David Watt

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual and related offences arising from allegations by a child complainant.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in treating the complainant's utterances during a later seizure-like episode as independent corroboration, because they were not admissible for the truth of their contents under the hearsay and prior consistent statement rules.

The court further held that the Crown expert's opinion linking the episode to the alleged assault was inadmissible because it exceeded the expert's qualifications and depended on unproven foundational facts.

As the impugned evidence was central to the credibility assessment, the convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant challenged orders dismissing his civil action arising from alleged new home construction defects and declaring him a vexatious litigant.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge misconstrued both the pleading and the statutory scheme under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act by treating the action as a prohibited relitigation of matters already determined by the Tribunal.

Relying on the distinction between Tarion decisions, Tribunal determinations, and surviving civil warranty claims, the court concluded that the pleaded claims related to defects found warranted and were not fully barred by issue estoppel, res judicata, or abuse of process.

The vexatious litigant order was also set aside because it was premised on the erroneous view that the Superior Court action itself was vexatious.

Leave to amend was granted only to the extent previously contemplated for the appellant's own claims, and no costs of the appeal were ordered.

In a pending conviction appeal involving child pornography offences, the Crown sought directions limiting full compliance with the Court of Appeal’s ineffective assistance protocol, and the self-represented appellant sought an order under s. 683(3) to examine or cross-examine former trial counsel.

The court held that the protocol is flexible and may be varied on a case-by-case basis, and it was unnecessary and inappropriate to make a preliminary merits determination of the ineffective assistance ground.

Given the existing record, the court permitted the Crown to decline the full fresh evidence process contemplated by the protocol, subject to any further order of the panel hearing the appeal.

The appellant’s request to examine or cross-examine former trial counsel was dismissed because the proposed questioning would not materially advance the claim.

The appellant appealed her convictions for assault with a weapon and assault causing bodily harm against her ten-year-old son, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence in making credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that any alleged errors did not meet the test for material misapprehension of evidence under Lohrer, and noting the complainant's evidence was corroborated by physical scarring.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the trial judge erred in finding reasonable and probable grounds for his arrest and failing to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant contended the trial judge misapprehended evidence by reconciling the arresting officer's identification with defence witnesses who testified that a re-enactment showed it was impossible to identify the driver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the totality of the circumstances, including informant information and the officer's recognition of the appellant's distinctive hairstyle, which had been altered before the defence simulations.

The appellant appealed his convictions for invitation to sexual touching and sexual assault.

The trial judge had relied on what he characterized as admissions by the appellant to reinforce the complainant's credibility.

The Crown conceded on appeal that the trial judge misapprehended the appellant's evidence, as the appellant had not made those admissions.

The Court of Appeal held that this error vitiated the findings of guilt, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The moving parties (plaintiffs in a proposed class proceeding for privacy breach) brought a motion to quash the defendant hospital's appeal to the Court of Appeal.

They argued the motion judge's order refusing to strike their claim for lack of jurisdiction under the Personal Health Information Protection Act was interlocutory, meaning the appeal should go to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, holding that an order refusing to dismiss or stay an action based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is a final order, as it precludes the defendant from continuing to dispute jurisdiction.

Therefore, the appeal was properly before the Court of Appeal.

The appellant was originally charged with indictable offences and elected trial by judge and jury in the Superior Court of Justice.

On the trial date, the Crown re-elected to proceed by summary conviction, and the appellant pleaded guilty before the Superior Court judge.

The appellant appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge lacked jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal held that while the Crown had the authority to re-elect the mode of proceeding, the Superior Court of Justice is not a summary conviction court and lacked jurisdiction to take the guilty pleas and impose sentence.

The appeal was allowed, the sentence and pleas were quashed, and the matter was remitted to the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellants were substantially successful on their appeal, which resulted in a new trial on certain issues.

They sought costs of $52,994.52 on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondent argued for a reduced amount of $25,000 due to divided success.

The Court of Appeal agreed the appellants were substantially successful but applied a minor reduction for divided success, fixing costs at $45,000 all-inclusive.

The costs of the first trial were remitted to the judge hearing the new trial.

The appellant mother appealed a Superior Court decision that upheld a trial judge's order making her two children Crown wards without access.

The children had been in care since 2010.

The trial judge found the children would be at risk if returned to the mother due to her mental health, inability to care for them, and a toxic relationship.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle by the Superior Court judge and upheld the decision, noting the statutory timelines had passed and the children must be placed for adoption.

The appellants sold their business to the respondent under a Share Purchase Agreement that included an initial payment and potential Earn-Out Payments based on future earnings (EBIAT).

The trial judge found that revenues from a specific project were excluded from the EBIAT calculation and that the earnings threshold was not met.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by interpreting the contract's calculation provision in isolation rather than reading the agreement as a whole.

The Court also found the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors in assessing the expert financial evidence regarding revenue deferral, and ordered a new trial solely on whether the earnings threshold was met.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for aggravated assault, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention on a secure forensic unit.

He argued the Board erred by rejecting a hybrid disposition that would have allowed discretion to transfer him to a general forensic unit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion that a hybrid disposition was premature to be reasonable given the early stages of the appellant's treatment.

Although the Board improperly relied on the appellant's request for an absolute discharge to buttress its findings, the error was of no consequence.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to set aside a default judgment for unpaid credit card debt.

He argued the motion judge erred in refusing his request for an adjournment, which he sought via an agent due to a family emergency.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge properly exercised his discretion in refusing the adjournment, noting that the motion judge had considered the merits of the appellant's claim and found no basis to set aside the default judgment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her motion to extend the time to appeal a Crown wardship order regarding her 14-year-old daughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no explanation for the lengthy delay, no merit to the appeal, and that it was not in the best interests of the child, who had been placed for adoption, to upset her current arrangements.

The appellant appealed his sentence for fraud, arguing the trial judge erred by not permitting him to address the court before sentencing and by finding a conditional sentence inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the failure to allow the appellant to speak was an inadvertent procedural error that would not have changed the outcome, as the judge was already aware of his remorse.

The court further found the sentence was fit given the monetary amount, breach of trust, and lengthy duration of the fraud.

The appellants, adult independent children of the deceased, appealed a trial decision dismissing their application to set aside their father's will.

The deceased left his entire estate to his daughter-in-law.

The appellants argued the deceased had a moral obligation to provide for them.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that Ontario law does not recognize a moral obligation to provide for independent adult children that can displace a competent testator's autonomous distribution of property.

The appellant was convicted of defrauding a bank of $375,000 and sentenced to four years' imprisonment, along with a restitution order and a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the custodial sentence and the terms of the fine.

The Court of Appeal upheld the four-year sentence as fit and within the appropriate range.

The court also upheld the imposition of the fine in lieu of forfeiture but varied the order to allow the appellant two years from his release to pay the fine and reduced the default term of imprisonment from four years to three years.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and related offences, arguing the trial judge failed to scrutinize the complainant's evidence with the same rigour as his own.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not unfairly reject the appellant's evidence and was entitled to accept the complainant's explanation for her incremental disclosure.

The court concluded the trial judge's reasons were adequate to permit meaningful appellate review.

The appellants obtained ex parte Anton Piller and Mareva injunctions against the respondents based on misleading evidence.

The injunctions were later set aside, and a damages inquiry was held pursuant to the appellants' undertaking as to damages.

The inquiry judge awarded the respondents $954,576 in damages, including compensation for a seized cellphone, loss of transition time, and legal fees, as well as a charging order for respondents' counsel.

The appellants appealed the damages award and the charging order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the inquiry judge made no errors in assessing damages or granting the charging order.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their application to assess the legal accounts rendered by the respondent law firm.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred in concluding there were no special circumstances to permit the assessment.

The court noted the application judge failed to account for an admitted 15% discount that may not have been honoured and the existence of an escrow agreement securing the disputed amount.

Leave was granted to assess all accounts rendered by the respondent.