David Watt

The appellant, a Canadian citizen convicted of drug smuggling in Japan, was transferred to Canada to serve the remainder of his sentence under the International Transfer of Offenders Act.

His 13-year Japanese sentence was adapted to the Canadian maximum of 10 years.

The appellant brought a habeas corpus application, arguing that 400 days spent in a Japanese workhouse in lieu of paying a fine should be credited toward his Canadian custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the fine and imprisonment were separate elements of the Japanese sentence, and the workhouse days were served solely to purge the fine, not on account of the penal sentence.

The appellant was convicted of assault and assault with a weapon against his aunt and daughter, and sentenced to nine months' incarceration.

He appealed both conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias by relying on cultural stereotypes, misapprehended evidence, and erred in relying on his daughter's KGB statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no apprehension of bias and no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary findings.

While the trial judge erred in treating the appellant's lack of remorse as an aggravating factor, the Court upheld the nine-month sentence as fit.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 4 years and 3 months for armed robbery, unlawful confinement, and related offences.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's determination that a 5-year global sentence was appropriate given the significant planning and aggravating factors.

However, the Court found errors in the calculation of pre-disposition custody credit, specifically regarding a 3-week period prior to release and a 13-month period spent in custody on unrelated charges that were ultimately stayed.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced by 7 months to 3 years and 8 months.

The appellant appealed his conviction for mischief and his 17-month sentence for mischief and sexual exploitation.

The mischief occurred when the appellant pulled the parking brake of a moving vehicle driven by his stepdaughter, who had refused to let him out.

The appellant argued the driver was unlawfully confining him, meaning she was not in lawful use of the vehicle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the Crown negated unlawful confinement as it requires a significant period of time.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the cumulative sentence reflected no error in principle given the breach of trust and vulnerability of the sexual exploitation complainant.

The appellant appealed his convictions arising from a traffic stop, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing his credibility during a blended voir dire and trial.

The trial judge had rejected the appellant's testimony, citing his presence during the officers' testimony as an opportunity to fabricate his story, and relying on his counsel's perceived reactions to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal found this to be a legal error, holding that the appellant was entitled to have his credibility assessed without paying an evidentiary price for exercising his right to be present at trial.

The Court also found the trial judge's s. 24(2) Charter analysis was tainted by this flawed credibility assessment.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder following a stabbing at a party.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on opportunity, motive, and prior inconsistent statements of two witnesses who recanted at trial.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in allowing the Crown to cross-examine its own witnesses under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act, admitting their out-of-court statements as substantive evidence, and in his jury instructions regarding hearsay, post-offence conduct, and circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant was convicted of possession of stolen property and driving offences after a stolen car crashed into a parked truck.

At trial, the appellant claimed a man named 'Steve' was driving.

The trial judge rejected this evidence but made three errors of law: mischaracterizing the defence as an alibi, improperly applying the adverse inference under s. 258(3) of the Criminal Code to the issue of identity, and misusing the appellant's criminal record.

The Court of Appeal found that despite these errors, the evidence against the appellant was so overwhelming that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred.

The appeal was dismissed using the curative proviso.

The appellant was convicted of knowingly violating a condition of his Long Term Supervision Order prohibiting him from viewing pornography, after being caught watching a pornographic program at his half-way house.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by fast-forwarding through parts of the DVD and by applying an objective standard of mens rea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the context of the program and correctly found the appellant had subjective knowledge that he was watching pornography.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol level.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding the roadside breath demand was made 'forthwith' under s. 254(2)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, holding that the proposed ground of appeal involved well-established legal principles and a fact-specific inquiry that did not raise a question of law alone of general importance.

The appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault following his participation in a prison riot where he severely injured an unconscious inmate.

He was sentenced to seven and one-half years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge failed to properly apply the principle of parity, given the lighter sentences imposed on co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the disparity was justified because the appellant's participation was of significantly greater gravity and moral blameworthiness than that of the other participants.

The appellant, an octogenarian with medical issues, appealed his concurrent 12-month custodial sentences for historical sexual assault, interference, and exploitation of a child.

He argued the sentence should be served conditionally.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was below the usual range for prolonged sexual abuse by a person in a position of trust, and that denunciation and deterrence required a custodial sentence despite the appellant's medical difficulties.

The appellant was convicted of several counts related to a home invasion and sentenced to 10 years in custody.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his alibi and in accepting the evidence of an unsavoury witness to establish identity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's factual findings or consideration of confirmatory evidence, including fingerprints and the timing of the arrest.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 10-year sentence reflected the seriousness of the offence and the appellant's criminal record.

The appellant pleaded guilty to defrauding her employer of over $300,000 over 14 months.

She appealed her 10-month carceral sentence, seeking a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle.

The court noted the breach of trust, the duration of the scheme, and concluded the sentence was already very lenient despite mitigating factors such as self-reporting and a guilty plea.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment finding it had constructively dismissed the respondent employee and awarding him $80,911.88 in damages.

The employee, a dock supervisor for 25 years, was reassigned to a newly created 'freight analyst' position with significantly reduced supervisory functions and prestige.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that this unilateral change constituted a substantial alteration of essential employment terms.

The Court also affirmed that the employee was not required to accept the new position to mitigate his damages, given the unfriendly work environment, acrimonious relationships with supervisors, and the loss of dignity associated with the demotion.

The appellant appealed his convictions for multiple offences relating to an armed home invasion robbery.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding sufficient evidence of identity, misapprehended evidence, and erred in law by reversing the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge reasonably inferred identity from circumstantial evidence, including the doctrine of recent possession, and did not misapprehend material evidence or misapply the W.(D.) framework.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Ministry of Transportation (MTO) appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for the failure of a road surface treatment applied by the respondent contractors.

The trial judge concluded the contract was a method specification contract, placing the risk of failure on the MTO, and heavily criticized MTO's counsel for allegedly improperly influencing its expert witness, awarding full indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's interpretation of the contract but found he erred in his severe criticism of MTO's trial counsel, noting that counsel's interactions with the expert were appropriate under the principles in Moore v. Getahun.

Consequently, the Court reduced the trial costs award from full to substantial indemnity.

The appellant law firm performed collection work for the respondent bank under a written agreement.

Following the termination of the agreement, the parties disputed the interpretation of a provision regarding invoicing for services performed up to the termination date.

The motion judge agreed with the respondent's interpretation and granted summary judgment dismissing the action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error or extricable question of law in the motion judge's interpretation of the contract.

The court also held that the general duty of honesty in contractual performance recognized in Bhasin v. Hrynew did not affect the interpretation.

The appellant was convicted of impaired operation of a motor vehicle after causing a four-vehicle accident.

He testified that he was not impaired while driving but consumed a large amount of alcohol immediately after the accident (bolus drinking).

The trial judge disbelieved the appellant, relying on toxicological evidence based on a seven-ounce consumption scenario, but ignored evidence based on a ten-ounce scenario that could have supported the appellant's claim.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the appeal, finding the error immaterial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial, holding that the failure to consider the ten-ounce toxicology evidence was a material misapprehension of evidence relevant to the appellant's credibility.

The Crown appealed the sentence of three years less a day imposed on the respondent for 36 offences, including assault, assault with a weapon, and criminal harassment, committed against two domestic partners.

The trial judge had improperly credited the respondent with one year for 133 days of pre-sentence custody based on an unsupported Charter breach.

The Court of Appeal found the original sentence manifestly unfit given the serious aggravating factors, including assaults on pregnant victims and blatant disregard for probation orders.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was increased to 4.5 years' imprisonment.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his convictions for criminal harassment and breach of trust.

He had used police resources to obtain information about the complainant and her boyfriend to facilitate his harassment of her.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdicts were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The court also rejected the argument that the trial judge failed to properly apply the W.(D.) framework to the appellant's inculpatory statement to the police.