Clément Gascon

The appellant franchisor operated a network of cleaning franchises in the Quebec region through a tripartite business model: the franchisor negotiated master cleaning contracts with clients, assigned those contracts (imperfectly) to franchisees who performed the actual cleaning, while remaining directly liable to clients for non-performance.

A parity committee claimed unpaid wages on behalf of a franchisee under the Act respecting collective agreement decrees.

The majority held that the trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error by failing to consider the tripartite nature of the business model, and that the franchisee was an "employee" and the franchisor a "professional employer" within the meaning of the Act.

The dissent would have restored the trial judge's decision, finding no reviewable error and that the imperfect assignment did not materially affect the franchisee's assumption of business risk, and that the franchisor did not exercise sufficient control to qualify as a professional employer.

The appellant was charged with child luring after sending sexually explicit online communications to an undercover police officer posing as a 14-year-old girl.

The police used screen capture software to record the communications without prior judicial authorization.

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal, though for different reasons: the majority (Brown J., Abella and Gascon JJ. concurring) held that the appellant had no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because he communicated with someone he believed to be a child who was a stranger; Karakatsanis J. (Wagner C.J. concurring) held there was no search or seizure because the police simply received messages directed to them; Moldaver J. concurred in the result; and Martin J. dissented in part, finding a s. 8 breach but agreeing that exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2) was not warranted.

The accused was charged with second degree murder in the death of his wife.

The trial judge granted a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay.

The Crown appealed but the Court of Appeal declined to adjudicate on the merits, dismissing the appeal as moot on the basis that the accused had been deported to a country with which Canada has no extradition treaty.

The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeal erred at the first stage of the mootness test: deportation of an accused, even to a non-extradition treaty country, does not render criminal proceedings moot where the underlying basis for those proceedings has not disappeared and a live controversy remains.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Court of Appeal for decision on the merits.

The Crown brought a motion to quash the respondent's notice of appeal as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court of Appeal had been unanimous in dismissing the accused's appeal from his convictions, and the accused had filed a notice of appeal as of right based on an alleged disagreement between appellate judges on a point of law.

The Court held that a dissent giving rise to an appeal as of right under s. 691(1)(a) of the Criminal Code must be a disagreement that affects the result.

Because the disagreement expressed by one judge went only to reasoning and did not affect the result, it was properly characterized as a concurring opinion rather than a dissent.

Motion to quash granted.

A class action was brought against a telecommunications provider on behalf of approximately two million Ontario residents who alleged they were overcharged through an undisclosed call-rounding practice.

The class consisted of both consumers (protected from arbitration by the Consumer Protection Act, 2002) and non-consumer business customers bound by a mandatory arbitration clause in standard form contracts.

The majority held that s. 7(5) of the Arbitration Act, 1991 does not grant the court discretion to refuse to stay claims that are dealt with in an arbitration agreement, and that the first precondition under s. 7(5)(a) was not met because the sole matter in dispute — alleged overbilling — was dealt with in the arbitration agreements.

The business customer claims were therefore stayed, as only the consumers benefited from the Consumer Protection Act's override of the arbitration clause.

Four judges dissented, holding that s. 7(5) confers a discretion to allow the entire proceeding including arbitrable claims to continue in court where it would be unreasonable to separate them.

The appellant was detained in pre-trial custody on firearm offences and sought a review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.

The reviewing judge applied a two-step test requiring the accused to first establish either unreasonable prosecutorial delay or a material impact of time on the initial basis for detention before the court could assess whether continued detention was justified under s. 515(10).

The Supreme Court allowed the moot appeal to resolve a systemic national divergence, holding that unreasonable delay is not a threshold condition for a s. 525 detention review — the sole overarching question is whether continued detention is justified under s. 515(10).

The Court also clarified the procedural obligations of the jailer to apply forthwith, the judge to schedule the hearing at the earliest opportunity, and the discretion under ss. 525(9) and 526 to give directions expediting the trial.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of three subsections of the child luring provision in a police sting operation context: the age presumption under s. 172.1(3), the reasonable steps requirement under s. 172.1(4), and the one-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 172.1(2)(a).

The majority held that s. 172.1(3) infringes s. 11(d) of the Charter and cannot be saved under s. 1, but that s. 172.1(4) does not infringe s. 7 because it only limits a defence rather than providing an independent pathway to conviction.

Because the trial judge convicted on a legally unsound basis — failure to take reasonable steps — without finding proof beyond a reasonable doubt of actual belief, the conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The constitutionality of the mandatory minimum was left to the new trial judge.

Karakatsanis J. concurred but would have also declared the mandatory minimum unconstitutional.

Abella J. dissented in part, finding s. 172.1(4) also unconstitutional and that an acquittal should be entered.

A lawyer referred his clients to a financial advisor who was his personal friend, and over a period of four years repeatedly endorsed and encouraged the clients to invest with the advisor's firm.

The investments turned out to be part of a Ponzi scheme and the clients lost over $5 million.

The trial judge dismissed the professional liability claim, finding no causal link between the lawyer's faults and the clients' losses.

The Quebec Court of Appeal reversed, finding the trial judge had assessed the evidence through a distorting lens leading to palpable and overriding errors.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Court of Appeal correctly identified palpable and overriding errors and that the lawyer's breaches of his duty to advise and duty of loyalty were a true cause of the clients' losses; the intervening fraud did not break the chain of causation.

The appellant, a Quebec resident sued personally in Utah alongside two companies he allegedly controlled, brought a motion to dismiss challenging jurisdiction, alter ego liability, and the economic loss rule.

A default judgment was ultimately entered against all defendants.

The respondent sought recognition and enforcement of that judgment in Quebec.

The majority held that the appellant submitted to the Utah court's jurisdiction under art. 3168(6) of the Civil Code of Québec by presenting substantive arguments that, if accepted, would have resolved part of the dispute on its merits, thereby establishing sufficient substantial connection under art. 3164 C.C.Q. The appeal was dismissed, with Côté J. dissenting on the grounds that submission to jurisdiction was not established and no substantial connection existed between the dispute and Utah.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault with a weapon and unlawful confinement, arguing the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal for Alberta had dismissed the appeal, deferring to the trial judge's credibility assessment.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal, finding the verdict was not unreasonable and the convictions were properly upheld.

The appellant Crown appealed the acquittal of a high school teacher charged with voyeurism under s. 162(1)(c) of the Criminal Code after he used a concealed pen-camera to surreptitiously record female students engaged in ordinary school activities in common areas of the school.

The majority of the Court of Appeal had upheld the acquittal on the basis that the students were not in circumstances giving rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the appeal and entered a conviction, holding that circumstances giving rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy under s. 162(1) are circumstances in which a person would reasonably expect not to be the subject of the type of observation or recording that in fact occurred, taking into account the entire context.

The majority (Wagner C.J.) adopted a multi-factor contextual test informed by s. 8 Charter jurisprudence, while a concurring minority (Rowe J.) proposed a conjunctive test requiring both loss of control over one's image and infringement of sexual integrity.

The appellant was charged with refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample.

At trial, the Crown conceded the availability of the defence of extreme intoxication akin to automatism, and the accused was acquitted.

The Court of Appeal for Quebec set aside the acquittal and entered a conviction, doing so by raising and deciding the availability of the defence despite the Crown's concession.

The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeal erred in raising and deciding the availability of the defence in view of the Crown's concession.

Given the unusual circumstances, it was not in the interests of justice to overturn the acquittal, and the Court expressly refrained from deciding the availability of the defence on the merits in the absence of an adequate record on the constitutional issues.

A long-term offender was charged with breaching the residency condition of his long-term supervision order, which required him to reside at a community correctional centre.

The appellant sought to collaterally attack the validity of that residency condition at trial, arguing it exceeded the Parole Board's statutory authority under s. 134.1(2) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act and violated his s. 7 Charter rights.

The majority held, applying the Maybrun framework, that Parliament did not intend to permit such a collateral attack because effective review mechanisms — including writing to the Parole Board and applying for habeas corpus — were available to the appellant.

The concurring minority would have permitted the collateral attack given the constitutional dimensions and severity of the potential penalty, but agreed the s. 7 claim failed on its merits because the residency condition was not arbitrary.

The appeal was dismissed and the conviction upheld.

The Crown appealed the Court of Appeal's decision setting aside the accused's second degree murder conviction and ordering a new trial on manslaughter only.

The accused had been convicted of second degree murder by a jury after evidence of his after-the-fact conduct — including moving, burning, and disposing of his domestic partner's body — was admitted on the issues of causation and intent.

The majority of the Supreme Court held that the after-the-fact conduct was properly admissible to prove intent for second degree murder, and that the jury charge, assessed as a whole, adequately equipped the jury to decide the case without a limiting instruction on propensity reasoning; the conviction for second degree murder was restored.

Martin J., dissenting in part, agreed on admissibility but found the omission of a propensity limiting instruction was a reversible error of law requiring a new trial on second degree murder.

Karakatsanis J. dissented entirely, holding the after-the-fact conduct was inadmissible on intent and a directed verdict should have been granted.

The appellants, a provincial energy regulator and an orphan well association, appealed from a decision holding that provincial oil and gas licensing obligations could not be enforced against a trustee in bankruptcy because they conflicted with the federal Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The majority of the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the regulator's use of its statutory powers to enforce end-of-life abandonment and reclamation obligations did not create an operational conflict or frustration of purpose with the BIA.

The majority found that s. 14.06(4) of the BIA shields trustees only from personal liability, not the liability of the bankrupt estate, and that a bona fide public regulator enforcing public duties is not a creditor asserting a claim provable in bankruptcy.

Moldaver and Côté JJ. dissented, finding a genuine operational conflict and frustration of purpose under both branches of the paramountcy test, and that the Abitibi three-part test for provable claims was satisfied.

A person with disabilities and long-term tenant of a non-profit housing corporation refused to disclose the value of a Henson trust established for her care and maintenance when applying for annual rent subsidy assistance.

The housing corporation denied the application on the ground that the trust constituted an 'asset' under its Asset Ceiling Policy, making the application incomplete.

The majority of the Court held that a Henson trust — where the beneficiary cannot compel distributions and cannot unilaterally collapse the trust — does not constitute an 'asset' within the ordinary meaning of that term in the rental assistance application, as it is not property the beneficiary can use to discharge debts or liabilities.

The Court further held that the tenancy agreement imposed a contractual obligation on the housing corporation to consider a complete assistance application, which obligation was breached.

The appeal was allowed, declaratory relief was granted, and the issue of monetary remedy was remitted to the court of original jurisdiction.

The appellant was convicted of theft on the basis of circumstantial evidence and appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada following the Manitoba Court of Appeal's dismissal of his appeal.

The Court of Appeal had found no error in the trial judge's admission of opinion evidence given by witnesses, and concluded it was reasonable for the trial judge to find that the evidence as a whole excluded all reasonable alternatives to guilt.

The Supreme Court agreed with the majority's reasons in the Court of Appeal and dismissed the appeal.

The Crown brought a motion to stay a declaration of invalidity issued by the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada, which had declared s. 130(1)(a) of the National Defence Act of no force or effect in its application to any civil offence carrying a maximum sentence of five years or more imprisonment, pending the Crown's appeal of that decision.

The Court applied the well-established test from Manitoba (Attorney General) v. Metropolitan Stores Ltd. and RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) and found that the balance of convenience did not favour granting the stay.

The motion was dismissed.

Two Canadian citizens residing abroad for more than five years challenged the constitutionality of provisions of the Canada Elections Act that denied the right to vote in federal elections to non-resident citizens absent from Canada for five consecutive years or more.

The Attorney General conceded a breach of s. 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The majority held that the five-year limit could not be justified under s. 1, finding that the restriction was not minimally impairing and that the vague electoral fairness objective was outweighed by the deleterious effects of disenfranchising well over one million non-resident Canadians.

The relevant impugned provisions were declared of no force or effect and the Act was modified to extend the vote to all non-resident citizens.

The Court allowed the appeals and held that the mandatory victim surcharge in section 737 of the Criminal Code violates section 12 of the Charter for impecunious offenders.

The provision was declared of no force and effect immediately.