Eleanore A. Cronk

The appellant school board appealed a decision refusing to stay the respondent's Small Claims Court action.

The appellant argued that the respondent was arguably a member of the union, and an arbitrator should determine if the collective agreement applied under s. 48(1) of the Labour Relations Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the lower courts' conclusion that the respondent was not a union member, as the appellant failed to meet its evidentiary onus.

The respondents sought full indemnity costs for the appeal and the appeal to the Superior Court of Justice, relying on a contract provision for full recovery by the 'prevailing party'.

The Court of Appeal found that the respondents were not the prevailing party on the central issue of damages for the restrictive covenant.

Furthermore, the costs claimed were excessive.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs fixed at $20,000 for the Superior Court appeal and $12,500 for the Court of Appeal.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of arson.

He was arrested and held in police custody for 16 hours before being interviewed and giving a statement.

The Crown failed to account for this 16-hour period or explain why the appellant was not brought before a justice of the peace.

The trial judge admitted the statement, finding that the appellant's consultation with counsel cured any concerns about the delay.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge misdirected himself on the burden of proof for voluntariness.

Proof of access to counsel is not a proxy for proof of voluntariness, and the Crown was required to account for the lengthy period of custody.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and uttering a threat to cause bodily harm, as well as his sentence of 11 years and 4 months.

The appellant had confined his former girlfriend in the trunk of her car, bound her, and placed a plastic bag and canvas bag over her head secured with duct tape.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the trial judge's factual conclusions regarding the use of the plastic bag and the appellant's subjective intent to kill were supported by the evidence.

The court also upheld the threat conviction, noting it did not require proof of a weapon.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as the trial judge properly considered the aggravating factors, including the domestic context and breach of bail.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of 32 months' imprisonment (after 40 months' credit for pre-trial custody) for sexual assault, unlawful confinement, and breach of recognizance.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately consider his rehabilitation prospects, imposed a sentence higher than the Crown's submission, failed to mitigate for time spent in segregation, and imposed an excessive sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding the sentence was proper given the violent nature of the offences and the appellant's lengthy prior record.

The appellant appealed his assault conviction, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and challenging the trial judge's assessment of his credibility, particularly regarding his head injury and alcohol consumption.

The Court of Appeal found that trial counsel was competent and that the trial judge properly applied the W. (D.) framework.

The court held that the Crown's cross-examination on the appellant's head injury and alcohol use was proper, and the trial judge did not misuse this evidence in rejecting the appellant's implausible version of events.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, who acted as the getaway driver in two robberies, appealed his sentence of 18 months' incarceration.

He argued for a conditional sentence or a shorter reformatory term, citing his youth, lack of criminal record, and the lesser sentences of his accomplices.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's refusal to impose a conditional sentence but found the 18-month term failed to adequately reflect the disparity between the appellant's role and that of his accomplices, as well as his mitigating factors.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the sentence was reduced to 12 months' incarceration.

The appellant was serving a conditional sentence for trafficking in a narcotic when he was arrested on numerous charges relating to stolen property and firearms.

The sentencing judge found on a balance of probabilities that the appellant breached the condition to keep the peace and be of good behaviour, and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in custody.

On appeal, the appellant argued the judge applied the wrong standard of proof, relied on insufficient evidence, and failed to consider alternatives to incarceration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that the standard of proof for a breach of a conditional sentence is the ordinary civil standard of a balance of probabilities, and that the presumption in favour of incarceration upon a breach was appropriately applied.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by not imposing a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge failed to consider the disparity between the appellant's sentence and his wife's conditional discharge for a related offence, and gave insufficient regard to the appellant's interests, including the loss of his livelihood as a chartered accountant due to travel restrictions.

The appeal was allowed, and given the passage of time, an absolute discharge was substituted.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of six drug-related offences, including conspiracy to traffic cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking, and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the jury instructions regarding reasonable doubt, the W.(D.) credibility framework, the separation of counts, and the definition of possession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals on the first three grounds, finding the charge as a whole was sufficient.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on the possession count, finding the trial judge erred by instructing the jury that responsibility for a bedroom was sufficient for possession of drugs found in an adjacent cupboard and ceiling.

A new trial was ordered for that count, and the global sentence was reduced from seven to six years.

The appellants, parents of a three-month-old child who died from severe injuries, appealed the dismissal of their application for certiorari to quash their committal for trial on charges of second degree murder.

They argued that the preliminary inquiry judge found no evidence indicating which parent caused the fatal injuries or that they acted in concert, and thus they should be discharged or committed only for manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the inquiry judge correctly concluded there was sufficient circumstantial evidence—including exclusive opportunity, motive, and awareness of the child's deteriorating health—upon which a properly instructed jury could find either or both appellants guilty of second degree murder as principals or parties.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud arising from the operation of a food bank.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended accomplice evidence, failed to apply a Vetrovec warning, and erred in drawing inferences from fraudulent non-profit receipts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence, sufficient caution applied to the accomplice's testimony, and that the trial judge's inferences regarding the receipts were reasonably supported by the record.

The Crown appealed an 18-month sentence, which the respondent conceded fell below the acceptable range.

Following the original sentencing, the respondent suffered a serious stroke, leaving him seriously disabled and in need of special care.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the Crown that the appropriate range was 3 to 5 years and varied the sentence to 4 years' imprisonment, noting the correctional authorities' obligation under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act to provide essential health care and rehabilitative treatment.

The client retained the solicitors on a contingency fee basis for a catastrophic personal injury action.

The action settled at mediation for $2.5 million in general damages plus costs and disbursements.

The client signed an agreement at mediation authorizing the solicitors to take their maximum contingency fee of $500,000 inclusive of GST.

The client later challenged the fees.

The assessment officer and motions judge both reduced the fees, finding the agreement unfair or unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the solicitors' appeal, holding that the fee agreement was fully understood by the client, freely entered into, and reasonable given the significant risks assumed by the solicitors and the excellent result achieved.

The appellant brought an action against the respondent, with whom she had a secret extra-marital affair for 14 years, claiming damages for failure to provide adequate child support.

The appellant had signed a release in 1974 for $27,500.

The motions judge struck out the appellant's claims under Rule 21.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the appellant's 26-year delay in seeking rescission of the release constituted acquiescence under the doctrine of laches, making her equitable claims certain to fail.

The appellant and respondent had an extramarital affair resulting in two children.

In 1974, the appellant executed a release discharging the respondent from all claims in exchange for a lump sum.

Twenty-six years later, the appellant brought an action seeking rescission of the release, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's decision to strike the claim under Rule 21, finding that the appellant's lengthy delay in bringing the equitable claims constituted acquiescence, making the action certain to fail.

The adult appellants brought an action against the respondent, their alleged biological father, claiming damages for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment for failing to provide adequate child support during their youth.

The motions judge struck the statement of claim under Rule 21.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the claim was essentially one for retroactive child support which circumvented the comprehensive statutory scheme.

The court also held that on the facts pleaded, the respondent owed no fiduciary obligations to the appellants as he never assumed a parental role or exercised control over their lives.

The appellant lent money to the respondents secured by a charge on their condominium.

The respondents defaulted on payments in 1990.

Over ten years later, the appellant commenced power of sale proceedings and an action for possession and payment.

The motions judge held that all claims were barred by the Limitations Act and ordered the charge discharged.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision, holding that a uniform ten-year limitation period applies to remedies under charges or mortgages, including actions for possession, actions on the covenant, and power of sale proceedings.

The appellant wife appealed a trial judgment dismissing her claim for spousal support and ordering her to repay child support.

The parties had a 20-year traditional marriage where the wife sacrificed her career to raise children and support the husband's career.

A separation agreement waived spousal support.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by not applying s. 33(4) of the Family Law Act.

The Court set aside the waiver, finding it resulted in unconscionable circumstances given the wife's poverty and the husband's high income.

Spousal support was awarded at $2,500 to $3,000 per month.

The appeal regarding child support repayment was dismissed.

The plaintiffs were injured in a motor vehicle accident in California and settled with the at-fault driver for the policy limits.

They then sued their own insurer in Ontario under the OPCF 44 Family Protection Coverage endorsement for their excess losses.

The insurer argued that Ontario's no-fault provisions (ss. 267.1 and 267.2 of the Insurance Act) applied to limit the claim, characterizing them as issues of 'quantum' under the policy.

The Court of Appeal held that the statutory provisions relate to 'liability', not 'quantum', and therefore the substantive law of California governed the liability issues.

The insurer's appeal was dismissed.