Eleanore A. Cronk

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, weapons dangerous, and common assault following a bar room brawl where a victim was stabbed.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge improperly shifted the burden of proof, the verdicts were unreasonable, and the rule against multiple convictions should apply.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the burden of proof and unreasonable verdict arguments but agreed that the Kienapple principle applied to the charges of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, as they arose from the same delict.

The conviction for assault with a weapon was stayed, but the sentence appeal was dismissed as the original sentence remained fit.

The appellants were injured when a youth, who had left a residential treatment home operated by the respondent without permission, crashed a stolen car into their house.

Over three years later, the appellants moved to add the respondent as a defendant, alleging negligent supervision.

The motions judge dismissed the motion, finding the respondent was protected by the six-month limitation period under the Public Authorities Protection Act and refusing to exercise discretion to add the party due to presumed prejudice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming the respondent was acting as a public authority fulfilling a public duty, and the appellants failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice caused by the delay.

The appellants were convicted of conspiracy related to the illegal entry of individuals into Canada.

They appealed their convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting intercepted communications obtained pursuant to Ontario wiretap authorizations that relied on evidence from a Quebec authorization.

The appellant Kullman also argued that the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay statements of his co-conspirator under the Carter approach, arguing it did not meet the necessity and reliability criteria established in Starr.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no jurisdictional defects in the wiretap authorizations and holding that the traditional co-conspirators' exception to the hearsay rule survives the principled approach established in Starr.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on two counts of dangerous driving causing death.

The respondent lost control of his vehicle, striking a concrete pillar and killing two passengers.

The trial judge found the only evidence was excessive speed and, relying on R. v. Pezzo, concluded speed alone could not ground a conviction.

The Court of Appeal held the trial judge erred in law, clarifying that excessive speed can constitute dangerous driving depending on the context.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed a decision regarding the interpretation of s. 16(1.02) of the Young Offenders Act.

The issue was whether an oral application for a transfer to youth court made before a justice of the peace constituted an application made in 'youth court'.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the Crown that a justice of the peace does not preside over a 'youth court' as defined in the Act.

The appeal was allowed, and the lower court's decision was set aside, without prejudice to a future defence application in the proper court.

The appellant appealed his conviction for extortion and his sentence of four years' imprisonment.

The sole ground of appeal argued was the trial judge's failure to give a limiting instruction to the jury regarding evidence of the appellant's association with the Hell's Angels motorcycle gang.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the instruction should have been given, its absence occasioned no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice given the strong Crown case and the lack of objection by trial counsel.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the four-year term was within the fit range.

The appellant appealed his conviction for arson.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the first two grounds of appeal, holding there was sufficient evidence that the fire threatened firefighters and was of incendiary origin caused by the appellant.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on the third ground, finding the trial judge improperly treated the case as a credibility contest and failed to apply the W.(D.) framework.

The trial judge erred by inferring guilt directly from his rejection of the appellant's evidence without analyzing the Crown's evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for wilfully attempting to obstruct justice and failing to comply with a recognizance, arising from conversations with a Crown witness while awaiting trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The trial judge erred by failing to assess the appellant's mens rea regarding his belief that, as a self-represented accused, he was permitted to speak to witnesses.

Furthermore, the trial judge misapprehended the evidence by finding the witness felt intimidated, which the Crown conceded was not supported by the record.

The applicants brought a motion for directions and requested an extension of time to deliver their factum on the cross-appeals.

Following the initial reasons, the parties reached an agreement.

On consent, the court ordered the cross-appeals to be scheduled for hearing on June 16, 2003, and extended the time for the applicants to deliver their factum.

The appellant moved for an adjournment of the hearing of the appeal after recently retaining new counsel.

The appeal was from an order refusing to set aside a previous order that struck out the appellants' statement of defence and counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal denied the adjournment and quashed the appeal, finding that the order appealed from was interlocutory, not final.

Therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction, as any appeal from the interlocutory order lies to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his conviction for sexual assault.

He argued that the summary conviction appeal court judge erred in law by finding that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence and that the verdict was reasonable.

The Court of Appeal found that although the trial judge misapprehended a portion of the evidence regarding the complainant's continuous observation of the appellant, the verdict was reasonable based on the complainant's identification of the appellant through a combination of factors.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a sentence imposed after guilty pleas to sexual assault and sexual exploitation involving prolonged sexual abuse of a child by a parent in the family home.

The Court of Appeal held that a conditional sentence was demonstrably unfit given the controlling principles of denunciation and specific and general deterrence, the vulnerability of the victim, the breach of trust, the repeated acts over an extended period, and the respondent's prior sexual assault record.

The court further found that the sentencing judge erred by failing to impose house arrest as a term of the conditional sentence.

Leave to appeal was granted and the sentence was increased to two years less a day imprisonment, with credit for the portion of the conditional sentence already served, while probation remained unchanged.

The appellant pleaded guilty to five counts of sexual assault with a weapon against his former spouse and was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment, consecutive to a sentence he was already serving for a separate sexual assault.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding he was a sexual sadist based on expert testimony and that the sentence violated the totality principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the 10-year sentence was fit and appropriate given the brutal, protracted, and horrendous nature of the offences, regardless of the sexual sadism finding.

The appellant was convicted of driving with excess alcohol.

At trial, the judge disbelieved the appellant's evidence, finding it could not provide a foundation for 'evidence to the contrary', and drew an adverse inference from his failure to call a confirmatory witness.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted leave but dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the trial judge's disbelief of the appellant's evidence was the primary basis for rejecting the defence, and the adverse inference was merely ancillary.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months' imprisonment for possession of child pornography and a concurrent 6-month sentence for breach of probation.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended a joint submission, improperly punished him for past lenient sentences, and sought to introduce a psychiatric report as fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no joint submission existed regarding the sentence range, the trial judge properly applied the jump principle for repeat offenders, and the proposed fresh evidence failed the Palmer test for admissibility.

The Court of Appeal issued an addendum to its judgment dated December 4, 2002, to correct erroneous references to section 125(1)(b) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.

All such references were deleted and replaced with references to section 125(1)(a)(ii) of the Act.

The judgment remained unchanged in all other respects.

The applicants brought a motion for directions concerning cross-appeals by the Township.

They sought a determination that the cross-appeals were moot due to a post-judgment land use agreement, and directions regarding the contents of the Township's appeal book.

The motion judge dismissed the request for a mootness determination, holding that under Rule 61.16(2.2), a motion that finally determines an appeal must be heard by a three-judge panel.

The motion judge granted directions requiring the Township to file a certificate respecting evidence and to include certain omitted materials in a supplementary appeal book.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of its application for a retroactive DNA data bank authorization under s. 487.055(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The application was dismissed because the respondent's sentence for his predicate sexual offences had expired, although he was still serving a consecutive sentence for breach of probation.

The Crown argued that s. 139(1) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act merged the sentences, making the application timely.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that sentence merger under the CCRA is for administrative purposes like parole eligibility and does not extend the duration of a sentence for a specific offence for the purpose of DNA authorizations.

The parties entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) to market CFC-free refrigerants.

The relationship deteriorated, leading to multiple lawsuits involving claims of breach of contract, misrepresentation, and conversion.

The trial judge found that the Lam Group breached the JVA but that the Gu Group had waived its right to damages by its subsequent conduct in negotiating a new agreement.

The trial judge also denied the Gu Group an inquiry into damages on the Lam Group's interlocutory injunction undertaking because the Gu Group had flagrantly violated the injunction.

The Lam Group's cross-appeal regarding pre-contractual misrepresentations and oppression was dismissed.

The trial judge's award of $50,000 in punitive damages against the Lam Group for the conversion of a laptop computer was upheld.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals and the cross-appeal.

The applicant sought leave to appeal her sentence of a $2,000 fine for three counts of owning and operating a body rub parlour without a license contrary to a City of Toronto by-law.

She argued she was forced to proceed to trial without counsel, could not afford the fine, was not given an opportunity to speak, and lost her business investment.

The Court of Appeal found that the record contradicted her claims regarding counsel and the opportunity to speak, and that the remaining grounds did not satisfy the statutory test for leave to appeal.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.