David M. Paciocco

The appellant father appealed an enforcement order and a restraining order made in a family law matter concerning parental alienation.

The enforcement order granted the respondent mother temporary parenting rights to facilitate the children's enrollment in an intensive therapeutic program ("Family Bridges") to address parental alienation.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the enforcement order, affirming the motion judge's jurisdiction under Family Law Rules r. 1(8) to make such orders as necessary for compliance, and finding that the orders were in the children's best interests and supported by evidence of the father's alienating conduct.

The restraining order was varied on consent to mitigate its impact on the father's livelihood.

The dissenting judge argued that the motion judge lacked jurisdiction to vary a final order under r. 1(8) without following the specific procedural requirements for changing parenting orders under the Family Law Rules, Children's Law Reform Act, or Divorce Act, and that there was insufficient evidence to support such a drastic therapeutic intervention.

The appellants, April Vuong and Hao Quach, appealed their convictions for large-scale fraud and their 6-year sentences.

They argued that their s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time was infringed, that the trial judge erred in permitting a forensic accountant to testify as a non-expert witness, and that their sentences were unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding that the delay was justified under the Jordan transitional exceptional circumstance, that any error regarding the witness testimony was cured by the Criminal Code's proviso, and that the sentences were fit and within the appropriate range for a sophisticated Ponzi scheme.

The Crown appealed a 12-month sentence imposed on a young Black first-time offender for possession of a loaded handgun.

The trial judge had significantly reduced the sentence based on social context evidence of systemic anti-Black racism.

The Court of Appeal held that while social context evidence of anti-Black racism is highly relevant to assessing an offender's moral blameworthiness and rehabilitative prospects, it does not reduce the objective gravity or seriousness of the offence.

The Court also held that the Gladue framework for Indigenous offenders does not apply directly to Black offenders, though it can inform the approach.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence varied to two years less a day, but permanently stayed due to the passage of time.

An appeal concerning the equalization of net family property following a marriage breakdown, specifically the interpretation and application of a domestic contract regarding a $45,000 deposit on a matrimonial home.

The appellant argued the trial judge double-counted this amount, giving the respondent an unfair advantage.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by allowing the $45,000 to be both an exclusion under the domestic contract and a marriage-date deduction under the Family Law Act.

The appeal was allowed in part, correcting the arithmetic error and reducing the equalization payment owed by the appellant.

The appellant mother brought a motion for a stay of proceedings related to the Court of Appeal's decision, pending her leave to appeal application to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The motion judge granted the stay, finding serious issues of public importance arising from the dissenting opinion, a risk of irreparable harm to the children if the stay was denied (potential separation from the primary caregiver and determination of parenting rights based on gender-based principles in a non-Hague Convention country), and that the balance of convenience favored granting the stay.

The stay was conditional on the mother filing her leave to appeal application within 45 days.

The moving parties, who had cared for an Indigenous child since shortly after birth, sought a stay of a Superior Court decision that struck their custody application and permitted the children's aid society to relocate the child to a different province.

The Court of Appeal granted the stay pending the final determination of the appeal, finding that there was a serious issue to be tried regarding the validity of out-of-court customary care agreements and the best interests of the child.

The court concluded that the child would suffer irreparable harm if removed from her long-term caregivers before the appeal was resolved, and that the balance of convenience favoured maintaining the current placement with conditions to ensure ongoing connection to the child's Indigenous culture and family.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her motion to dismiss the respondent's application for matrimonial relief on jurisdictional grounds, arguing Ontario lacked jurisdiction or China was the more appropriate forum.

The motion judge found Ontario had jurisdiction but that China was not the clearly more appropriate forum.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of jurisdiction but found the motion judge erred in the forum non conveniens analysis by failing to adequately consider pre-existing marital agreements executed in China and overemphasizing the Ontario property.

The appeal was allowed, and the respondent's application was stayed, directing the matter to China.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order dismissing their action against TD Bank and Primmum Insurance, which alleged breach of fiduciary duty related to property insurance and mortgage renewal.

They also sought leave to appeal substantial indemnity costs orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the summary judgment appeal, finding no fiduciary duties were owed, the action was res judicata, and statute-barred.

The costs appeal was also dismissed, as the fresh evidence of a settlement offer was inadmissible and had no bearing on the correctness of the costs award.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal granted leave and allowed the appeal, determining that a conditional sentence was a fit sentence, aligning with what the trial judge would have imposed had it been available.

The terms of the conditional sentence were to be prepared and released subsequently.

The applicant, Jamal Daye, sought re-release pending appeal after his initial bail was revoked due to new firearms and breach charges.

He had previously been convicted of narcotics trafficking and sentenced to 5.5 years.

The Crown opposed his re-release on tertiary grounds, arguing that his detention was necessary to preserve public safety and confidence in the administration of justice.

The court found that while the appeal was not frivolous, its strength did not outweigh the public interest concerns, particularly given the seriousness of the new alleged offences and the breach of bail conditions.

The application for re-release was denied.

The Crown appealed a lower court's decision to set aside a conviction against Becker Bros.

Trucking Inc. for operating a commercial motor vehicle in an unsafe condition, contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

The appeal judge had ruled that certified Ministry records and copies of documents produced by the driver were inadmissible.

The Court of Appeal found that the appeal judge erred in both conclusions, holding that the Ministry's certified documents were admissible as "statements" under s. 210(7) of the HTA, and that the documents produced by the driver were admissible under s. 216.1(5) of the HTA or as an exception to the hearsay rule (admissions by documents in possession).

The Court allowed the Crown's appeal, reinstating the conviction and sentence.

The appellant appealed convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon stemming from two separate incidents.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of unsavoury witnesses under Vetrovec principles and the use of "prefer" language in evaluating witness credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied Vetrovec by seeking corroboration and that the use of "prefer" was a linguistic slip, not a misapprehension of the burden of proof, given the overall context of the reasons and the trial judge's self-direction on the standard of proof.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a 6-year sentence for aggravated assault, which included credit for pre-sentence custody and harsh conditions of confinement.

The conviction stemmed from a violent knife attack on his former partner's husband.

The sentencing judge emphasized general deterrence and denunciation, noting the victim's severe injuries, the appellant's use of two knives, his related criminal record, and the attack occurring partly in front of his daughter.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's assessment of the appellant's limited insight into the gravity of the offence, which restricted the weight given to his rehabilitative potential.

The application for leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal itself was dismissed, upholding the original sentence.

The appellant, a youthful first offender, appealed sentences imposed for four home invasion robberies, which resulted in a total term of nine years imprisonment (adult and youth sentences).

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to differentiate youth sentencing principles from adult ones, misapplying the paramountcy of individual deterrence and rehabilitation for youthful first offenders, and improperly using the appellant's youth as an aggravating factor.

The court reduced the global adult sentence from nine years to seven years, while affirming the one-year concurrent youth sentence as it was already spent.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible, appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to continue his detention order.

The Court of Appeal found the Board erred in its application of the "significant risk" test, concluding there was insufficient evidence to establish that the appellant posed a significant threat to public safety.

The appeal was allowed, and an absolute discharge was granted.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that ordered his continued detention at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.

The appellant argued that a conditional discharge allowing him to return to his independent apartment was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's decision was entitled to deference and reasonably concluded that the appellant required close 24-hour supervision due to his history of decompensation, violent behaviour, and substance abuse.

The appellant, an Indigenous man, sought leave to appeal a 30-month sentence for aggravated assault and breach of probation, arguing the trial judge failed to properly apply Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal granted leave but dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge adequately considered Gladue principles, even without a formal Gladue report, by relying on a s. 21 Mental Health Act report.

The court concluded the sentence was fit given the gravity and escalating nature of the offences and the appellant's history of failed rehabilitation and terrorizing the complainant.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, his designation as a dangerous offender, and the imposition of an indeterminate sentence.

The trial judge's finding that the complainant's passivity was due to fear and not consent was upheld, with the Court of Appeal affirming that silence or passivity does not constitute communicated consent.

The court also upheld the dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, citing the appellant's history of sexual assaults and the intractability of his behavioural challenges, supported by expert psychiatric evidence.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

This appeal concerned an insurer's duty to defend its insured, Panasonic Eco Solutions Canada Inc., against two breach of contract claims in an arbitration.

The professional errors and omissions policy excluded contractual liability unless the liability would exist in the absence of the contract.

The application judge found a duty to defend one claim (Engineering Agreement) but not the other (Proceeds Agreement).

The Court of Appeal allowed the insurer's appeal and dismissed the insured's cross-appeal, finding no duty to defend either claim.

The court held that the liquidated damages claim under the Engineering Agreement was purely contractual and the sole remedy, thus falling within the exclusion.

The claim under the Proceeds Agreement was for a contractual debt, and related negligent misrepresentation and unjust enrichment claims were also not covered by the policy.

The appellant, Roger Guppy, brought an appeal from convictions.

Despite being offered assistance by duty counsel, the appellant declined and remained silent when asked for submissions.

The Crown requested the appeal be dismissed as abandoned.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal as abandoned due to the appellant's continued silence and failure to make submissions.