David M. Paciocco

The appellant was convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after nearly 2.5 kilograms of cocaine were found in a hidden compartment in his vehicle.

He appealed, arguing the verdict was unreasonable because there was little evidence he knew about the drugs and his brother had access to the vehicle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that despite the trial judge's expressed sympathy and disagreement with the verdict, a properly instructed jury could reasonably conclude guilt based on the appellant's ownership and exclusive use of the vehicle, the visibility of the compartment, and the high value of the drugs.

The appellant, Kevin Janeiro, appealed his convictions for robbery and having his face masked, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable and the trial judge materially misapprehended evidence, particularly regarding identity and lost security video.

The Court of Appeal found the convictions unreasonable due to material misapprehensions of evidence concerning fingerprint and DNA evidence, and the importance of the lost security video.

The court also found a Charter breach due to the negligent loss of the security video.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and verdicts of acquittal substituted.

The Crown appealed the four-year sentence imposed on the respondent for various drug offences, including trafficking in cocaine and fentanyl.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, finding that the trial judge made fundamental errors in sentencing.

These errors included misidentifying the sentencing range for mid-level cocaine traffickers, erroneously comparing it to fentanyl, misapprehending the gravity of the offence, and overemphasizing the mitigating effect of the guilty plea.

The appellate court emphasized that fentanyl is a more dangerous drug requiring higher penalties and that the weight of a guilty plea varies by case circumstances.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was increased to six years.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and possession for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the trial judge gave deficient jury instructions regarding eyewitness identification, voice identification, and circumstantial evidence (Villaroman caution).

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did err in failing to provide these cautions.

However, the court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, finding that the evidence against the appellant was overwhelming, making a conviction inevitable despite the errors.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, R.H., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The complainant testified that she consented to the sexual touching, which occurred due to the appellant's drug-induced paranoid hallucinations about her infidelity.

The trial judge, despite the complainant's testimony of consent and the Crown's argument focusing on the complainant's inconsistent police statement, convicted the appellant on the basis that her consent was vitiated by the history of violence in their relationship.

This theory of vitiated consent was not advanced by either counsel during the trial, nor was it raised by the judge with the parties before the decision.

The Court of Appeal found that convicting the appellant on an unargued and uncanvassed theory constituted a fundamental unfairness and denied the appellant his constitutional right to make full answer and defence.

The appeal was allowed, the sexual assault conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered on that count.

The appellant (father) appealed a trial judge's order that reversed the primary residence of his son, J.K., from him to the respondent (mother), and granted the mother sole decision-making responsibility.

The trial judge had found the father to be abusive and not credible, and the mother credible and a victim of parental alienation created by the father.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in applying the best interests test and in failing to meaningfully consider the recommendations of a court-appointed assessor, Dr. Goldstein, whose reports were largely disregarded due to findings by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on best interests and credibility.

While disagreeing with the trial judge's interpretation that family law proceedings are not "civil proceedings" under s. 36(3) of the RHPA (which prohibits admissibility of certain regulatory records), the Court found that the admissible facts (complaint, investigation, public undertakings) were sufficient to justify giving no weight to Dr. Goldstein's opinions.

The appellant, M.M., appealed his conviction for sexual interference and sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing his application for a mistrial based on a reasonable apprehension of bias.

This apprehension arose from an ex parte communication between the trial judge and a justice of the peace who was related to the appellant's ex-spouse and children.

The Court of Appeal found that while the justice of the peace's conduct was a lapse of judgment, the trial judge took appropriate remedial steps by immediately putting the encounter on record, hearing submissions, and explaining his impartiality.

The Court concluded that a reasonable observer would not find the trial judge biased, and therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCR) for assault with a weapon and possession of a dangerous weapon, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition that continued her detention order.

She sought an absolute or conditional discharge, or a new hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion reasonable.

The court noted the appellant's schizophrenic illness requiring medication, her lack of insight into her condition, and the risk of decompensation and danger to the public without supervision, especially given her history of substance abuse contributing to the index offences.

The court emphasized that her progress occurred under direct hospital supervision and that there was no record of success in a controlled community setting.

The appellant, V.N., appealed his conviction for possessing and accessing child pornography, arguing his guilty plea was uninformed due to unawareness of collateral consequences: a lifetime SOIRA order and ineligibility for a criminal record suspension.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that V.N. failed to present credible evidence establishing a reasonable possibility that he would not have pleaded guilty had he been aware of these consequences, as his primary concerns at the time of the plea were addressed.

P.C. appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference and sought leave to appeal his four-year sentence.

The appeal raised grounds concerning the trial judge's jury charge, specifically the language used to refer to the unrepresented accused's evidence versus his submissions, and the sufficiency of assistance provided to the unrepresented appellant.

Additionally, the appellant challenged the trial judge's factual findings at sentencing, particularly regarding penetration, and the weight given to mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reversible error in the jury charge, that sufficient assistance was provided to the appellant, and that the sentencing judge was entitled to make factual findings not explicitly determined by the jury's verdict.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Matthew Shedden, appealed his convictions for various drug offences, arguing that the search warrant used to obtain evidence was invalid.

The challenge at trial, which contended there were no reasonable and probable grounds to believe drugs would be found at the residence (his mother's home), was unsuccessful.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the trial judge applied an incorrect legal standard or provided insufficient reasons, the record amply supported the valid issuance of the search warrant.

The court concluded that reasonable inferences could be drawn from the appellant's observed conduct, including frequent visits to the residence between suspected drug transactions, to establish the necessary reasonable grounds.

This is a Crown appeal concerning jury instructions on the mens rea for sexual assault, specifically when the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent is unavailable.

The trial judge instructed the jury that the Crown must prove the knowledge element (accused knew of, was wilfully blind or reckless as to, absence of consent) and allowed them to consider evidence of the respondent's mistaken belief.

The Court of Appeal held that while the knowledge element is always part of the Crown's burden, the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury to disregard evidence of legally ineffective mistaken beliefs, effectively allowing an unavailable defence through the "back door." The court allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellants, committed to trial for second-degree murder, successfully appealed a judicial review order that had quashed their preliminary inquiry judge's decision and directed committal for first-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal found the reviewing judge erred by substituting his view of the evidence for that of the preliminary inquiry judge, incorrectly identifying jurisdictional errors.

The preliminary inquiry judge had correctly applied the law and did not commit jurisdictional error by finding insufficient evidence for first-degree murder.

The appeal was allowed, the judicial review decision quashed, and the original committal for second-degree murder reinstated.

The appellants sought to set aside an order dismissing their motion to stay the enforcement of certain costs orders from lower court proceedings.

However, the Supreme Court of Canada subsequently dismissed their application for leave to appeal with costs, rendering the appeal before the Court of Appeal moot.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as moot, and costs were fixed in favour of the respondents.

This appeal concerned the conviction of Elaine Biddersingh for second-degree murder.

The appellant raised three grounds: the trial judge erred in dismissing her application for a judge-alone trial due to negative pretrial publicity, erred in ruling certain statements admissible, and erred in refusing to instruct the jury on an intervening act of drowning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the conviction.

The Crown's cross-appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant, G.M.C., appealed his convictions for assault and compliance charges, following a 12-day trial.

The appeal was based on three grounds: the trial judge's alleged improper judicial notice of "memory science" uneven scrutiny of evidence (including credibility assessment, demeanour, and use of bad character evidence), and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding that the trial judge's observations on memory were common sense, that there was no reversible error in the credibility assessments or application of different standards, and that the isolated incidents did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court affirmed the convictions.

The appellants appealed a compliance order requiring them to remove faulty Kitec plumbing from their condominium unit and allow inspection, along with an order for costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the lower court's finding that Kitec plumbing constituted a dangerous condition under s. 117 of the Condominium Act, justifying the remedial order.

The court also upheld the full indemnity costs award against the appellants due to their recalcitrance, fixing appeal costs at $4,500.

J.T. appealed convictions for possessing and making child pornography available, arguing two errors by the trial judge: admitting expert evidence without qualification regarding file downloading, and committing a Sekhon error by relying on anecdotal evidence that child pornography does not automatically appear on computers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the first point did not require expertise as it was mundane factual evidence, and the second was not a Sekhon error as the testimony explained technical operation, not guilt, and did not reverse the burden of proof.

The appellant, Boris Panovski, appealed his convictions for first-degree murder and aggravated assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in the jury charge, specifically regarding the application of the W.(D.) rule to exculpatory eyewitness testimony, the overall inadequacy and imbalance of the charge, and the admission of certain non-recognition evidence.

The court determined that these errors were not curable by the proviso.

The appeal was allowed, convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The moving parties sought to set aside an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal that denied them an extension of time to appeal.

The underlying appeal concerned a motion to remove opposing counsel from the record, which had been dismissed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to set aside, confirming that the underlying order was interlocutory and therefore the Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal.