in a combined multi-party application, which was within its jurisdiction under the Tenant Protection Act, 1997 and the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The appellant father appealed an order dispensing with his consent to allow the respondent mother to travel to Israel with their two young children.

The mother had been diagnosed with a terminal illness and wished to visit her family.

The Court of Appeal found that the mother's terminal illness constituted a material change in circumstances under s. 17(5) of the Divorce Act.

The court upheld the decision that the trip was in the children's best interests but varied the order to include strict conditions regarding travel safety, medical insurance, and a 21-day limit due to the unstable situation in Israel.

The mother, who had primary residence of the children under a joint custody agreement, appealed a motions judge's order refusing to permit her to relocate with the children from Delhi to Tecumseh for new employment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motions judge erred in principle by failing to give sufficient consideration to the custodial parent's views, the children's wishes, and the enhancement of the mother's ability to care for the children, as required by Gordon v. Goertz.

The mother was permitted to move, with an order to share travel for the father's access.

The appellant was convicted of selling professional lacrosse tickets without a licence under s. 2(20) of By-Law 20-85.

On appeal, he argued that tickets are not 'goods' within the meaning of the by-law and that the municipality lacked the authority to enact the provision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that tickets fall within the ordinary meaning of 'goods' as movable personal property, and that the municipality had the necessary authority under the Municipal Act to enact the licensing by-law.

Following the release of reasons for judgment on May 17, 2002, the Court of Appeal received the respondents' Bill of Costs and written submissions from the parties.

Having regard to the success on appeal, the legal issues raised, and the submissions, the court awarded the respondents their costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $10,500 inclusive of Goods and Services Tax and disbursements.