David Watt

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to eight years in custody.

He appealed the sentence, arguing he should have received enhanced pre-trial custody credit on a 1.5 to 1 basis and that the sentence was unfit because he did not bring the gun to the scene.

The Crown conceded the pre-trial custody issue, and the Court of Appeal applied the Summers framework to increase the credit to 39 months.

However, the court dismissed the fitness of sentence appeal, finding the sentencing judge had already accounted for the fact that the appellant did not bring the gun and that the sentence was fit given the aggravating factors.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted aggravated sexual assault arising from unprotected sexual intercourse after an HIV positive diagnosis.

He argued the trial judge erred by making an unassisted handwriting comparison of a motel registration card and by failing to properly apply the W.(D.) analysis to assess credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's handwriting conclusion was reasonable and that he had properly instructed himself on the burden of proof and credibility assessment.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding a s. 8 breach regarding the search warrant, and that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove constructive possession.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis and held that the circumstantial evidence, including the appellant being the only man living in the apartment where the drugs were found in men's pants, was sufficient to support the conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought to add the respondents as defendants to an action arising from a 2009 oil spill.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding it was statute-barred.

On appeal, the appellant argued she only discovered the specific conduct giving rise to the claim during a 2013 examination for discovery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the appellant's insurer had put the respondents on notice of a potential claim related to renovations as early as July 2010.

Therefore, the limitation period began to run no later than July 2010, and the 2014 motion to add them as defendants was statute-barred.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded prohibited weapon, possession of a firearm knowing its possession was unauthorized, and breach of a weapons prohibition.

He was sentenced to six years' imprisonment, less pre-sentence custody.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentencing judge failed to properly apply the 'jump principle' given his prior global sentence of six and one-half months.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge explicitly considered the jump principle and the sentence was within the appropriate range.

The appellant brought a private prosecution against Hydro One regarding a dispute over the delivery of utility bills.

A Justice of the Peace dismissed the prosecution, finding the facts did not disclose a criminal offence.

The appellant appealed to the Superior Court of Justice, where the judge converted the appeal to an application for mandamus.

The judge found the Justice of the Peace committed a jurisdictional error by conflating the procedures under sections 504 and 507.1 of the Criminal Code, but declined to grant mandamus because the materials did not establish a prima facie case.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal and his motion for a de novo mandamus order, finding no error in the lower court's decision and noting that Hydro One had fulfilled its statutory duties.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a young child, arguing that the trial judge gave inadequate reasons, reached an unreasonable verdict, misapprehended evidence concerning opportunity and post-incident circumstances, and misapplied the W.(D.) framework.

The court held that, although brief, the reasons were sufficient when read in the context of the evidence and submissions, and adequately disclosed why the trial judge accepted the complainant's evidence and rejected the denial evidence.

The court further held that the verdict was supported by the record, no material misapprehension of evidence was shown, and the trial judge properly applied the criminal burden of proof and the W.(D.) principles.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit robbery and robbery arising out of a home invasion and was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred by failing to apply the principle of parity, ignoring mitigating factors, overemphasizing denunciation and deterrence, and placing too much weight on his youth record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and holding that the sentence was fit given the serious aggravating factors, including the appellant's use of a shotgun, his extensive record, and his lack of remorse.

The appellant appealed his convictions for using an imitation firearm in the commission of an indictable offence and breach of a recognizance.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of the principal Crown witness and that the imitation firearm conviction was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the credibility assessment and concluding there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that the object used was an imitation firearm.

The appellant, an inmate, appealed from an order refusing to quash his committal to stand trial for second degree murder.

The Crown alleged that after the appellant and others assaulted the deceased, the appellant provided a rope which the deceased used to hang himself.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge properly engaged in a limited weighing of the circumstantial evidence and that there was a sufficient evidentiary foundation upon which a reasonable jury could infer guilt.

The appellant pleaded guilty to production of marijuana and received an absolute discharge.

No mandatory firearms prohibition order was made, but police refused to return his firearms.

The appellant appealed to set aside his guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown erroneously elected to proceed summarily on an exclusively indictable offence, and the trial judge failed to put the appellant to his election for mode of trial.

This failure deprived the trial court of jurisdiction, which could not be cured on appeal.

The Court also clarified that a mandatory firearms prohibition does not take effect without a judicial order.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm and drug offences, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding inconsistencies in police evidence and by refusing to allow cross-examination of a police officer about an unrelated SIU investigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury charge on credibility was adequate and the proposed cross-examination was not relevant to the issues at trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of child pornography, arguing the trial judge erred in finding he had knowledge of the nature of the images in a deleted folder on his computer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding it was a logical inference that the appellant knew the criminal nature of the files since he specifically sought them out to delete them before a police visit.

The court also rejected the argument that the conviction for possession was inconsistent with his acquittal for accessing child pornography, as the two verdicts were based on different evidence.

The appellant, previously found not criminally responsible for threatening death and assault, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention at CAMH with a condition allowing him to live in approved community accommodation.

The appellant argued the Board erred by not ordering a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board properly considered the relevant criteria, including the appellant's liberty interest, and reasonably concluded that a detention order was necessary to ensure CAMH could approve his housing as the safest first step for reintegration.

The appellant commenced an action in 1989 alleging the respondents dumped coal tar that migrated onto its property between 1924 and 1958.

In 2014, the motion judge dismissed the 25-year-old action for delay under Rule 24.01, finding the delay after 2003 was inordinate and inexcusable, and that the appellant failed to rebut the strong presumption of prejudice given the unavailability of key witnesses and documents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's application of the test for dismissal for delay or his costs awards.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault involving two complainants.

He argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the use of similar fact evidence across counts, the assessment of similarities and differences in the evidence, the possibility of collusion, and the assessment of the complainants' credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice in the omission of an express 'bad personhood' instruction and concluding the trial judge's instructions adequately equipped the jury to perform their adjudicative function.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault following an altercation between boaters that resulted in the complainant losing sight in his left eye.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended material evidence regarding the intentional application of force and consent, and failed to consider the defence of accident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence and concluding that the trial judge's findings on intentional force and consent foreclosed the defence of accident.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching, arguing the trial judge's reasons were insufficient, misapprehended the evidence, and applied an uneven standard of scrutiny.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons permitted meaningful appellate review and properly assessed the credibility of the complainant and the appellant's police statement.

The appellant appealed a sentence of indeterminate detention following a dangerous offender designation.

He argued the trial judge erred in concluding there was no reasonable possibility of eventually controlling his risk in the community.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion was firmly grounded in the evidence, noting the appellant committed the predicate offence while on conditional release.

The appellant pleaded guilty to defrauding his employer of over $2.3 million and was sentenced to two years' imprisonment and ordered to pay $1.3 million in restitution.

After serving his sentence, he appealed the restitution orders, arguing inability to pay and that the orders hindered his ability to obtain a record suspension.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the appellant's failure to explain where the stolen funds went, his breach of trust, and his choice to prioritize significant discretionary spending over making restitution payments.