Eleanore A. Cronk

The respondent purchased a vehicle from a client to settle a debt, without obtaining proper documentation or inquiring about the vehicle's history.

The vehicle was later stolen, and the police discovered it had been previously stolen before the respondent acquired it.

The respondent filed an insurance claim, which the insurer denied on the basis that he lacked an insurable interest.

The trial judge and Divisional Court applied the factual expectation test and ruled in favour of the respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the insurer's appeal, holding that the factual expectation test does not apply to stolen property and that the respondent's willful blindness regarding the vehicle's origins negated any claim of good faith, thereby depriving him of an insurable interest.

The appellant, a land surveyor, appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing his application for judicial review.

The issue was whether a member of the Discipline Committee whose term of office expired could continue to participate in a disciplinary hearing that had only heard preliminary motions.

The Court of Appeal held that the hearing had 'commenced' and evidence had been 'heard' through the filing of exhibits, satisfying section 26(11) of the Surveyors Act.

Furthermore, the member had 'participated in a hearing' under section 4.3 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The appeal was dismissed, allowing the member to continue on the panel.

The appellant, a Canadian citizen, appealed his committal for extradition to the United States on a charge of sexual battery involving his daughter, and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order.

He argued that he had already been punished in Ontario for the same conduct, and that extradition would violate his rights under sections 6 and 7 of the Charter given the mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment without parole for 25 years in Florida.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the application for judicial review, finding that the Ontario sentence did not punish him for the Florida conduct, the potential penalty did not shock the conscience of Canadians given the horrific nature of the offence, and prosecution in Canada was not a viable option.

The Minister of Health appealed a Divisional Court decision that allowed Apotex Inc.'s application for judicial review.

Apotex sought to increase the listed prices of three of its drug products in the Formulary after a generic competitor failed to bring its lower-priced products to market.

The Minister refused to recommend the price increase, citing a cost neutrality policy.

The Court of Appeal held that the appropriate standard of review for the Minister's highly discretionary decision was patent unreasonableness.

The Court found that the Minister's refusal was rational and not patently unreasonable, as the Formulary was already in effect and the cost neutrality policy was applicable.

The appeal was allowed and the application for judicial review was dismissed.

The patient, who was found incapable of making treatment decisions, had previously refused anti-psychotic medication while capable.

His mother, acting as his substitute decision-maker, refused consent to new anti-psychotic medication based on his prior wish.

The Consent and Capacity Board found the prior wish inapplicable due to the patient's deteriorated condition and the availability of new, more effective medication with fewer side effects, ordering the mother to consider his best interests.

The Superior Court overturned this decision as unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the psychiatrist's appeal, restoring the Board's decision, holding that it was reasonable for the Board to conclude the prior wish was not applicable to the changed circumstances and that the substitute decision-maker must act in the patient's best interests.

The appellant's former solicitor obtained a charging order under the Solicitors Act against all sums receivable by the appellant under a divorce judgment, including spousal support arrears, for unpaid legal fees.

The appellant appealed the order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that as a matter of law and public policy, charging orders should not be made against spousal support payments, as support is distinct from property and is intended to address demonstrable need.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual touching of his five-year-old stepdaughter.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately warn himself about the frailties of the child's evidence, erred in relying on confirmatory evidence, and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding an undisclosed interaction between the Crown and the complainant's mother outside the courtroom.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and credibility.

The application to admit fresh evidence was dismissed as it did not meet the Babinski test for admission based on non-disclosure.

The insured was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received Statutory Accident Benefits until a dispute arose.

After commencing litigation, the parties settled at a private mediation.

The insured later retained new counsel and successfully moved to rescind the settlement, arguing the insurer failed to comply with disclosure requirements under section 9.1 of the Automobile Insurance Regulation.

The insurer appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 9.1 does not apply to settlements reached after litigation has commenced.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault after the complainant was attacked by three men outside a karaoke restaurant and struck in the eye with a broken glass.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding eyewitness identification and party liability, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the jury charge and concluding there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the verdict.

The appellants, holders of debentures issued by BCED, appealed a trial judgment finding that a series of corporate reorganizations and asset transfers did not breach a successor obligor clause in the trust indenture.

The clause prohibited BCED from transferring 'all or substantially all' of its assets unless the transferee assumed the debenture debt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the asset transfers did not meet either the quantitative or qualitative threshold to constitute 'all or substantially all' of BCED's assets.

The Court also found that a subsequent guarantee and foreclosure did not constitute a prohibited 'transaction' under the trust indenture, as the indenture expressly permitted BCED to incur and secure senior indebtedness.

The minor respondent was injured in Florida when his tricycle collided with a school bus.

The respondents settled their Florida action for the maximum amount recoverable under Florida's sovereign immunity legislation.

They then sought indemnification from their Ontario insurer under the S.E.F. 44 Family Protection Endorsement for the shortfall.

The insurer appealed a motion judge's finding that the minor respondent had a cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the minor respondent was 'legally entitled to recover' damages despite the Florida statutory cap, and that the tortfeasors were 'inadequately insured' because their excess insurance was unavailable to the respondents.

The appellant brought an action for passing off against the respondent, alleging that the name and get-up of the respondent's beer product caused confusion with its own product.

The trial judge dismissed the action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal, holding that the respondent's registered trade-mark for the label was a complete defence to the passing off claim.

Under section 19 of the Trade-marks Act, the registration of a trade-mark gives the owner the exclusive right to use it throughout Canada unless the mark is shown to be invalid.

The appellant's previous counsel was removed from the record shortly before trial, and the appellant was warned the trial would proceed peremptorily.

On the trial date, the appellant sought an adjournment to obtain new counsel and review disclosure, which the trial judge refused.

During the trial, the appellant applied for prohibition and a stay of proceedings, arguing his right to a fair trial was infringed.

The applications judge denied the application, and the appellant appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that prerogative remedies should not be sought during a trial and the normal remedy is an appeal at the end of the trial.

The Court also denied the appellant's request to be represented by a non-lawyer agent.

The appellant appealed his conviction and six-month custodial sentence for an offence involving a young teenager.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly weighed the probative value against the unfair prejudice.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle given the breach of trust involved.

The appellants appealed their sentence for aggravated assault.

During pre-trial discussions, the trial judge indicated he would impose 12 to 15 months' imprisonment on a guilty plea if the pre-sentence report was positive.

The report was positive, and the appellants pleaded guilty.

However, the trial judge sentenced them to two years less a day, having forgotten his earlier position.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding an appearance of unfairness, and reduced the sentence to 15 months plus three years' probation.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its counterclaim and cross-claim in a patent dispute.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motions judge erred by assessing credibility, weighing evidence, and making findings of fact on disputed issues, which are functions reserved for the trier of fact.

The motions for summary judgment were dismissed and the matter was sent to trial.

The respondents, who operated a horse farm, were sued by a horse trainer who sustained injuries after falling from a horse.

The trainer initially pleaded she was an employee, but later amended her claim to remove references to employment, as the respondents' farm liability insurance policy excluded coverage for employees.

The insurer refused to defend the action, arguing the pleadings were manipulated and seeking to introduce extrinsic evidence to prove the trainer was an employee.

The applications judge declared the insurer had a duty to defend and declined to consider the extrinsic evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the insurer's appeal, holding that the duty to defend is determined by the pleadings and the policy, and that extrinsic evidence cannot be used to make premature findings of fact on matters at issue in the underlying tort litigation.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding liability and damages for a bridge collapse.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in findings of negligence under the Highway Traffic Act, failing to apportion negligence under the Negligence Act, misusing similar fact evidence, and improperly depreciating the cost of new materials used for repairs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings on negligence, noting contributory negligence was not pleaded or argued at trial, and upholding the depreciation figure as appropriate.

The appellant and a co-accused were jointly tried for trafficking crack cocaine.

Their defences were antagonistic.

At trial, the judge permitted the co-accused's counsel to cross-examine the appellant on the facts underlying past drug-related charges that had been withdrawn or resulted in acquittals, in order to show propensity and attack credibility.

The appellant was convicted and appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that an acquittal is a declaration of innocence for all purposes.

The highly prejudicial effect of cross-examining the appellant on the underlying facts of charges for which he was acquitted outweighed its probative value and compromised his right to a fair trial.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent $83,500 in damages for breach of contract and conversion, and $50,000 in punitive damages for breach of fiduciary duty arising from an agreement to promote and sell the respondent's paintings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding bias, commission credits, and the quantum of punitive damages, finding the trial judge's conclusions well-supported by the evidence.

The Court allowed the appeal only to set aside pre-judgment interest on the punitive damages and to clarify that the respondent's priority to fire insurance proceeds applied only to those directly related to the destroyed paintings.