David Watt

The appellant appealed convictions relating to child pornography and voyeurism, arguing principally that the trial judge improperly admitted and relied on similar fact and disposition evidence without a voir dire.

The court held that the impugned extrinsic evidence concerning the hidden webcam, neighbourhood children, and other voyeuristic recordings was admissible because its probative value on identity and situation-specific propensity outweighed any prejudicial effect.

Count-to-count evidence was also properly used as circumstantial evidence of identity and context.

The court found no prejudice from the absence of a formal admissibility ruling and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

At the Board hearing, the appellant's counsel did not contest the issue of significant risk.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the Board erred by failing to discharge its inquisitorial function and make an independent determination that the significant threat threshold had been met.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board was entitled to rely on counsel's acknowledgment, which was supported by the appellant's history and psychological assessments indicating a significant prospect of recidivism.

The appellant appealed his convictions arising from an alleged domestic assault.

At trial, the judge sought corroboration for the complainant's testimony and relied on the opinion evidence of an investigating police officer regarding the complainant's demeanour and injuries, as well as the complainant's prior consistent statements to her daughter and police.

The Court of Appeal held that the officer's evidence improperly ventured into expert opinion and was used to shore up the complainant's credibility.

Furthermore, the prior consistent statements were improperly used for their truth.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and possession of child pornography relating to a young girl.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in restricting cross-examination under s. 276 of the Criminal Code, misapprehended evidence, and improperly used child pornography evidence.

He also sought to introduce fresh evidence and appealed his six-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or factual findings.

The fresh evidence application was dismissed as it lacked sufficient probative value.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the six-year global sentence was fit given the serious aggravating factors.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the appellant's appeal on the basis that the underlying decision—a refusal to remove opposing counsel and a related refusal to grant an adjournment—was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the refusal to grant an adjournment was intertwined with the interlocutory refusal to remove counsel.

The motion to quash was granted and the cross-motion was dismissed.

The appellant, a permanent resident, was convicted of aggravated assault after burning her ten-year-old child with a hot iron.

She appealed her 20-month sentence, seeking a reduction to five months to preserve her right to appeal a removal order under immigration law.

The Court of Appeal found that while the sentencing judge erred by failing to expressly consider the specific immigration consequences, the 20-month sentence remained fit and proportionate given the egregious breach of trust and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of assault with a weapon and possessing a dangerous weapon following a street fight.

His summary conviction appeal was dismissed.

He sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding that the proposed grounds of appeal either did not raise questions of law alone, lacked general significance to the administration of justice, or did not reflect a clear error amounting to a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his convictions and nine-year sentence for sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual exploitation involving two foster children.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact evidence, failing to caution the jury on potential tainting, and failing to enter Kienapple stays.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no error in the admission of similar fact evidence or the jury instructions, but granted Kienapple stays on the sexual assault counts.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the appellant's deteriorating health did not render the otherwise fit sentence unfit.

The Crown applied to revoke the respondent's release pending his conviction appeal for second-degree murder.

The respondent, while bound by a recognizance prohibiting communication with trial witnesses, approached the forensic pathologist who testified at his trial at a gas station and discussed the case.

The respondent was subsequently charged with breaching his recognizance.

The Court of Appeal found reasonable grounds to believe the respondent breached his release conditions and committed an indictable offence.

The respondent failed to show cause why his detention was not justified.

The release order was revoked and the recognizance cancelled.

The appellant appealed a net sentence of two years and seven months imposed following a guilty plea to possession of a prohibited firearm with ammunition.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in drawing unwarranted inferences, imposing an excessive sentence, and failing to give adequate credit for harsh bail conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fell within the appropriate range given the appellant's prior record, breach of a weapons prohibition, and the nature of the firearm (a sawed-off shotgun stored with ammunition).

The appellant was convicted of possession for the purpose of trafficking approximately 26 pounds of marijuana found in the trunk of a car he was driving.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in relying on his knowledge of a small amount of marijuana in the console and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the cumulative effect of the circumstantial evidence supported the inference that he knew about the marijuana in the trunk.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was fit given the amount of drugs seized.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in her treatment of bruising evidence and the mens rea of the offence.

The Crown appealed the 90-day intermittent sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's reliance on the physical injuries as consistent with the complainant's testimony.

The Court allowed the Crown's sentence appeal, finding the original sentence manifestly unfit for a date-rape scenario involving contemptuous disregard for the complainant's personal integrity, and substituted an 18-month term of imprisonment.

The appellant was convicted of firearm and drug offences arising from cross-border smuggling trips where she transported drugs to the U.S. and returned with guns.

She appealed her convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on wilful blindness and allowing cross-examination on her knowledge of gun crime in Toronto.

She also appealed her seven-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding sufficient evidence to support the wilful blindness instruction and no unfairness in the cross-examination.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was fit and within the appropriate range.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break and enter, dangerous driving, failing to stop for police, and mischief.

He argued the trial judge erred in relying on eyewitness identification, that he was not being 'pursued' by police when boxed in, and that there was no mens rea for mischief when he reversed into a police cruiser.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the reliability of the identification evidence, correctly interpreted 'pursuit' to include the police's actions to capture him, and reasonably inferred recklessness for the mischief charge.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual touching and sexual assault of a young child.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the first incident occurred in his truck and that this error tainted the credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that even if the trial judge erred regarding the location of the first incident, it did not play an essential part in the reasoning process or taint the overall credibility assessment.

The appellant appealed his sentence, seeking a reduction based on fresh evidence including his assertion of Métis status, rehabilitation efforts, and time spent on bail pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence did not warrant a reduction.

The court noted that Aboriginal Legal Services could not confirm his status, his troubled background was already considered, and the sentence imposed for violent and sexually exploitative crimes was already at the low end of the range.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge failed to sufficiently scrutinize a key witness's evidence for reliability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was aware of the weaknesses in the witness's evidence but explained why he accepted it.

The court held that the trial judge's credibility determination was entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual touching and invitation to sexual touching arising from allegations by a child complainant.

The appeal challenged the trial judge’s final instructions on the basis that no express W.D. instruction was given and that comments about the complainant’s testimonial accommodation under s. 486.2 improperly suggested enhanced credibility.

The Court of Appeal held that the jury charge, viewed as a whole and in the context of the trial and counsel’s addresses, adequately conveyed the burden and standard of proof.

It also held that the impugned accommodation instruction, while inartfully phrased, would not have led jurors to conclude that the complainant was more truthful.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a three-year penitentiary sentence imposed following convictions for multiple sexual offences against a young complainant.

The offences involved luring the complainant to a residence, exposing her to pornography, sexual touching, and intimidation with a knife while demanding sexually degrading conduct.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge failed to apply the totality principle and undervalued rehabilitation.

The Court of Appeal held that although the reasons did not explicitly reference totality, the sentencing judge was aware of the prior sentence and the effective concurrency of the new term.

The sentence was within the appropriate range and properly emphasized denunciation and deterrence for offences against children.

The appellant challenged convictions arising from conduct during a G20 street demonstration, arguing the trial judge failed to adequately address evidence bearing on his knowledge that a marked police cruiser was occupied by an officer.

The court held the reasons were sufficient, particularly in a credibility-driven case, and found the video evidence strongly supported the finding that the appellant knew the officer was inside the cruiser.

The court also upheld the conviction for intimidating a justice system participant under s. 423.1 of the Criminal Code, rejecting arguments based on legislative history and the alleged transitory nature of the officer's fear.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal in part because the sentence for assaulting a peace officer exceeded the lawful maximum for a summary conviction offence, and reduced that sentence to six months concurrent.